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Abstract
This thesis examines the determinants inequality and its effects on macroeconomic outcomes,
and in particular the economic effects of bankruptcy law.
The first two chapters are joint work with Jochen Mankart. In the first chapter, we examine
the effects of Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy law on entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are
subject to production risk. They can borrow and if they fail they can default on their debt.
We examine the optimal wealth exemption level and the optimal credit market exclusion
duration in this environment.
In the second chapter, we introduce secured credit, in addition to unsecured credit in a
model that is similar to the one in the first chapter. Secured credit lowers the cost of a
generous bankruptcy regime because agents who are rationed out of the unsecured credit
market can still obtain secured credit. Therefore, the optimal exemption level is very high.
In the third chapter, I estimate stochastic process for earnings of Italian individuals. I find
that individual’s earnings present statistically significant heterogeneity both in levels and in
growth rates that is determined before the beginning of economic activity.
In the fourth chapter, I analyze the quantitative effects of introducing immediate debt
discharge (fresh start) in the procedures of personal bankruptcy law on the saving and default
decisions of Italian household. I find that introducing fresh start in the Italian bankruptcy
law would worsen credit conditions, without almost any benefit in terms of better insurance.
The fifth chapter is joint work with Emanuele Tarantino and Nicolas Serrano-Velarde. In
this chapter we exploit the recent reform of bankruptcy law in Italy to analyze the effects
of bankruptcy regulation on the cost of credit. We find that strengthening firms’ rights to
renegotiate outstanding deals with creditors increased the costs of funding, while simplifying
the procedure of liquidation decreased the costs of funding.
In the sixth chapter, I show that credit market imperfections are not necessary to generate
an individual poverty trap.
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Preface
This thesis examines the determinants inequality and its effects on macroeconomic outcomes.
In particular in the first two chapters and in the fourth chapter, I analyze, with quantitative
general equilibrium models with endogenously heterogeneous agents, how bankruptcy law
affects inequality and how inequality shapes the effects of bankruptcy law on the economic
outcomes. In the third and in the last chapter I analyze the determinants of inequality: in
the third chapter I estimate the stochastic process governing individual earnings while in
the last chapter I analyze the conditions for a poverty trap to emerge even in a world with
perfect credit markets. In the fifth chapter I look at the effects of bankruptcy law on the cost
of finance.
The first two chapters are joint work with Jochen Mankart. In the first chapter, we
examine the effects of Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy law on entrepreneurs. We develop
a quantitative general equilibrium model of occupational choice that examines the effects
of the US personal bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship. The model explicitly incorporates
US personal bankruptcy law and matches empirical features of the US economy regarding
entrepreneurship, wealth distribution, and bankruptcy filings by entrepreneurs. The option
to declare bankruptcy encourages entrepreneurship through insurance since entrepreneurs
may default in bad times. However, perfectly competitive financial intermediaries take the
possibility of default into account. They charge higher interest rates which reflect these
default probabilities. Thus, personal bankruptcy provides insurance at the cost of worsening
credit conditions. Our quantitative evaluation shows that in the current US bankruptcy
law the latter effect dominates. Halving the wealth exemption level from the current level
would increase entrepreneurship, the median firm size, welfare, and social mobility, without
increasing inequality. On the other hand, eliminating completely the possibility of bankruptcy
would reduce welfare and entrepreneurship.
In the second chapter, we introduce secured credit, in addition to unsecured credit in a
model that is similar to the one in the first chapter. We show that secured credit alters the
results dramatically. The reason is that if secured credit is not available, a high exemption
level leads to tight endogenous borrowing limits. This implies that some, in particular poor,
6
7agents will be excluded from borrowing because their ex post incentive to default is too high.
However, if they can waive their right to default by using secured credit, i.e. by providing
collateral, the negative effect of a generous bankruptcy law is lessened and so the optimal
exemption level is a lot higher.
In the third chapter, I estimate the stochastic process for earnings of Italian individuals. My
estimates show that Italian individual’s earnings present statistically significant heterogeneity
both in levels and in growth rates that is determined before the beginning of economic activity.
At the same time I find that shocks affecting earnings during the life-cycle exhibit a very
persistent component. However if we control for observables (in particular sex and education)
the variance of the growth rate is much smaller. Our estimates suggest that the contribution
to the variance of permanent income of factors that are already determined at the moment of
entering the labour market is in the order of 80
In the fourth chapter, I focus on consumer bankruptcy. In particular I examine the
effects of introducing immediate debt discharge (fresh start) in the procedures of personal
bankruptcy law on the saving and default decisions of Italian households. The option to
declare bankruptcy provides insurance against the downside of uninsurable earnings risk by
discharging some or all the debt since consumers may default on their liabilities in bad times.
However, financial intermediaries will consider the availability of debt discharge into account
and they will charge higher interest rates on their loans. Thus immediate debt discharge
provides better insurance at the cost of worse credit conditions. To quantify this trade-off we
develop an overlapping generations, heterogeneous agents quantitative model of consumption,
saving and bankruptcy decisions of Italian households. The model explicitly includes default
consequences on the Italian legislative framework and replicates empirical features of the
Italian economy regarding savings, debt, credit conditions and wealth distribution. Our
quantitative evaluations show that the main effect of introducing fresh start in the Italian
bankruptcy law would be that of worsening credit conditions. This would more that outweigh
the benefits, if any, that fresh start provides in terms of better insurance. The overall effect
would be a reduction in welfare of all the agents in the model. The magnitudes of the average
welfare losses are in the order of a reduction of 0.1
The fifth chapter is joint work with with Emanuele Tarantino and Nicolas Serrano-Velarde.
We study the effects of the 2005/06 reforms of Italian bankruptcy law on the costs of finance
for small and medium sized firms. We exploit the quasi-experimental features of the policy
change in combination with a unique loan-level dataset covering the universe of funding
contracts. Our results indicate that the reforms significantly reduced the interest rates charged
by banks on loans and overdrafts. The fact that the reforms were introduced in a piecemeal
fashion allows us to separately identify the impacts of the two major bills composing the
policy change. We find that the bill strengthening firms’ rights to renegotiate outstanding
deals with creditors increased the costs of funding, while the law simplifying the procedure of
liquidation decreased the costs of funding.
8In the sixth chapter I show that, contrary to what it is usually assumed in the development
literature, credit market imperfections are not necessary to generate an individual poverty
trap. If productivity is increasing in consumption a poverty trap can emerge from income
effects even under perfect credit markets.
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Chapter 1
Personal Bankruptcy Law and
Entrepreneurship: A Quantitative
Assessment
1.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs employ half of all workers in the US and they create three quarters of all new
jobs.1 Over time, successful small entrepreneurial firms grow into big firms and drive the
technological progress. For example, four of the 20 largest companies in 2007, Microsoft,
Cisco Systems, Google and Dell, were born in the last generation. Personal bankruptcy
law is important for entrepreneurs because if an entrepreneur’s firm is not incorporated he
is personally liable for all the debts of his firm. And even if the firm is incorporated, the
entrepreneur very often has to provide personal guarantees to secure a loan [Berkowitz /
White 2004]. Ten percent of entrepreneurs go out of business each year, and out of these
around twenty percent through bankruptcy.
This paper investigates quantitatively the effects of personal bankruptcy law on entrepren-
eurship. We focus on two key features of the personal bankruptcy procedures: the wealth
exemption level and the duration of the credit market exclusion period. The wealth exemption
level determines how much wealth a person can keep in case of a default. The length of
the credit market exclusion period determines when someone who has defaulted in the past
regains access to credit.
Bankruptcy introduces some contingency in a world of incomplete credit markets in which
1 We thank Alex Michaelides for his continuous support and valuable comments, and Francesco Caselli and
Maitreesh Ghatak for helpful comments at various stages of this research. We are also grateful to Daniel
Becker, Wouter Den Haan, Emmanuel Frot, Alberto Galasso, Bernardo Guimaraes, Christian Julliard, Rachel
Ngai, and participants at the LSE macro and development seminars, the 2008 EEA meeting and the 2008
SCE meeting.
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only simple debt contracts are available. However, it provides only partial contingency
and does not complete the markets fully. This contingency provides insurance against
entrepreneurial failure at the cost of worsening credit conditions. If the bankruptcy law does
not allow default under any circumstances, i.e. if there is full commitment, credit will be
available at low interest rates because borrowers can not default. This comes at the expense
of borrowers having no insurance against business failure. If, however, the bankruptcy law
makes default very easy, borrowers might be insured against bad outcomes. But in order to
compensate for the default risk banks have to charge higher interest rates or ration credit
altogether. In both extreme cases the equilibrium outcome can be one of almost no credit.
In the former case there is no demand for credit whereas in the latter there is no supply of
credit. In this world many firms are inefficiently small, especially those owned by poorer
entrepreneurs. This trade-off is at the center of recent public discussions and policy changes
in Europe and the US. In Europe the bankruptcy law is much harsher than in the US. Many
countries like for example Germany, Netherlands and the UK, made it more lenient with
the explicit aim of fostering entrepreneurship.2 The policy changes in the US went into the
opposite direction. Following the huge increase in personal bankruptcy filings, US Congress
in 2005 passed a law making personal bankruptcy less beneficial for filers. Even though the
focus of the discussion has been on consumer bankruptcy, the effects on entrepreneurship
are important because around 80,000 failed entrepreneurs file for bankruptcy each year. Our
paper quantitatively assesses the relative strength of these two opposing forces, insurance
versus credit conditions, on the number of entrepreneurs, on the access of poor agents to
entrepreneurship, on firm size, and on welfare, inequality and social mobility.
We build an infinite horizon heterogeneous agent model which has an occupational choice
problem at its core. Agents differ with respect to their entrepreneurial productivity and
their working productivity. Each period they decide whether to become an entrepreneur
or a worker, based on a noisy signal of their productivities. Cagetti / De Nardi [2006] also
have this occupational choice at the center of their model. Their model is able to explain
the US wealth distribution, in particular the extreme skewness at the top. However, in their
model entrepreneurship is a risk-free activity because there is no uncertainty about current
productivities. Thus there is no default in equilibrium and there is no insurance role for
bankruptcy. In our model default exists because a significant fraction of entrepreneurs files
for bankruptcy.
Starting with Athreya [2002], there is a growing literature on consumer bankruptcy. For
example, Livshits et al. [2007] compare the US system under which future earnings are exempt
after consumers have declared bankruptcy with a European type of system under which future
earnings are garnished to repay creditors. They find that the welfare differences between the
systems depend on the persistence and variance of the shocks. Chatterjee et al. [2007] show
that a recent tightening of the law in the US implies large welfare gains.3 We differ from all
2 In a companion paper, we are currently investigating the effects of introducing a US type of law in Europe.
3 Other papers in this growing literature are Athreya [2006], Athreya / Simpson [2006], Li / Sarte [2006],
Mateos-Planas / Seccia [2006].
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these papers by focusing on entrepreneurs.4 Moreover, as Chatterjee et al. [2007], we focuses
on the wealth distribution because the benefits of bankruptcy depend crucially on the wealth
of an agent.
There are two closely related papers that analyze the effects of bankruptcy on entrepreneur-
ship in a quantitative setting similar to our paper.5 Akyol / Athreya [2007] use an overlapping
generations, partial equilibrium framework. They have heterogeneity in human capital. Their
main results is that the current system is too generous. Meh / Terajima [2008] have a similar
framework (partial equilibrium OLG model) in which they analyze bankruptcy decisions of
both consumers and entrepreneurs. Our paper differs from these in the following way: We
have two types of shocks, one persistent and one transitory. This allows us to capture the
feature that many agents enter and exit entrepreneurship frequently. This fact has been
emphasized by Quadrini [2000]. Our model is a general equilibrium model. The importance
of general equilibrium effects has been shown by Li / Sarte [2006].
Our model is able to replicate key macroeconomic variables of the US economy: capital
output ratio, fraction of entrepreneurs in the population, exit rate, bankruptcy filings of
entrepreneurs, wealth of entrepreneurs compared to workers. Based on this model we conduct
two experiments to assess whether the current exemption level and the current exclusion
period are optimal. Our main result is that the current system is too lenient with respect to
the exemption level.
There are significant welfare gains from halving the current exemption level. These are
in the order of 1.4% of annual consumption per household which corresponds to $700 in
2007. The welfare gains from lowering the exemption level do not only occur from an ex ante,
expected utility, perspective but also across the entire wealth distribution. Both the rich and
the poor would gain. The cause of this result is that the current system provides too much
insurance. This worsens credit conditions for entrepreneurs so much that there are fewer of
them. Entrepreneurship increases from 7.6% of the population to 8.6% if the exemption level
is halved because credit gets cheaper. However, completely abolishing bankruptcy would lead
to a welfare loss in the order of $60 per household since some insurance is valuable.
The effects of changing the exclusion period are small. Reducing it from six to two years
yields a welfare gain in the order of $90 annually per household. Reducing the exclusion
period allows the talented entrepreneurs who have defaulted in the past to regain access to
credit sooner and therefore run bigger firms. In contrast to increasing the exemption level,
this form of insurance, is less harmful for credit conditions since it does not reduce the amount
the banks recover in the event of default. However, since the number of talented defaulters is
small compared to all defaulters, these effects are quantitatively small.
4 Zha [2001] is a theoretical investigation of similar issues. However his model abstracts from occupational
choice, that we show to be the crucial channel through which bankruptcy law affects entrepreneurship.
Moreover he does not calibrate his model to the US economy. Therefore his simulations give only qualitative
suggestions.
5 These two papers and ours’ were developed independently. We published our first version in June 2007 on
our website.
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Our results are consistent with the empirical finding of Berkowitz / White [2004] who
show that in states with higher exemption levels credit conditions are worse. Our results are
partially consistent with the findings of Fan / White [2003]. They show that entrepreneurship
increases when the exemption level is increased from a very low level. However we differ for
high exemption levels: we find that high exemption levels lead to a decline in entrepreneurship
while they find the opposite.
The paper is organized as follows, Section 2 provides an overview of US bankruptcy law
and presents data on entrepreneurial failure. In Section 3 we present our model and discuss
the equilibrium condition. In Section 4 we discuss our calibration strategy and present the
baseline results. Section 5 explains the main mechanism of the model. In Section 6 we
conduct the policy experiments and Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Entrepreneurial failure and personal bankruptcy in the US
Personal bankruptcy procedures in the US consist of two different procedures: Chapter 7
and Chapter 13. Under Chapter 7, all unsecured debt is discharged immediately. Future
earnings cannot be garnished. This is why chapter 7 is known as providing a "fresh start".
In exchange for this a person filing for bankruptcy has to surrender all wealth in excess of
an exemption level. The exemption level varies across US states, ranging from $11,000 in
Maryland to unlimited for housing wealth in some states, for example Florida. Following the
literature, we calculate the population-weighted average across states. The resulting average
exemption level is $77,591 in 1993.6
Under Chapter 13 agents can keep their wealth, debt is not discharged immediately and
future earnings are garnished. Entrepreneurs are better off under Chapter 7 for three reasons:
they have no non-exempt wealth, their debt is discharged immediately and they can start a
new business straight away, since their income will not be subject to garnishment (see White,
2007). 70% of total bankruptcy cases involving entrepreneurs are under chapter 7. Therefore
we will focus on Chapter 7 only.
Persons can file for bankruptcy only once every six years. The bankruptcy filing remains
public information for ten years. But there is no formal rule about bankruptcy filers being
excluded from credit. However,in practice, we observe that bankruptcy filers have difficulties
obtaining credit for a periods ranging from 3 to 8 years after the filing [Athreya 2002].
The US. Small Business Administration reports an exit rate of on average 9.7% per annum
for small firms in the period from 1990-2005.7 Out of these failing firms 9.3% exit through
6 The wealth exemption level does not change much over time. We choose 1993 because it is in the middle of
the sample years for our data on entrepreneurship wealth distribution and bankruptcies.
7 The U.S. Small Business Administration splits small firms into employer and non-employer firms. Employer
firms have at least one employee working in the firm. There are roughly five million employer and 15 million
non-employer firms in the U.S. Since the focus of our paper is on entrepreneurs who own and manage the firm
we use only the data for employer firms since non-employer firms have in many cases the owner not working in
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bankruptcy, according to the official data from the Administrative Office of the Courts.8
Unfortunately, the official data on personal bankruptcy caused by a business failure seem to
be severely downward biased. Lawless / Warren [2005] estimate that the true number could
be three to four times as big. Their own study is based on an in-depth analysis of bankruptcy
filers in five different judicial districts. Their explanation of this discrepancy is the emergence
of automated classification of personal bankruptcy cases. Almost all software used in this
area has "consumer case" as the default option. Thus reporting a personal bankruptcy case
as a "business related" case requires some - even though small - effort while being completely
inconsequential for the court proceedings. In addition to their own study they report data
from Dun & Bradstreet according to which exit through bankruptcy is at least twice the
official number9.
In the calibration of our model we set the baseline exemption level equal to $77,591. The
baseline exclusion period is set to six years. We calibrate the model such that the ratio of
bankruptcies over exits is equal to 20%.
1.3 The model
Our economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. Agents face
idiosyncratic uncertainty, but there is no aggregate uncertainty. At the beginning of every
period, agents decide whether to become workers or entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur must
decide how much to invest and, if he is allowed to, how much to borrow. An entrepreneur
who has defaulted in the past is not allowed to borrow for some time. Since we focus on the
implications of personal bankruptcy for entrepreneurs, workers are not allowed to borrow.
Agents have only a noisy signal of their productivities and are subject to uninsurable risk.
After the shocks are realized, production takes place. At the end of the period borrowers
decide whether to repay or whether to default and how much to consume and how much
to save. If they default, they will be borrowing constrained in the next period. Thus, they
cannot borrow but they can still save. Anticipating this behavior banks vary the interest rate
charged for each loan taking into account the individual borrower’s default probability. The
remainder of this section presents the details of the model.
the firm. To ensure consistency across our three databases, when we use data from the Survey of Consumer
Finance (SCF) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) we define entrepreneurs as business owners
who manage a firm with at least one employee.
8 While one can obtain exit rates from the PSID data (Quadrini, 2000), it is impossible to obtain reliable
bankruptcy data from the PSID. There is only one wave in which respondents were asked about past
bankruptcies.
9 Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) is a credit-reporting and business information firm. D&B compiles its own
independent business failure database. Until the emergence of automated software for law firms and courts in
the mid 1980s, the official business bankruptcy data and the index compiled by D&B have a positive and
significant correlation of 0.73. From 1986-1998 this correlation coefficient becomes negative and insignificant.
Extrapolating from the historic relationship between the D&B index and personal bankruptcy cases caused by
business failures leads to the conclusion that the official data underreport business bankruptcy cases at least
by a factor of two.
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1.3.1 Bankruptcy law and credit status
Agents who have borrowed can declare bankruptcy. In the event of a default the agent’s
debt is discharged, and at the same time any assets in excess of an exemption level X are
liquidated. There are transaction costs in the liquidation process so that banks can only
obtain a fraction f of each unit of capital they liquidate.
An agent who has declared bankruptcy in the past can save but he cannot borrow for a
certain period of time. We call this agent borrowing constrained and we denote his credit status
as BC. We assume that every borrowing constrained agent, whether worker or entrepreneur,
faces a credit status shock at the end of the period. This probability captures the duration of
the credit market exclusion period. With probability (1− %) the agent remains borrowing
constrained. With probability % the agent can borrow again. He becomes an unconstrained
agent with credit status UN10. % is calibrated such that the average exclusion period is six
years, the value observed in the data.
1.3.2 Households
Our economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. Each
agent differs according to the level of assets a, the entrepreneurial productivity θ, the working
productivity ϕ, and the credit status S ∈ {UN,BC}.
Preferences
For simplicity we abstract from labor-leisure choice. All agents supply their unit of labor
inelastically either as workers or as entrepreneurs. There is no disutility of labor. Agents
discount the future at the rate β. Therefore they maximize the following utility function
U = E
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
}
(1.1)
Productivities
Each agent is endowed with a couple of stochastic productivity levels: one as an entrepreneur
θ and one as a worker ϕ. We make the simplifying assumption that the working and
entrepreneurial ability processes are uncorrelated. At the beginning of each period the agent
knows only his past productivities ϕ−1 and θ−1, but his productivity as a worker and as
entrepreneur during the current period, denoted by ϕ and θ, are revealed only after he has
taken the occupational choice and investment decisions.
10 The length of the exclusion period is transformed into a probability in order to avoid an additional state
variable that keeps track of the numbers of years left before the solvency status is returned to UN. This
procedure is standard in the literature, see Athreya [2002] and Chatterjee et al. [2007].
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The workers’ ability process. Following the literature11 we assume that labor productivity
follows the following AR(1) process12:
logϕt = (1− ρ)µ+ ρ logϕt−1 + εt (1.2)
where εt is iid and ε ∼ N (0, σε). If the agent becomes a worker his labor income during
current period is given by wϕ.
The entrepreneurs’ ability process. In contrast to the case of working ability, there are no
reliable estimates of the functional form for the case of entrepreneurial ability. Therefore,
following Cagetti / De Nardi [2006], we will assume a parsimonious specification where
entrepreneurial productivity follows a 2-state Markov process with θL = 0 and θH > 0 and
transition matrix
Pθ =
[
pLL 1− pLL
1− pHH pHH
]
(1.3)
We calibrate the 3 parameters (θH , pHH and pLL) to match some observed features of
entrepreneurial activity in the US economy.
1.3.3 Technology
Entrepreneurial sector Every agent in the economy has access to a productive technology
that, depending on her entrepreneurial productivity θ, produces output according to the
production function
Yi = θiχikνi (1.4)
where θi is agent i′s persistent entrepreneurial productivity described above. We assume that
production is subject to an iid idiosyncratic shock with χi ∈ {0, 1}, where χi = 0 happens
with probability pχ. This iid shock represents the possibility that an inherently talented
entrepreneur (i.e. an agent with high and persistent θi) might choose the wrong project or
could be hit by an adverse demand shock. Quadrini [2000] shows that the entry rate of
workers with some entrepreneurial experience in the past, is much higher than the entry rate
of those workers without any experience. Therefore it seems that entrepreneurs come mostly
from a small subset of total population. If their firms fail, they are very likely to start a new
firm within a few years. The iid shock χi helps us to capture this difference in the entry
rates.
Corporate sector Many firms are both incorporated and big enough not to be subject to
personal bankruptcy law. Therefore we follow Quadrini [2000] and Cagetti / De Nardi [2006]
and assume a perfectly competitive corporate sector which is modeled as a Cobb-Douglas
11 See for example Storesletten et al. [2004].
12 In the simulation we discretize this process by methods based on Tauchen [1986a].
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production function
F (Kc, Lc) = AKξcL1−ξc (1.5)
where Kc and Lc are capital and labor employed in this sector. Given perfect competition
and constant returns to scale the corporate sector does not distribute any dividend. Capital
depreciates at rate δ in both sectors.
1.3.4 Credit market
We assume that there is perfect competition in the credit market. Therefore banks must
make zero profit on any contract13. The opportunity cost of the lending to entrepreneurs is
the rate of return on capital in the corporate sector. This is also equal to the deposit rate.14
Banks offer one period non-contingent debt contracts. The only agent who interacts with
banks is the unconstrained entrepreneur. Banks know everything about the agent: his assets
and his productivities. For any given value of (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) and for any amount lent b, by
anticipating the behavior of the entrepreneur, the banks are able to calculate the probability
of default and how much they will get in the case of default. Perfect competition implies that
they set the interest rate, r (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b), such that they break even. Therefore, banks offer
a menu of one period debt contracts which consists of an amount lent b and a corresponding
interest rate r (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b) to each agent (a, θ−1, ϕ−1).
1.3.5 Timing
At the beginning of the period, agents who have defaulted in the past and who have not received
the positive credit status shock are borrowing constrained. The other agents are unconstrained.
All agents face an occupational choice: they choose whether they become entrepreneurs
or workers. However they make this decision without knowing their productivities (θ, ϕ).
Since these productivities follow a Markov process they use past productivities (θ−1, ϕ−1) to
forecast their current productivities (ϕ, θ).
Workers deposit all their wealth at the banks, receiving a rate of return rd. After productiv-
ities are realized and production has taken place, they choose consumption and savings. At
the end of the period the borrowing constrained worker receives the credit status shock. With
probability % he remains borrowing constrained next period (i.e. S′ = BC). With probability
(1− %) he becomes unconstrained next period (i.e. S′ = UN).
The borrowing constrained entrepreneur can choose how much to invest in his firm before
the current θ is realized. He deposits the remaining wealth at the bank. Thus the entrepreneur
13 In many papers on consumer bankruptcy banks cross-subsidize loans. This implies however that a bank
could make positive profits by denying credit to the most risky borrowers. (see Athreya [2002] and Li / Sarte
[2006]). For an approach similar to ours, see Chatterjee et al. [2007].
By the law of large numbers average ex post profits will be zero too
14 In our model the banks are isomorphic to a bond market in which each agent has the possibility to issue
debt.
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faces a portfolio choice between investing in his own firm (risky asset) or in a safe bank
deposit. But he can not borrow. After (θ, ϕ) and χ are realized and production has taken
place, he chooses consumption and savings. At the end of the period he receives the credit
status shock.
The unconstrained entrepreneur can borrow from perfectly competitive banks. Before
knowing (θ, ϕ) and χ, he chooses his capital stock by deciding how much to borrow (or invest
at rate rd). In case the entrepreneur borrows, by picking from the menu {b, r (a, θ−1, ϕ−1.b)}
offered by banks, he invests everything in his own firm. After (θ, ϕ) and χ are realized and
production has taken place, the entrepreneur can decide whether to repay his debt and be
unconstrained next period (i.e. S′ = UN) or whether to declare bankruptcy and be borrowing
constrained next period(i.e. S′ = BC). After that he chooses consumption and savings.
Summarizing, the timing is as follows:
1. The agent enters the period with a state (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, S);
2. The agent chooses whether to become a worker or an entrepreneur;
3. Unconstrained entrepreneurs choose from the menu {b, r (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b)} offered by
perfectly competitive banks;
4. Real and financial investment decisions are taken;
5. Productivities (θ, ϕ) and the iid shock χ ∈ {0, 1} are realized and production takes
place;
6. Bankruptcy decisions are taken by the unconstrained entrepreneurs;
7. Consumption and saving decisions are taken;
8. The credit status shocks for all borrowing constrained agents are realized;
9. End of period: the new state is (a′, θ, ϕ, S′).
Since the credit state S consists only of the two states BC and UN , we define the individual
state variable as (a, θ−1, ϕ−1), and we solve for two value functions V UN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) and
V BC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) one for each credit status.
1.3.6 The problem of the borrowing constrained agent
This agent cannot borrow, but he can save at an interest rate rd. At the beginning of the
period he can choose whether to become an entrepreneur, which gives utility NBC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1)
or a worker which yields utility WBC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1). Therefore the value of being a borrowing
constrained agent with state (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) is
V BC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) = max
{
NBC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) ,WBC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1)
}
(1.6)
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where the "max" operator reflects the occupational choice.
Worker At the beginning of the period the borrowing constrained worker deposits all his
wealth at the bank. Then (θ, ϕ) are realized, production takes place and he receives labor
income wϕ. At the end of the period, he chooses consumption and saving, taking into account
that he will receive a credit status shock. With probability % he will be still borrowing
constrained next period with an utility V BC (a′, θ, ϕ), while with a probability (1− %) he
will become unconstrained with an utility V UN (a′, θ, ϕ). Therefore the expected utility of a
borrowing constrained worker with wealth a and productivities (θ−1, ϕ−1) is
WBC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) =
E
 maxc,a′
{
u (c) + β
[
%V BC (a′, θ, ϕ) + (1− %)V UN (a′, θ, ϕ)
]}
s.t. c+ a′ = wϕ+
(
1 + rd
)
a
 (1.7)
Entrepreneur At the beginning of the period the borrowing constrained entrepreneur chooses
the amount of capital, k ∈ [0, a], to invest in his firm and the amount a− k to deposit at the
bank. After (θ, ϕ) and the shock χ are realized he will decide how to allocate the resources
χθkν + (1− δ) k +
(
1 + rd
)
(a− k) among consumption and savings. Therefore the optimal
value of the borrowing constrained entrepreneur is
NBC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) =
max
0≤k≤a
E
 maxa′,c
{
u (c) + β
[
%V BC (a′, θ, ϕ) + (1− %)V UN (a′, θ, ϕ)
]}
s.t. c+ a′ = χθkν + (1− δ) k +
(
1 + rd
)
(a− k)
 (1.8)
where the expectation operator E {·} now considers also the temporary shock χ.
1.3.7 The problem of the unconstrained agent
At the beginning of the period the unconstrained agent faces the following occupational choice
V UN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) = max
{
WUN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) , NUN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1)
}
(1.9)
where WUN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) is the utility of becoming a worker and NUN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) of becom-
ing an entrepreneur.
Worker The problem of the unconstrained worker is identical to the borrowing constrained
one except that the agent will be unconstrained in the future for sure. His utility is
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WUN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) = E
 maxc,a′
{
u (c) + βV UN (a′, θ, ϕ)
}
s.t. c+ a′ = wϕ+
(
1 + rd
)
a
 (1.10)
Entrepreneur The unconstrained entrepreneur decides how much to invest in his firm
k = a+ b by choosing how much to borrow (b > 0) or save at rate rd (b < 0). If he borrows
he can choose from the menu {b, r (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b)} offered by the banks. After (θ, ϕ) and the
shock χ are realized he can choose whether to declare bankruptcy (default) or whether to
repay and how much to consume and save. He solves the problem backwards.
If he repays his debt, he has to choose how to allocate his resources, χθkν + (1− δ) k −
b [1 + r (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b)], between consumption and savings. Given that the decision of repaying
is done when current productivities (θ, ϕ) and the shock χ are known, his utility from repaying
is given by
Npay (a, b, θ, ϕ, χ) = max
c,a′
{
u (c) + βV UN
(
a′, θ, ϕ
)}
(1.11)
s.t. a′ + c = χθkν + (1− δ) k − b [1 + r (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b)] (1.12)
k = a+ b (1.13)
If he defaults, his debt is discharged. But he loses all his assets in excess of the ex-
emption level X. Thus, the resources to allocate between consumption and savings are
min {χθkν + (1− δ) k,X}. Moreover if he defaults he will be borrowing constrained next
period. Therefore by declaring bankruptcy he gets
N bankr (a, b, θ, ϕ, χ) = max
c,a′
{
u (c) + βV BC
(
a′, θ, ϕ
)}
(1.14)
s.t. a′ + c = min {χθkν + (1− δ) k,X} (1.15)
k = a+ b (1.16)
He will declare bankruptcy if N bankr (a, b, θ, ϕχ) > Npay (a, b, θ, ϕ, χ) and vice versa. Thus,
at the beginning of the period the agent choose the optimal amount of b from the menu
{b, r (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b)} anticipating his future behavior. Therefore his utility is given by
NUN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) =
max
{b,r(a,θ−1,ϕ−1,b)}
E
[
max
{
Npay (a, b, θ, ϕ, χ) , N bankr (a, b, θ, ϕ, χ)
}] (1.17)
where the max operator inside the square brackets reflects the bankruptcy decision, and
the max operator outside the square brackets reflects the borrowing decision.
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1.3.8 The zero profit condition for the banks
We assume that the banks observe the state variables (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) at the moment of offering
the contract. For any given state (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) and for any given loan b, the bank knows
in which states of the world the agent will declare bankruptcy by solving the problem of
the agent. Therefore it is able to calculate exactly the probability that a certain agent
with characteristics (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) will default for any given loan b. Denote this probability
pibankr (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b).
If the agent repays the bank receives [1 + r(a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b)] b. If the agent defaults the bank
sells the firm’s undepreciated capital and it does not obtain the full value, but only a fraction
f . This captures two features. First, since business wealth is not exempt under Chapter 7,
the agent will try to move as much wealth as possible out of his firm into exempt wealth,
e.g. housing. Second, as for example shown by Ramey / Shapiro [2001], the sales value of
business assets is below their value with the firm. Therefore the bank receives: nothing if
χθkν + f (1− δ) (a− b) < X while it receives χθkν + f (1− δ) (a+ b)−X otherwise.
The zero profit condition for the bank is given by
[
1− pibankr(a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b)
]
[1 + r(a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b)] b+
pibankr(a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b) max {χθkν + f (1− δ) (a+ b)−X, 0}
 = (1 + rd)b (1.18)
1.3.9 Equilibrium
Let η = (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, S) be a state vector for an individual, where a denotes assets, θ−1
entrepreneurial productivity, ϕ−1 working productivity and S the credit status. From the
optimal policy functions (savings, capital demand, default decisions), from the exogenous
Markov process for productivity and from the credit status shocks, we can derive a transition
function, that, for any distribution µ (η) over the state provides the next period distribution
µ′ (η). A stationary equilibrium is given by
• a deposit rate of return rd and a wage rate w
• an interest rate function r (η)
• a set of policy functions g (η) (consumption and saving, capital demand, bankruptcy
decisions and the occupational choice)
• a constant distribution over the state η, µ∗ (η)
such as, given rd and w:
• g (η) solves the maximization problem of the agents;
• the corporate sector representative firm is optimizing;
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• capital, labor and goods market clear:
– capital demands come both from entrepreneurs and from the corporate sector,
while supply comes from saving decisions of the agents;
– labor demand comes from corporate sector, while labor supply come from the
occupational choice of the agents;
• the function r (η) reflects the zero profit condition of the banks
• The distribution µ∗ (η) is the invariant distribution associated with the transition
function generated by the optimal policy function g (η) and the exogenous shocks.
The model has no analytical solution and must be solved numerically. The algorithm used
to solve the model and other details are presented in the appendix.
1.4 Calibration and baseline results
1.4.1 Parametrization
Fixed parameters
Following standard practice in the literature we try to minimize the number of parameters of
the model used to match the data. We therefore select some parameters which have already
been estimated in the literature. We choose ρ = 0.95 for the auto-regressive coefficient of the
earnings process15. The variance of the earnings process is chosen to match the Gini index of
labor income as in PSID data which is 0.3816. The process is approximated using a 4-state
Markov chain, using the Tauchen [1986a] method as suggested by Adda / Cooper [2003]17.
Total factor productivity is normalized to 1, while the share of capital in the Cobb-Douglas
technology for the Corporate sector is set to ξ = 0.36. The depreciation rate is set δ = 0.08.
Felicity is assumed to be CRRA with coefficient of relative risk aversion σ = 2.
These parameters are summarized in table 1.1:
15 In a life cycle setting, Storesletten et al. [2004, 2001] find ρ in the range between 0.95 and 0.98. We choose
ρ = 0.95 to take into account that the agents in our model are infinitely lived. Since the intergenerational
auto-regressive coefficient is lower. Solon [1992] estimates it around 0.4.
16 The exact value of the variance is σ2ε = .08125. This is higher than the estimate of Storesletten et al.
[2004] of about 0.02. We abstract from many important factors that are empirically relevant for the earnings
distribution, e.g. human capital, life-cycle savings. Therefore, in order to generate the observed inequality, we
choose a higher variance of the earnings process.
17 Floden [2007] shows that for highly correlated processes the method of Adda / Cooper [2003] achieves a
higher accuracy than the original methods of Tauchen [1986a] and Tauchen / Hussey [1991].
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Table 1.1: The fixed parameters
Parameter Symbol Baseline
TFP A 1 (normalization)
Share of capital ξ 0.36
Depreciation rate δ 0.08
CRRA σ 2
Working productivities ϕ1 < ϕ2 < ϕ3 < ϕ4
[
ϕ1 = 0.316, ϕ2 = 0.745
ϕ3 = 1.342, ϕ4 = 3.163
]
Transition matrix Pϕ

0.8393 0.1579 0.0028 0.0000
0.1579 0.6428 0.1965 0.0028
0.0028 0.1965 0.6428 0.1579
0.0000 0.0028 0.1579 0.8393

Bankruptcy policy parameters
The two policy parameters are the exemption level X and the probability % of remaining
borrowing constrained. The law does not state any formal period of exclusion from credit
after bankruptcy filing. For our baseline specification, we set % = 0.2 which corresponds
to an average exclusion period from credit of 5 years18. The exemption level differs across
US states. Using state-level data for 1993, we calculate the population-weighted average
exemption level across states.19 ("homestead" plus "personal property" exemption). The
resulting average exemption level is $77,591, taking an average household labor income of
$45,000 corresponds to a value of 1.72 for the exemption/wage ratio. Table 1.2 summarizes
the bankruptcy parameters:
Table 1.2: the bankruptcy parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Exemption/wage X/w 1.72
Exclusion period (expressed as probability) % 0.2
Calibrated parameters
We are left with the following 7 parameters to be calibrated: high entrepreneurial productivity
(θH), entrepreneurial productivity transition matrix (pHH , pLL), concavity of entrepreneurial
production function (ν), capital specificity (f), discount factor (β) and the probability of the
transitory shock ( pχ).
We choose these 7 parameters such that the model matches the following 7 moments of
18 This choice is in line with the consumer bankruptcy literature which sets the average length of exclusion in
this range. Athreya [2002] sets this at 4 years, Li / Sarte [2006] to 5 years, Chatterjee et al. [2007] to 10 years.
19 We took the data from Berkowitz / White [2004] and top-coded the unlimited homestead exemption to the
maximum state exemption.
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the US economy. First we want the model to match the capital-output ratio (K/Y) in US
economy. In the literature we find values ranging from 2.5 to 3.1 We target it to be 2.8
and we check the sensitivity of the results to different values. We target the fraction of
exits through bankruptcy (bankruptcy/exit). Given the discussion in Section 2 we set this
equal to 20%.20 The fraction of entrepreneurs in the total population is 7.6% in the Survey
of Consumers Finances.21 Based on data from the US Small Business Administration the
exit rate of entrepreneurs is equal to 9.3%. Therefore we set the baseline target at 9.3%.
However the exit rate based on the PSID is higher (around 13.6%).22 Therefore we check the
sensitivity of results to higher values.
Quadrini [2000] points out that the entry rate for workers who had some entrepreneurial
experience in the past is much higher than the entry rate for those without any experience. It
seems that entrepreneurs come mostly from a small subset of total population. If their firms
fail, they are very likely to start a new firm within a few years. In the PSID the ratio of entry
rate of experienced entrepreneurs over the average entry rate is 13. This is an important
target because the bankruptcy law affects the possibility and the speed of re-entry for failed
entrepreneurs.
Since the benefits of bankruptcy depend crucially on the wealth of an agent we match some
features of the wealth distribution. The US wealth distribution is extremely skewed with the
top 40% of richest households holding around 93% of total assets.23 The Gini coefficient is
very high, at around 0.8. There is a large literature that tries to match the wealth distribution
in the US. The most difficult part is to match the extremely rich agents at the top end of
the distribution. But, as we show below, for our model it is particularly important to match
the lower end of the distribution. Therefore we target the share of wealth held by the richest
40%. As a last target we choose to match the ratio of the median wealth of entrepreneurs to
the median wealth in the whole population. This target captures features of both the wealth
distribution and entrepreneurial productivity and technology. We set the target to 5.6 as
found in the SCF.24
The targets are summarized in the second column of table 4.
1.4.2 The baseline calibration
We first present the baseline version of the model. Table 1.3 reports the value of the calibrated
parameters in the baseline specification
while table 1.4 reports the value of the targets and the actual results achieved in the
20 Given the uncertainty about the estimates we check the sensitivity of results to changing this target to 10%
and to 30%.
21 See Appendix B for data sources, definitions and further details.
22 One possible explanation for this difference could be that the PSID undersamples wealthy households.
Therefore successful entrepreneurs are likely to be undersampled.
23 See Appendix B for details.
24 This ratio ranges from 4.8 to 5.6 in the SCF according to definitions of entrepreneurs and samples adopted.
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Table 1.3: the calibrated parameters
Parameter Symbol Benchmark Value
High entrepreneurial productivity θH 0.52
Entrepreneurial productivity transition pHH , pLL 0.95 , 0.9937
Concavity of entrepreneurial technology ν 0.875
Capital specificity f 0.4
Discount factor β 0.865
Probability of transitory shock pχ 0.185
baseline specification.
Table 1.4: the baseline calibration targets
Moment Target Model
Fraction of Entrepreneurs (in %) 7.6 7.6
Ratio of medians (in %) 5.6 4.34
Share of net-worth of top 40% 93.0 89.4
K/Y 2.8 2.687
Exit Rate (in %) 9.3 9.4
Bankruptcy/Exit (in %) 20.0 22.0
Entry rate of experienced/Average entry rate 13.0 8.3
The equilibrium rate of return on capital in the corporate sector (rd) is 7.81%. Since the
equilibrium wage is 1.0207, each unit in our model correspond approximately to $44,000 in
1993. Less than one percent (0.79%) of the total population is borrowing constrained. Even
though our model does not replicate exactly the ratio of medians and the share of the wealth
held by the richest 40%, it captures the main features that entrepreneurs are several times
richer than workers and that most of the wealth is held by the richest. Table 1.5 shows
that our model does not replicate the wealth concentration at the top end of the wealth
distribution. In particular the richest one percent hold 16% of total wealth in our model
while they hold 35% in the data25. However for the purpose of our policy experiments it is
important that the model replicates the middle and lower part of the wealth distribution
since bankruptcy law affects almost exclusively these agents.
Table 1.5: wealth distribution: data and model
percentage wealth in top
1% 5% 20% 40% 60%
US data (SCF 1995) 35 56 81 93 99
Benchmark model 16 38 65 84 95
Even though our model does not replicate the difference in the entry rate between experi-
25 This is the reason that the Gini coefficient of wealth is 0.64 in the model, while it is 0.8 in the data. Cagetti
/ De Nardi [2006] and Castañeda et al. [2003] show that life-cycle savings and the bequest motive are essential
to match the wealth distribution. Introducing these features in the model would be computationally too costly.
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enced and inexperienced workers exactly it captures the fact that the former are many times
more likely to enter entrepreneurship than the latter.
Quadrini [2000] reports that around 40% of total capital is invested in the entrepreneurial
sector. In our baseline specification this fraction is slightly higher, around 45%. However the
US. Small Business Administration estimates that the share of the entrepreneurial sector in
terms of employment is 50%.
1.5 Investigating the model’s mechanisms
1.5.1 Occupational choice
The key ingredient of the model is occupational choice. Figure 1.1 represents the occupational
choice of an unconstrained agent with high entrepreneurial productivity and low working
productivity. The dotted line shows the value function of becoming a worker, whereas the
solid line shows the value function of becoming an entrepreneur26.
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Figure 1.1: Occupational choice (S = UN, θ−1 = θH , ϕ−1 = 0.316)
The first result is that, otherwise identical agents choose differently according to their
wealth: poor agents become workers while rich agents become entrepreneurs. This result
is standard in the occupational choice under credit market imperfections literature [see for
26 The value functions have kinks since the actual value function for an unconstrained agent is given by the
upper envelop of the two functions in Figure 1.1. Therefore discounted utility tomorrow is kinked as well. The
kinks do no coincide exactly with the intersection of the two functions. However the kinks must be close to
the intersection of the two curves exactly because the value function tomorrow is identical for entrepreneur
and worker.
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example Banerjee / Newman 1993]. The main reasons are that poor agents have smaller
firms and face higher interest rates. They have smaller firms because, being poor, they need
to borrow more but they face higher rates on the loans. The cost of financing is higher for the
poor for two reasons. First, they have a higher incentive to default. Defaulting rich agents
have to give up all their wealth above the exemption level. Second, in the event of default
the bank gets less when the agent is poor. Thus, to break even, the bank has to charge a
higher interest rate. That is, in this model, wealth acts as collateral.
1.5.2 The behavior of the unconstrained agents
The second important ingredient is the decision of the unconstrained entrepreneurs. The
solution of the entrepreneurs’ problem is represented in Figure 1.2:
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Figure 1.2: interest rate and firm size (θ−1 = θH , ϕ−1 = 1.341)
The upper panel shows credit demand (debt) of the entrepreneur, the middle panel
represents the corresponding interest rate charged and the lower panel capital demand (firm
size). As shown above the poorer agents (e.g. agents with assets a = 2) become workers while
all the others become entrepreneurs (a > 3.5). The very rich entrepreneurs (e.g. a = 14) will
never find it profitable to default. Their wealth is so high that defaulting is too costly for
them. Therefore they can borrow at rate rd. The "middle class" entrepreneurs (e.g. a = 6)
will instead default if their productivity θ drops to θL or a bad shock (χ = 0) happens, since
the cost of bankruptcy is lower for them. Then the bank, in order to break even, must charge
a higher interest rate. The interest rate depends (negatively) on the assets of the entrepreneur,
because in the event of default the bank will be able to seize the difference between the
assets of the entrepreneur and the exemption level. Capital demand for the "middle-class"
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entrepreneurs is increasing because the cost of borrowing is declining. The discontinuity in
all three functions between "middle-class" and rich entrepreneurs (around a = 10.5) is due to
the change in the default decision. Those who default are insured against the bad outcome
whereas those who do not default are not. This explains why relatively poorer agents (e.g.
a = 10) have slightly bigger firms than relatively richer agents (e.g. a = 11).
1.5.3 A first look at the effects of bankruptcy
Bankruptcy affects the problem of the unconstrained agents, because it changes credit
conditions and the extent of insurance available. We examine these effects with the following
experiment. We compare the behavior of the unconstrained agents and the banks in two
different situations: one in which bankruptcy is allowed and one in which bankruptcy is
absent. Figure 1.3 shows the capital demand function and the interest rate function in these
situations.
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Figure 1.3: Firm size and interest rate (S = UN, θ−1 = θH , ϕ−1 = 1.314)
The effects of allowing bankruptcy depend on the wealth of the agent. First, the behavior
of the very rich (e.g. a = 12) is not affected. They are entrepreneurs and they repay their
debt even in the bad states. As explained above, even if bankruptcy is available, it is too
costly for them. Second, allowing bankruptcy affects the behavior of the less rich agents
(e.g. a = 8). They are entrepreneurs in both situations. But when bankruptcy is allowed
they borrow more because they can and will default in the bad states. Therefore their firms
are bigger (upper panel). This insurance comes at expense of higher interest rates (lower
panel). Anticipating default in the bad states the banks have to charge higher interest rates
in order to break even. We call this increase in the firm size the intensive margin. Third,
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the occupational choice of even less rich agents (e.g. a = 4) is affected. When bankruptcy
is not allowed they are not insured against bad outcomes. Therefore they do not want to
borrow, even though they could borrow at rate rd. They become workers. When bankruptcy
is allowed they are insured against bad outcomes. Therefore they borrow, even though they
have to pay a high interest rate. This increases the rewards of entrepreneurship enough to
change their occupational choice. We call this increase of the number of entrepreneurs the
extensive margin. Fourth, the occupational choice of the very poor agents (e.g. a = 2) is not
affected, they are workers in both situations.
In this particular experiment abolishing bankruptcy reduces entrepreneurship and firm
size, the intensive and the extensive margins are negative. The negative effect of lowering the
amount of insurance available dominates the positive effect of better credit conditions.
1.6 The effects of bankruptcy reforms
We now turn to analyze the effects of changes in the bankruptcy law. We conduct 2 different
experiments:
1. we change the exemption level from zero, which corresponds to eliminating bankruptcy
completely, to a very high level, twice the current level;
2. we change the length of the credit market exclusion period from two to 20 years.27
We will focus our attention mainly on changes in the following variables: entrepreneurship,
the poor’ access to entrepreneurship, welfare, distributional issues and social mobility.
1.6.1 Changing the exemption level
Our first policy experiment is to analyze the effects of changing the exemption level. First
we inspect the changes in the policy functions and later we analyze the quantitative results.
Figure 1.4 reports capital demand (upper panel) and the interest rate (lower panel) for 3
different values of X/w. It shows the effects of increasing the exemption level from X/w = 0,
which corresponds to completely eliminating bankruptcy to an intermediate one (X/w = 0.875)
and to the actual one (X/w = 1.72).
Increasing the exemption level, from zero to 0.875 has two effects. Both, the firms get
bigger (intensive margin) and more agents enter entrepreneurship (extensive margin). The
insurance effect is dominating. Further increasing the exemption level, to the current level of
1.72, has three effects. First, agents with assets around 3, who were entrepreneurs before,
become workers because credit conditions worsen so much that they outweigh the increase
27 In the model this corresponds to changing the probability of receiving a positive solvency shock % from 0.5
to 0.05.
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Figure 1.4: Firm size and interest rates, different exemption levels (θ−1 = θH ,ϕ−1 = 1.342)
in insurance. The extensive margin is negative. Second, agents with assets around 6 are
charged higher interest rates for the same reasons. Thus they run smaller firms. For these
agents the intensive margin is negative. Third, agents with assets around 10 switch from
never defaulting to defaulting in the bad states. Now they runs bigger firms, even if credit
conditions are worse, because of the insurance effect. For these agents the intensive margin is
positive.
The magnitude of these effects depends on the number of agents affected. The extensive
margin is unambiguously positive. The sign of the intensive margin, however, is ambiguous.
It depends on the wealth distribution. The increase in capital demand of agents with asset
around 10 is bigger than the decrease in capital demand of agents with asset around 6. But
the overall effects depend on the number of agents in these areas of the wealth distribution.
Table 1.6 reports the variables of interest for 5 values of X/w. Column 2 reports results
when bankruptcy is absent (X/w = 0). Column 4 reports results for the baseline calibration
(X/w = 1.72) and column 6 for doubling the current exemption level (X/w = 3.5).
The first pattern to notice is that no bankruptcy and extremely generous bankruptcy law
produce very similar results (see column 2 and column 6). When bankruptcy is absent the
demand for risky loans (loans with high interest rate due to high positive default probability)
is zero. Entrepreneurial activity is so risky that only relatively rich agents, who always repay
and get credit at rate rd, become entrepreneurs. When bankruptcy law is very generous, the
banks have to charge such high interest rates on risky loans that nobody demands them.
Again, only rich agents become entrepreneurs. This also explains that the ratio of medians is
highest in the case of no bankruptcy and very generous bankruptcy law. Even though for
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Table 1.6: the effects of changes in the exemption level
X/w 0 0.875 1.72 2.625 3.5
Exit rate (in %) 9.5 9.9 9.4 9.6 9.6
Fraction of Entrepreneurs (in %) 7.4 8.1 7.6 7.4 7.4
Bankruptcy/Exit (in %) 0 45.9 22.2 0.2 0.3
Capital/Output 2.677 2.693 2.677 2.677 2.677
Median assets of Entr/ Median assets 4.467 4.157 4.347 4.429 4.429
Share of Capital in entr. sector (in %) 47.8 49.4 47.9 47.8 47.8
Gini of Assets 0.635 0.636 0.635 0.635 0.635
Share of assets in top 40% of pop (in %) 89.0 89.3 89.0 89.0 89.0
Median output in entrepreneurial sector 15.05 14.55 14.58 15.05 15.05
Welfare ( %-change in cons.-equivalent) -0.07 1.26 0 -0.05 -0.05
Welfare of the POOR -0.09 1.27 0 -0.07 -0.06
Welfare of the RICH -0.02 1.23 0 0.03 0
each level of assets entrepreneurs borrow less and therefore have smaller firms, the median
firm size is bigger under extreme bankruptcy laws, see Figure 1.528. The reason for this result
is again that only rich agents, who have bigger firms, become entrepreneurs.
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Figure 1.5: Firm size distribution for different exemption levels
Next we investigate the effects of increasing the exemption level gradually from X/w = 0
to X/w = 3.5 on entrepreneurship, the poor’ access to entrepreneurship, welfare, wealth
distribution and social mobility. As can be seen in table 1.6 almost all variables follow a
hump-shaped pattern.
28 We smoothed the firm size distribution by creating ten equally sized bins to make the figure easier to read.
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Entrepreneurship Increasing the exemption level first increases and then decreases the
fraction of entrepreneurs. The insurance effect dominates the credit market conditions effect
for low exemption levels. The opposite is true for high exemption levels. The exit rate and
the fraction of exits through bankruptcy follow the behavior of the fraction of entrepreneurs.
The fraction of exits through bankruptcy first increases from zero percent to 46% when the
exemption level increases from X/w = 0 to X/w = 0.875. As insurance is higher, a bigger
fraction of exits happens through bankruptcy. When the exemption level increases further,
from X/w = 0.875 to X/w = 3.5 the fraction falls gradually back to zero percent because
only the rich, who never default, become entrepreneurs.
The impact of different exemption levels on the investment behavior of entrepreneurs can
be understood from the firm size distribution, see Figure 1.629.
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Figure 1.6: Firm size distribution (different exemption levels)
Increasing the exemption level from X/w = 0 to X/w = 0.875 leads to the creation of more
small firms due to positive extensive and intensive margins, see also Figure 1.4. When we
further increase the exemption level to X/w = 1.72 some of these new small firms disappear
because the negative effect on credit market conditions dominates.
Access to entrepreneurship of the poor Next we turn to how bankruptcy law affects the
determinants of entry into entrepreneurship. There is allocative inefficiency in our model
because insurance markets are missing. Part of this inefficiency is reflected in some poor
highly productive agents not becoming entrepreneurs, either because they receive too little
insurance or because the conditions at which credit is available are too bad. Table 1.7
29 As shown in Figure 1.5, the firm size distribution for higher exemption levels is identical to the case X/w = 0.
Therefore in Figure 1.6 we report only the cases: X/w = 0, X/w = 0.875, and X/w = 1.72.
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reports the effects of different exemption levels on the minimum assets needed for the highly
productive (θ−1 = θH) agent to become an entrepreneur.
Table 1.7: minimum wealth for entrepreneurship
X/w 0 0.875 1.72 2.625 3.5
ϕ−1= 0.316 0.481 0.160 0.421 0.381 0.361
ϕ−1= 0.745 1.323 0.842 1.263 1.323 1.323
ϕ−1= 1.342 3.768 2.946 3.507 3.768 3.768
ϕ−1= 3.163 16.032 15.030 15.230 16.032 16.032
The rows show these values for the levels of working productivity (ϕ−1). The attractiveness
of becoming a worker is increasing in working productivity. Thus, in order to enter entrepren-
eurship, the expected profits must be higher for an agent with high working productivity. Since
richer agents need to borrow relatively less and since they receive better credit conditions,
their expected profits are higher. This implies that, to become an entrepreneur, an agent
with high working productivity must be richer than an agent with low working productivity.
At each level of working productivity the wealth level at which an agent enters entre-
preneurship is lowest when X/w = 0.875. Thus, even from an efficiency point of view a
less generous bankruptcy law would improve upon the status quo. However, abolishing
bankruptcy completely would make it more difficult for the poor to become entrepreneurs,
thereby worsening allocative efficiency.
Welfare Following Aiyagari / Mcgrattan [1998], to assess welfare we first calculate expected
utility in each bankruptcy policy regime separately
V =
∫
η
V (η)dµ∗ (η) (1.19)
where η = (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, S) and µ∗ (η) is the equilibrium steady state distribution. Thus,
expected utility is measured over all asset levels, productivities and the credit status. This
utilitarian social welfare function weights all households equally. Then we calculate the
constant, at all states and dates, amount of consumption, consumption equivalent, that
yields expected utility V .30 We compare two bankruptcy policy regimes by calculating the
percentage change in consumption equivalent that makes agents indifferent between the two
regimes. For example, for a given regime Q, that yields utility V Q, this percentage change in
consumption equivalent is given by
λQ =
(
V Q + 1/ [(1− σ) (1− β)]
V bench + 1/ [(1− σ) (1− β)]
)1/(1−σ)
− 1 (1.20)
30 Thus, we first calculate a constant c¯ that yields that same utility as V . Given CRRA preferences this is the
solution to: (
c¯(1−σ) − 1
1− σ
)
1
1− β = V .
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where a positive λQ implies that regime Q increases welfare with respect to the baseline
regime.
Table 1.6 shows that welfare follows the same hump-shaped pattern as the other variables.
In particular welfare is highest for exemption level X/w = 0.875. Thus, halving the current
exemption level would increase welfare by 1.26%, which corresponds to an increase in annual
consumption of approximately $700 for the average household.
Table 1.6 also shows that there are no adverse distributional effects. Both, rich and poor
agents31 gain from reducing the exemption level from the current one.
Wealth distribution and social mobility Entrepreneurs are relatively less rich compared to
the entire population when X/w = 0.875. This is shown by the ratio of median assets in table
1.6. This is again due to the fact that there are more poor entrepreneurs when X/w = 0.875
than for any other exemption level. However changing the exemption level has little effect on
the wealth distribution: it does not change significantly the Gini coefficient and the share of
wealth held by the richest agents. The changes in entrepreneurship and firm sizes are too
small to significantly affect the wealth distribution.
We investigate the effects on social mobility by dividing all agents in 3 wealth classes:
poor, middle-class and rich, where each class accounts for 1/3 of total population. Then we
compute the transition between these classes over a 10 year horizon for the different values of
the exemption level. The results are reported in tables 1.8 to 1.1032.
Table 1.8: 10-years transition matrix: X/w = 0
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.721 0.246 0.033
middle-class 0.277 0.482 0.241
rich 0.004 0.270 0.726
Table 1.9: 10-years transition matrix: X/w = 0.875
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.717 0.249 0.034
middle-class 0.279 0.478 0.243
rich 0.004 0.274 0.722
These tables show that there is slightly more mobility in the intermediate case (X/w =
0.875) since the probabilities along the main diagonal are smaller. As shown in table 1.7,
for intermediate exemption levels poorer agents have more insurance and therefore enter
31 We define a poor agent as one with assets less than the median. Comparing the top and bottom quintiles
yields similar results.
32 Again, results for X/w = 2.625 and X/w = 3.5 are not reported. They are very similar to the case with
X/w = 0.
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Table 1.10: 10-years transition matrix: X/w = 1.72
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.720 0.248 0.032
middle-class 0.276 0.480 0.244
rich 0.005 0.271 0.724
entrepreneurship. Thus, in our model, entrepreneurship is a vehicle of social mobility. This is
consistent with the findings of Quadrini [2000].
1.6.2 Changing the exclusion period
The second policy experiment we conduct is to change the length of time an agent who has
defaulted is excluded from borrowing33. As discussed above we model this as changes in the
probability of a favorable credit status shock: %. Therefore a low % represents a long exclusion
period while a high % represents a short exclusion period.
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Figure 1.7: Utility and capital demand of borrowing constrained and unconstrained entre-
preneur
Table 1.11 reports the effects of gradually increasing the exclusion period from two years
(% = 0.5) to 20 years (% = 0.05) on the main variables. The baseline value of five years
(% = 0.2) is reported in column four.
Table 1.11 shows that reducing the length of the exclusion period increases welfare, and
33 The length of the exclusion period is determined mainly by banks in the US, but in principle this could be
regulated by a law.
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Table 1.11: the effects of changes in the exclusion period
% 0.5 0.25 0.2 0.1 0.05
Exit rate (in %) 9.3 9.4 9.4 9.6 9.8
Fraction of Entrepreneurs
(in %)
7.7 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.4
Bankruptcy/Exit (in %) 23.6 22.7 22.2 21.1 20.1
Capital/Output 2.686 2.680 2.678 2.668 2.654
Median assets of Entr/
Median assets
4.431 4.388 4.329 4.225 4.156
Share of capital in entr.
sector (in %)
48.8 48.0 47.8 46.7 45.4
Gini of Assets 0.065 0.065 0.063 0.064 0.063
Share of assets in top 40%
of pop.(in %)
89.2 89.1 89.0 88.8 88.6
Median output in
entrepreneurial sector
14.991 14.535 14.576 13.701 12.289
Welfare ( %-change in
cons.-equivalent)
0.12 0.02 0 -0.18 -0.43
Welfare of the POOR 0.05 -0.04 0 -0.09 -0.28
Welfare of the RICH 0.34 0.21 0 -0.46 -0.84
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the fraction of entrepreneurs monotonically. However these changes are quantitatively much
smaller than in the case of changing the exemption level. The main implication of increasing
% is to allow highly productive, failed agents to regain access to credit earlier. Figure 1.7
shows the difference in utility and the difference in firm size for a highly productive agent
between being borrowing constrained and being unconstrained.
One important difference between changing the exemption level and changing the exclusion
period is that the credit market conditions effects are smaller. Both, increasing the exemption
level and lowering the exclusion period, increase the attractiveness of defaulting. However,
the latter does not affect the amount recovered by banks in the event of a default. Therefore
the interest rates charged by banks do not change for most agents, see for example the agents
with assets between four and ten in Figure 1.8. These agents default in the bad states for
all values of %. However agents with assets around 10.5 change their behavior. Instead of
repaying their debt in all states, as they do when % = 0.05, they default in the bad states
when % = 0.5 because defaulting is more attractive. Therefore they borrow more and have
bigger firms. For similar reasons, agents with assets around 3.5 enter entrepreneurship only
when % increases.
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Figure 1.8: Capital demand and interest rate, different % (θ−1 = θH ,ϕ−1 = 1.341)
Some of the defaulters are hit by the very persistent change in entrepreneurial productivity.
Therefore only a fraction of defaulters are still highly productive as entrepreneurs. This
implies that the overall effects are small.
Next we investigate the effects of increasing the exclusion period from 2 years (% = 0.5) to
20 years (% = 0.05) on entrepreneurship, the poor’ access to entrepreneurship, welfare, wealth
distribution and social mobility in detail.
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Increasing the exclusion period from 2 years (% = 0.5) to 20 years (% = 0.05) lowers the
fraction of entrepreneurs. As shown in Figure 1.8, poorer agents do not enter entrepreneurship
as often as before because the cost of defaulting is higher. The median firm size decreases
because relatively rich entrepreneurs change their behavior. When they are hit by a bad shock
they do not default anymore. This implies that they are fully exposed to the production risk.
Therefore they operate smaller firms.
The wealth levels needed to become an entrepreneur, one for each level of working pro-
ductivity, are reported in table 1.12.
Table 1.12: minimum wealth for entrepreneurship
% 0.5 0.25 0.2 0.1 0.05
ϕ−1= 0.316 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.48
ϕ−1= 0.745 1.26 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28
ϕ−1= 1.342 3.47 3.53 3.53 3.59 3.63
ϕ−1= 3.163 15.63 15.73 15.73 15.73 15.63
Increasing the exclusion period implies that more wealth is needed to enter entrepreneurship.
Therefore it makes access to entrepreneurship more difficult for poor but highly productive
agents. But these changes are small, in particular when compared to the changes when the
exemption level is lowered.
Increasing the exclusion period also reduces welfare. Note that even though the Gini
coefficient is highest for the shortest exclusion period (% = 0.5), welfare for both, rich and
poor, is highest in this case as well. Lowering the exclusion period from the current five
years to two years would increase welfare by 0.12%, which corresponds to an increase in
annual consumption of approximately $70 for the average household. Increasing the exclusion
period to 20 years would yield a welfare loss of approximately 0.43%, which corresponds to a
decrease in annual consumption of approximately $230 for the average household.
As tables 1.13 to 1.15 show there are hardly any changes in social mobility.
Table 1.13: 10-years transition matrix: % = 0.5
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.721 0.248 0.032
middle-class 0.276 0.480 0.244
rich 0.005 0.270 0.725
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Table 1.14: 10-years transition matrix: % = 0.2
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.721 0.247 0.032
middle-class 0.276 0.479 0.244
rich 0.005 0.271 0.724
Table 1.15: 10-years transition matrix: % = 0.05
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.720 0.248 0.032
middle-class 0.276 0.480 0.244
rich 0.005 0.271 0.724
1.7 Conclusion
We explore quantitatively the effects of personal bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship in a
general equilibrium setting with heterogeneous agents. We developed a dynamic general
equilibrium model with occupational choice which explicitly incorporates the US bankruptcy
law. Our model endogenously generates interest rates that reflect the different default
probabilities of the agents. It accounts for the main facts on entrepreneurial bankruptcy,
entrepreneurship, wealth distribution and macroeconomic aggregates in the US.
We used the model to quantitatively evaluate the effects of changing the US bankruptcy law.
The simulation results show that reducing the exemption level would increase the fraction of
entrepreneurs and welfare. These effects are significant: halving the exemption level would
have positive welfare effects in the order of 1.4% of average consumption. All households,
rich and poor, would be better off. However eliminating bankruptcy completely would reduce
the number of entrepreneurs and welfare. The key mechanism driving most of our results
is the occupational choice of agents. The fraction of entrepreneurs would increase by one
percentage point if the exemption level were reduced by 50%.
We are currently extending our research program along two dimensions. First, we are
incorporating the transition to the new steady state. So far, our results are based on a
comparison of steady-states. Transitional effects might be important to evaluate welfare. In
addition it might explain why the current law is too lenient. It could be that some groups
lose during the transition and therefore oppose changes.
Second, we are expanding our model to incorporate explicitly a European type of bankruptcy
law. The laws in European countries are much harsher than the law in the US. For example
in Italy, debt is never discharged. A defaulter is liable forever. We are analyzing the effects
of introducing a US type of law on the Italian economy.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Computational strategy
The state vector for an individual is given by η = (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, S). The aggregate state variable
is a density µt (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, S) over the states. We assume that a take value on a grid Ga of
dimension na. Therefore the dimension of the individual state space is n = na × nθ × nϕ × 2
where nθ = 2 is the number of states for the entrepreneurial productivity and nϕ = 4 is the
number of states for the working productivity.
In order to solve the model we use the following approach:
Algorithm 1 Our solution algorithm is:
1. Assign all parameters values
2. Guess a value for the endogenous variable r.
3. Given r the FOC of the corporate sector uniquely pin down the wage rate w. The
representative competitive firm in the corporate sector will choose Kc and Lc such that
rd = ξAKξ−1c L1−ξc = ξA
(
Kdc
Ldc
)ξ−1
(1.8-1)
w = (1− ξ)AKξcL−ξc = (1− ξ)A
(
Kdc
Ldc
)ξ
(1.8-2)
Therefore r uniquely pins down
(
Kc
Lc
)
and in turn uniquely pins down w.
4. Given (r, w) we solve for the optimal value functions and corresponding policy functions
by value function iteration. The details of the zero profit conditions for the banks are
presented in the next subsection.
a) First we solve for the following policy functions34:
• Saving policy function: a′ (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, θ, ϕ, S,OCC) which for any state today
(θ−1, ϕ−1) and for any state tomorrow (θ, ϕ), for any given level of assets a,
for any given credit status S ∈ {UN,BC} and for any occupational choice
OC ∈ {W = 0, E = 1} gives us the optimal saving decision of the agent;
• Capital demand function k (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, S,OCC) for entrepreneurs;
• default decision d (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, θ, ϕ, S,OCC) for unconstrained entrepreneur;
34 Note that given our timing the saving and bankruptcy decisions are taken when the uncertainty about θ′and
ϕ′ has been resolved, therefore they appear as argument of the policy function.
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b) The above policy functions allow us to calculate the implied value functions
V (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, S,OCC)
c) This in turn allows us to solve for the occupational choice function
OC∗ (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, S) =
{
= 1 V (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, S, E) ≥ V (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, S,W )
= 0 otherwise
(1.8-3)
5. The policy functions, the exogenous transition matrix for the shocks (both for θ−1 and
for ϕ−1) and the credit status shock % allow us to derive the probability that an agent
in a certain state η will be in the state η′ next period, for any give state η. Given the
dimension of the state, all these probabilities form a transition matrix Pη of dimension
n× n.
6. The transition matrix Pη maps the current distribution35 µη into a next period distribu-
tion µ′η
µη,t+1 = P
′
η × µη,t (1.8-4)
We calculate the steady state distribution over the state µ∗η by solving for a
µ∗η = P
′
η × µ∗η (1.8-5)
7. From this we can derive the market clearing conditions
• the saving for the whole economy
SA (r) =
na∑
i=1
nθ∑
j=1
nϕ∑
v=1
2∑
u=1
ai × µ∗ (ai, θ−1j , ϕ−1v, Su) (1.8-6)
• the supply of labor
Ls (r) =
∑
i,j,v,u
µ∗ (ai, θ−1j , ϕ−1v, Su)× [1− OC∗ (ai, θ−1j , ϕ−1v, Su)]ϕ−1v (1.8-7)
• the demand of capital from the entrepreneurial sector
KdENTR (r) =
∑
i,j,v,u
p∗ (ai, θ−1j , ϕ−1v, Su)
× OC∗ (ai, θ−1j , ϕ−1v, Su)× k∗ (ai, θ−1j , ϕ−1v, Su)
(1.8-8)
where k∗ (ai, θ−1j , ϕ−1v, Su) = k [ai, θ−1j , ϕ−1v, Su, OC∗ (ai, θ−1j , ϕ−1v, Su)]
35 Note that in our framework the distribution of household over the state µη, is vector of dimension n whose
elements sum up to 1.
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8. Labor market clearing implies that labor supply Ls (r) is equal to labor demand Ldc .
Plugging this into the FOC (1.8-1) of the corporate sector we get the capital demand in
the corporate sector:
Kdc (r) =
(
r
ξA
) 1
ξ−1
LS (r) (1.8-9)
9. Now we look at capital market clearing:
KdENTR (r) +Kdc (r) = SA (r) (1.8-10)
10. If there is not equilibrium at point 9 we adjust the interest rate, go back to point 3, and
iterate until the market clears36.
Value function iteration
Given the presence of kinks in the problem we use a value function iteration algorithm to
solve for the value functions. We approximate the value functions using cubic splines.
The iteration goes as follows.
1. We guess a value function both for the UN and the BC agent: V BC0 (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) and
V UN0 (a, θ−1, ϕ−1)
2. Given the guesses, we solve for 4 value functions, two for the workers
(WBC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) and WUN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1)) and two for the entrepreneurs
(NBC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) and NUN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1)). The only non standard problem is to find
NUN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) where we take the zero profit condition of the bank into account.
The solution is described in the next subsection.
3. Form the function we can derive a new guess for the value function
V BC1 (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) = max
{
NBC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) ,WBC (a, θ−1, ϕ−1)
}
(1.8-11)
V UN1 (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) = max
{
NUN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) ,WUN (a, θ−1, ϕ−1)
}
(1.8-12)
4. Therefore we can construct an iteration of the form[
V BCj (a, η)
V UNj (a, η)
]
→
[
V BCj+1 (a, η)
V UNj+1 (a, η)
]
(1.8-13)
36 In practice we first run a grid search over different values for r and then bisect until we get market clearing.
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The zero profit condition
In the derivation of the optimal choice of the unconstrained entrepreneur we assume that he
can borrow from a perfectly competitive banking sector: that is there is free entry in the sector.
This implies that the bank makes zero profit on each contract. What we need is a menu of
contracts that the bank offers, where each contract is an amount lent b (a, θ−1, ϕ−1) and an
interest rate r (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b) that, give the assumption of perfect symmetric information, can
depend on the individual state of the agent
Banks will get repaid if the type-(a, θ−1, ϕ−1) agent finds it optimal not to declare bank-
ruptcy at the end of the period, given the amount lent. We denote the probability of
bankruptcy as pibankr (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b). Therefore the zero profit condition is given by [1− pibankr (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b)] [1 + r(a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b)] b+
+pibankr(a, η) max {χθkν + f (1− δ) (a− b)−X, 0}
 = (1 + r)b (1.8-14)
In order to find the equilibrium interest rate r (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b) charged to each type of agent
we must find the probability that the agent defaults. However, it is important to note that the
contracts the bank offers must all make zero profits in expectations, also the out-of-equilibrium
contracts (i.e. those the agent does not choose).
We solve the problem of unconstrained entrepreneurs over a grid. For any given type
(a, θ−1, ϕ−1) we find the optimal choice given a grid of possible levels of loans: bi ∈ [bmin, bmax].
Given each value of bi > 0 (if bi < 0 the agent saves so he does not need the bank and gets
an interest rate r) there are only three possibilities37:
• The agent always repays, both in the event of bad and in the event of a good shock to
entrepreneurial productivity. In this case pibankr (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b) = 1, and therefore the
only interest rate compatible with zero profits is r.
• The agent repays only in the case of a bad shock. In this case we know that
pibankr
(
a, θH , ϕ−1, b
)
= 1 − pHH and pibankr
(
a, θL, ϕ−1, b
)
= 1 − pLL and we can
calculate, for any b, the unique interest rate r (a, θ−1, ϕ−1, b) such that the bank breaks
even.
• The agent never repays so he never gets credit.
Therefore our strategy is, for any bi ∈ [bmin, bmax]
1. First we check what happens if the agent is offered the rate rd.
2. If the agent always repays we are done.
3. If the agent does not repay we check what would he do if he was offered the unique
37 This is under the assumption of only two state for entrepreneurial talent and that this is the only case that
matters.
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interest compatible with his defaulting only in the bad state. If he actually defaults
only in the bad state, we are done.
4. If at point 3 we find out that given the interest rate the agent will always default (in
the good and in the bad state) we know that the agent will never get credit so we set
his utility to −∞.
5. We do this for all the bi ∈ [bmin, bmax] and then the agent picks the bi that maximizes
his utility.
1.8.2 Data on Entrepreneurship
To calibrate the model and to select a value for the targets we need a definition of an
entrepreneur. Given the need to target bankruptcy, we are bounded in the choice by the
availability of data on business bankruptcy filings. The main source for data on business
bankruptcy is The Small Business Economy (2006) by the US Small Business Administration,
Office of Advocacy38. Their definition of entrepreneurs (see Table 1.8-1) is a business owner
who actually runs his business and has at least one employee. Given this definition the main
data on entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs’ termination and bankruptcy are reported in table 1.8-1.
To get the fraction of entrepreneurs in the population we apply the same definition of
entrepreneurs to several waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances (1989-2004). We define an
household as entrepreneurial if the head owns and runs a business with at least one employee.
The fraction of the population engaged in entrepreneurial activity, for several waves of the
SCF is reported in the last column of table 1.8-2. According to our definition, the fraction
of entrepreneurial household in total population is given by 7.62%. This number does not
differ from the numbers obtained by using other definitions of entrepreneurship used in the
literature39
Using the same definition we calculate the median net worth for entrepreneurial household
and for the total population, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. The results
are reported in table 1.8-3 which reports the median wealth based on other definition of
entrepreneurship as well.
The corresponding ratio of the median entrepreneurial wealth to the median wealth in
total population is 5.6640.
38 The original sources of data are:
• for the employers, from the Bureau of Census and U.S. Department of Commerce
• for employer’ births and terminations, from the Census Bureau
• for bankruptcies. from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (business bankruptcy filings).
39 Cagetti / De Nardi [2006] define as entrepreneurial an household whose head owns and runs a business and
declares herself as self-employed. Gentry / Hubbard [2004] define as entrepreneurial an household who owns
and runs a business with a total market value of at least 5000$.
40 Using other definitions of entrepreneurship the ratio of median wealth of entrepreneurs is lower: 4.8 and 5.3
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Table 1.8-1: entrepreneurship exit and bankruptcy
Year Entrepreneurs Exit Exit Rate Bankruptcy Bankruptcy/Exit
1990 5073795 531400 0.105 64853 0.122
1991 5051025 546518 0.108 71549 0.131
1992 5095356 521606 0.102 70643 0.135
1993 5193642 492651 0.095 62304 0.126
1994 5276964 503563 0.095 52374 0.104
1995 5369068 497246 0.093 51959 0.104
1996 5478047 512402 0.094 53549 0.105
1997 5541918 530003 0.096 54027 0.102
1998 5579177 540601 0.097 44367 0.082
1999 5607743 544487 0.097 37884 0.070
2000 5652544 542831 0.096 35472 0.065
2001 5657774 553291 0.098 40099 0.072
2002 5697759 586890 0.103 38540 0.066
2003 5767127 540658 0.094 35037 0.065
2004 5865400 544300 0.093 34317 0.063
2005 5992400 544800 0.091 39201 0.072
Average 5493734 533328 0.097 49136 0.093
SOURCE: US Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy (2006)
Table 1.8-2: fraction of entrepreneurs in total population
year Cagetti and De Nardi Gentry-Hubbard Our definition
1989 0.076 0.067 0.085
1992 0.081 0.096 0.081
1995 0.067 0.071 0.068
1998 0.074 0.074 0.073
2001 0.078 0.081 0.076
2004 0.075 0.084 0.075
Average 0.075 0.079 0.076
SOURCE: Survey of Consumer Finances (1989-2004)
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Table 1.8-3: median net worth of total population and of entrepreneurial household
Tot Cagetti
year Population and De Nardi Gentry-Hubbard Our definition
1989 47060 265000 318680 275500
1992 49600 208680 234250 300100
1995 57650 213300 226820 245801
1998 71700 331650 342600 371800
2001 86610 458000 495400 528900
2004 93001 536000 562500 606160
average 67603.5 335438.3 363375 388043.5
SOURCE: Survey of Consumer Finances (1989-2004)
In the literature another source of data on entrepreneurship is the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics [Quadrini 2000]. Given the panel structure it is particularly useful to calculate
exit and entry rates. However, one major drawback is that it undersamples rich households,
and therefore entrepreneurs. Unfortunately PSID does not report the number of employees
per firm. We cannot use our definition. In the literature on entrepreneurship that uses
PSID, Quadrini [2000], two definitions are adopted. According to the first an entrepreneur is
someone who declares himself self employed (SELF). According to the second an entrepreneur
is someone who owns a business (OWN). Both these definitions are less stringent than the one
adopted above. Column 2 and 3 of table 1.8-4 report the fraction of entrepreneurs in PSID
according to these definitions. The first definition yields an average fraction of entrepreneurs
of 11%. The second definition yields a fraction of 13%. This is much higher than the figure
derived from SCF data. Therefore we also use a third definition which is more restrictive: an
agent is an entrepreneur if both he owns a business and is self employed. This yields a lower
fraction of entrepreneurs, equal to 8%.
Given this discrepancy we avoid using PSID data unless it is strictly necessary. As a check
of the SBA data we calculate the exit and entry rates according to the 3 definitions above.
The entry rate in period t is defined as the ratio of the number of total households in the
sample who were workers in period t− 1 and were entrepreneurs in period t over the total
number of workers in period t− 1. The exit rate in period t is the ratio of those who were
entrepreneurs in period t−1 and are worker in period t over the total number of entrepreneurs
in period t− 1. The results are reported in table A5.
These numbers are much higher than the number from the number of SBA. The reason is
that the PSID undersamples rich household. Since successful entrepreneurs are richer and do
not exit, this results could be biased. Therefore, we choose as the target for the exit rate
9.3%.
Quadrini [2000] points out that the entry rate of workers who have some entrepreneurial
when using Cagetti / De Nardi [2006] and Gentry / Hubbard [2004] definitions respectively.
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Table 1.8-4: fraction of entrepreneurs
year SELF OWN BOTH
1969 0.11 0.08 0.06
1970 0.10 0.09 0.06
1971 0.10 0.09 0.06
1972 0.10 0.09 0.05
1973 0.10 0.09 0.06
1974 0.10 0.08 0.05
1975 0.10 0.08 0.06
1976 0.10 0.09 0.07
1977 0.10 0.09 0.06
1978 0.10 0.10 0.06
1979 0.10 0.10 0.06
1980 0.10 0.09 0.07
1981 0.10 0.10 0.06
1982 0.11 0.10 0.07
1983 0.11 0.11 0.07
1984 0.12 0.12 0.08
1985 0.13 0.14 0.09
1986 0.12 0.15 0.09
1987 0.13 0.15 0.09
1988 0.13 0.16 0.10
1989 0.13 0.15 0.09
1990 0.13 0.14 0.09
1991 0.13 0.14 0.09
1992 0.13 0.15 0.09
1993 0.13 0.13 0.08
1994 0.13 0.14 0.08
1995 0.12 0.13 0.08
1996 0.12 0.16 0.09
1997 0.13 0.17 0.09
average 0.11 0.12 0.08
SOURCE: PSID (1969-1997)
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Table 1.8-5: Exit and entry rates (different definitions of entrepreneurship)
year E
X
IT
O
W
N
EX
IT
SE
L
F
EX
IT
B
O
T
H
EN
T
RY
O
W
N
EN
T
RY
SE
L
F
EN
T
RY
B
O
T
H
1970 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.01
1971 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.01
1972 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.01
1973 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.02
1974 0.28 0.13 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.01
1975 0.22 0.10 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.02
1976 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.02
1977 0.20 0.12 0.21 0.03 0.02 0.01
1978 0.22 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.02
1979 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.01
1980 0.27 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.01
1981 0.22 0.10 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.01
1982 0.23 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.02 0.02
1983 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.01
1984 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.01
1985 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.02
1986 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.02
1987 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.01
1988 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.02
1989 0.24 0.15 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.02
1990 0.20 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.02
1991 0.22 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.02
1992 0.23 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.02 0.02
1993 0.25 0.13 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.02
1994 0.22 0.15 0.21 0.04 0.02 0.02
1995 0.25 0.13 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.02
1996 0.19 0.10 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.02
1997 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.01
average 0.21 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.02
SOURCE: PSID (1969-1997)
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experience in the past is much higher than the entry rate of those who has not got any
experience. Using the PSID data we replicate his results. An agent is defined as "experienced"
worker in t− 1 if he is a worker in period t-1 and has been an entrepreneur in any of the three
periods before (t− 2, t− 3, t− 4). All the remaining workers in period t− 1 are defined as
non-experienced. The entry rate for experienced and non experienced workers, as well as the
overall entry rate are reported in table 1.8-6.
Table 1.8-6: Entry rates (experienced and non experienced workers)
year total pop non experienced experienced
1974 0.015 0.009 0.313
1975 0.017 0.012 0.298
1976 0.014 0.010 0.280
1977 0.018 0.012 0.311
1978 0.014 0.009 0.216
1979 0.013 0.010 0.171
1980 0.011 0.008 0.190
1981 0.015 0.010 0.268
1982 0.014 0.010 0.197
1983 0.014 0.009 0.265
1984 0.023 0.017 0.324
1985 0.019 0.014 0.264
1986 0.014 0.010 0.182
1987 0.020 0.017 0.136
1988 0.017 0.012 0.192
1989 0.018 0.013 0.140
1990 0.017 0.013 0.167
1991 0.019 0.013 0.196
1992 0.017 0.012 0.185
1993 0.018 0.010 0.230
1994 0.019 0.011 0.247
1995 0.017 0.011 0.200
1996 0.012 0.008 0.167
average 0.016 0.011 0.223
SOURCE: PSID (1969-1997)
The entry rate of experienced workers is 14 times higher than the entry rate of the total
population.41
1.8.3 Formal definition of equilibrium
In our model the state space is given by 4 elements: the asset level a, the entrepreneurial
productivity θ, the worker productivity ϕ and the credit status S. We discretize the asset
41 If we restrict the sample period to 1989 to 1996,in order to be compatible with other data sources the ratio
falls to 11. We set this as the target.
1.8. Appendix 57
state space, assuming that assets can values on a grid of na elements Ga ⊆ <na+ . Given
the Markov approximation for the productivities processes we have that θ can take nθ = 2
values, θ ∈ Θ ≡
{
0, θH
}
, and ϕ can take nϕ = 4 values ϕ ∈ {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4} ≡ Γ. Moreover
S ∈ {BC,UN} ≡ Ξ. Following Huggett [1993], we can define the state space for the
households as Ω = Ga × Θ × Φ × Ξ. Letting σΩ be the Borel σ-algebra on Ω and letting
the optimal policy functions PF (ω) , ω ∈ Ω,(assets decisions, occupational choice, capital
demand, bankruptcy decision) we have that the policy functions and the exogenous stochastic
process imply a transition function T (ω, ς) ,∀ς ∈ σΩ on the measurable space (Ω, ω). This
transition function implies a stationary probability measure µ (ς) ,∀ς ∈ σΩ that describes the
distribution of households’ assets holdings, productivity levels, and credit status. Stationarity
implies
µ (ς) =
∫
Ω
T (ω, ς) dµ (1.8-15)
After this bit of notation we can formally state the following definition of stationary
equilibrium:
Definition 2 A stationary equilibrium of the model is a four-tuple {PF (ω), µ(ς),
(r, w), r(ω)} such that:
1. PF (ω) is optimal for given (r, w)
2. µ (ς) is the stationary distribution associated with the transition function generated by
PF (ω), given (r, w)
3. The corporate sector representative firm is optimizing, given (r, w)
r = ξAKξ−1c L1−ξc = ξA
(
Kc
Lc
)ξ−1
(1.8-16)
w = (1− ξ)AKξcL−ξc = (1− ξ)A
(
Kc
Lc
)ξ
(1.8-17)
4. r (ω) reflects the zero profit condition for the banking sector
5. Labor market and capital market clears.
Chapter 2
Personal Bankruptcy Law, Debt Portfolios
and Entrepreneurship
2.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs employ half of all workers in the US and they create three quarters of all new
jobs.1 Over time, successful entrepreneurs, for example Bill Gates in 1978 or Larry Page
and Sergey Brin in 1997, grow their small firms into big enterprises, for example Microsoft
and Google today. Personal bankruptcy law is important for entrepreneurs because if an
entrepreneur’s firm is not incorporated he or she is personally liable for all the unsecured
debts of this firm.2 Many entrepreneurs fail each year, and around 60,000 file for bankruptcy.
This paper investigates quantitatively the effects of personal bankruptcy law on entrepren-
eurship. Bankruptcy introduces some contingency in a world of incomplete credit markets
where only simple debt contracts are available. This contingency provides insurance against
entrepreneurial failure at the cost of worsening credit conditions. If the bankruptcy law
does not allow default under any circumstances, credit will be available at lower interest
rates because borrowers will not default. This comes at the expense of borrowers having no
insurance against business failure. If, however, the bankruptcy law makes default very easy,
borrowers might be insured against bad outcomes. But in order to compensate for the default
risk, banks have to charge higher interest rates or ration credit all together. In our model, as
in the real world, entrepreneurs can also obtain secured credit. This modifies the trade-off
between insurance and credit conditions by allowing agents, if they want to, to obtain cheap
1 We thank Alex Michaelides for his continuous support and valuable comments, and Francesco Caselli and
Maitreesh Ghatak for helpful comments at various stages of this research. We are also grateful to Orazio
Attanasio, Daniel Becker, Chris Caroll, Wouter Den Haan, Eric Hurst, Bernardo Guimaraes, Christian Julliard,
Winfried Koeniger, Tom Krebs, Dirk Krueger, Rachel Ngai, Vincenzo Quadrini, Victor Rios-Rull, Alwyn
Young and participants at Fifth European Workshop in Macroeconomics, the Heterogeneous Agent Models in
Macroeconomics workshop in Mannheim 2009 and the NBER 2009 Summer Institute EFACR workshop.
2 Meh / Terajima [2008] report that unsecured debt accounts for around on e third of all debt.
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(secured) credit even in a world with a very generous bankruptcy law. We find that allowing
entrepreneurs to obtain both, secured and unsecured credit, has quantitatively important
effects on the model economy.
The trade-off between insurance and credit conditions is at the center of recent public
discussions and policy changes in Europe and the US. In Europe, the bankruptcy law is much
harsher than in the US. Many countries, for example Germany, the Netherlands and the
UK, have made legislation more lenient with the explicit aim of fostering entrepreneurship.3
The policy changes in the US went in the opposite direction. Following the huge increase in
personal bankruptcy filings, US Congress in 2005 passed a law making personal bankruptcy
less beneficial for filers. Even though the focus of this discussion has been on consumer
bankruptcy, the effects on entrepreneurship are important because around 60,000 failed
entrepreneurs file for bankruptcy each year. Our paper quantitatively assesses the relative
strength of these two opposing forces: insurance versus credit conditions, on the number of
entrepreneurs, on the access of poor agents to entrepreneurship, on firm size, and on welfare,
inequality and social mobility.
We build an infinite horizon heterogeneous agent model, which has an occupational
choice problem at its core. Agents differ with respect to their entrepreneurial and working
productivity. During each period, they decide whether to become an entrepreneur or a worker.
Cagetti / De Nardi [2006] also have this occupational choice at the center of their model,
which is able to explain US wealth distribution, in particular its extremely skewed nature at
the top. However, in their model, entrepreneurship is a risk-free activity because there is no
uncertainty about current productivities. Thus there is no default in equilibrium and there is
no insurance role for bankruptcy. We have default in our model because in the US 2.25% of
all entrepreneurs file for bankruptcy.
Despite the importance of personal bankruptcy law for entrepreneurship, there is little
quantitative literature on this topic. Starting with Athreya [2002], the literature so far has
focused almost exclusively on consumer bankruptcy. For example, Livshits et al. [2007]
compare the US system under which future earnings are exempt after consumers have
defaulted with a European type of system under which future earnings are garnished to
repay creditors. They find that the welfare differences between the systems depend on the
persistence and variance of the shocks. Chatterjee et al. [2007] show that the recent tightening
of the law in the US implies large welfare gains.4 In this literature there are few papers that
focus on secured and unsecured borrowing. Athreya [2006] finds that welfare is increasing
in the wealth exemption level. Hintermaier / Koeniger [2008] examine the reasons for the
increase in consumer bankruptcies in a model with durable and nondurable goods.
There are three closely related papers that analyze the effects of bankruptcy on entre-
preneurship in a quantitative setting similar to our paper. Akyol / Athreya [2007] use an
3 In a companion paper, we are currently investigating the effects of introducing a US type of law in Europe.
4 Other papers in this growing literature are Athreya [2006], Athreya / Simpson [2006], Li / Sarte [2006],
Mateos-Planas / Seccia [2006].
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overlapping generations, partial equilibrium framework with heterogeneity in human capital.
Their main results is that the current system is too generous. Meh / Terajima [2008] have
a similar framework (partial equilibrium OLG model) in which they analyze bankruptcy
decisions of both consumers and entrepreneurs. Mankart / Rodano [2007] have a model with
temporary and permanent productivity shocks. The main result of all three papers is that
the current system is too generous.5
Our model is able to replicate key macroeconomic variables of the US economy: the capital
output ratio, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the population, the exit rate, the bankruptcy
filings of entrepreneurs, the wealth of entrepreneurs compared to workers. Based on this
model, we can conduct a policy experiment to assess whether the current exemption level
(how much wealth a person can keep in case of a default) is optimal.
Our main result is that the current system is too harsh with respect to the exemption
level. There are welfare gains from increasing the current exemption level to the optimal one.
Entrepreneurship would increase from 7.2% of the population to 7.4% if the exemption level
were increased because of the increased insurance effect. Moreover, eliminating bankruptcy
exemptions would lead to a reduction of welfare and a reduction in entrepreneurship to 6.6%
of the population.
Our results are strikingly different from other papers in the literature. Meh / Terajima
[2008], Akyol / Athreya [2007] and Mankart / Rodano [2007] find that the current system
is too generous6. The main difference is that all these paper do not allow entrepreneurs to
obtain secured, in addition to unsecured, credit.
In a counterfactual experiment we find that if we exclude secured credit we get similar
results as the previous literature: the current law appears to be too lenient. The reason is
the following. When we exclude secured credit some agents are credit rationed because their
incentive to default is too high. Therefore they become workers. Increasing the exemption
level worsens this problem. If instead these agents can obtain secured credit (i.e. pledge
collateral), they can run bigger firms and therefore find it profitable to become entrepreneurs.
Excluding secured credit from the analysis overstates the role of credit rationing. Thus, the
policy conclusion reached in the previous literature might be premature.
Our results, as those from Meh / Terajima [2008], Akyol / Athreya [2007] and Mankart
/ Rodano [2007] are consistent with the empirical finding of Berkowitz / White [2004] who
show that in states with higher exemption levels, credit conditions are worse. But our paper
is also consistent with the findings of Fan / White [2003] that show that entrepreneurship is
higher in states with a more lenient bankruptcy law. This is not true in the work of Meh /
Terajima [2008], Akyol / Athreya [2007] and Mankart / Rodano [2007].
Moreover, we use Epstein-Zin preferences. This allows us to distinguish between risk aversion
5 Zha [2001] is a theoretical investigation of similar issues. However his model abstracts from occupational
choice, which we show to be the crucial channel through which bankruptcy law affects entrepreneurship.
6 This result is also common to most papers in the consumer bankruptcy literature.
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and intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This is particularly interesting, given that the
costs of a generous bankruptcy system, in terms of higher interest rates, depend mainly on the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, while the benefits, in terms of insurance, depend on
risk aversion. Our choice of preferences allows us to examine these effects separately. We find
that the optimal exemption level increases with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
This result is quite intuitive since agents who are more willing to substitute consumption
across time are less affected by the higher borrowing rates resulting from higher exemption
levels. We also find that the optimal exemption level increases with risk aversion. The more
risk averse agents are the more they value insurance.
The paper is organized as follows, Section 2 provides an overview of US bankruptcy law
and presents data on entrepreneurial failure. In Section 3 we present our model and discuss
the equilibrium condition. In Section 4 we discuss our calibration strategy and present the
baseline results. Section 5 explains the main mechanism of the model. In Section 6, we
conduct the main policy experiment. In Section 7 we present the effects of excluding secured
credit and some robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Entrepreneurial failure and personal bankruptcy in the US
Personal bankruptcy procedures in the US consist of two different procedures: Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13. Under Chapter 7, all unsecured debt is discharged immediately, while a secured
creditor can fully seize the assets pledged as collateral. Future earnings cannot be garnished.
This is why Chapter 7 is known as providing a "fresh start". At the same time, a person filing
for bankruptcy has to surrender all wealth in excess of an exemption level. The exemption
level varies across US states, ranging from $11,000 in Maryland to unlimited for housing
wealth in some states, for example Florida. Therefore, we calculate the population-weighted
median across states. The resulting average exemption level is $47,800 in 1993.7
Under Chapter 13 agents can keep their wealth, debt is not discharged immediately and
future earnings are garnished. Entrepreneurs are better off under Chapter 7 for three reasons:
they have no non-exempt wealth, their debt is discharged immediately and they can start
a new business straight away, since their income will not be subject to garnishment [see
White 2007a]. 70% of total bankruptcy cases involving entrepreneurs are under Chapter 7.
Therefore we will focus on Chapter 7 only.
Persons can file for bankruptcy only once every six years. The bankruptcy filing remains
public information for ten years. Therefore, agents have difficulties obtaining unsecured credit
for some time after having defaulted. Secured credit, credit that is collateralized, is always
available.
The US. Small Business Administration reports an exit rate of on average 9.7% per annum
7 The wealth exemption level does not change much over time. We choose 1993 because it is in the middle of
the sample years for our data on entrepreneurship wealth distribution and bankruptcies.
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for small firms in the period from 1990-2005.8 Out of these failing firms 9.3% file for
bankruptcy, according to the official data from the Administrative Office of the Courts.9
Unfortunately, the official data on personal bankruptcy caused by a business failure seem to
be severely downward biased. Lawless / Warren [2005] estimate that the true number could
be three to four times as big. Their own study is based on an in-depth analysis of bankruptcy
filers in five different judicial districts. Their explanation of this discrepancy is the emergence
of automated classification of personal bankruptcy cases. Almost all software used in this
area has "consumer case" as the default option. Thus reporting a personal bankruptcy case
as a "business related" case requires some - even though small - effort while being completely
inconsequential for the court proceedings. In addition to their own study they report data
from Dun & Bradstreet according to which business bankruptcies are at least twice the official
number.10
In the calibration of our model we set the baseline exemption level equal to $47,800. The
baseline exclusion period is set to two year.11 We calibrate the model such that the default
rate of entrepreneurs is 2.25%.
2.3 The model
Our economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. Agents face
idiosyncratic uncertainty, but there is no aggregate uncertainty. At the beginning of every
period, agents decide whether to become workers or entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur must
decide how much to invest, how much to borrow secured and, if he is allowed to, how much
to borrow unsecured. An entrepreneur who has defaulted on unsecured credit is excluded
from unsecured credit for two year but is allowed to obtain secured credit. Since we focus on
the implications of personal bankruptcy for entrepreneurs, workers are not allowed to borrow.
Agents productivities evolve over time and agents are subject to uninsurable production risk.
8 The U.S. Small Business Administration splits small firms into employer and non-employer firms. Employer
firms have at least one employee working in the firm. There are roughly five million employer and 15 million
non-employer firms in the U.S. Since the focus of our paper is on entrepreneurs who own and manage the firm
we use only the data for employer firms since non-employer firms have in many cases the owner not working in
the firm. To ensure consistency across our three databases, when we use data from the Survey of Consumer
Finance (SCF) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) we define entrepreneurs as business owners
who manage a firm with at least one employee.
9 While one can obtain exit rates from the PSID data [Quadrini 2000], it is impossible to obtain reliable
bankruptcy data from the PSID. There is only one wave in which respondents were asked about past
bankruptcies.
10 Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) is a credit-reporting and business information firm. D&B compiles its own
independent business failure database. Until the emergence of automated software for law firms and courts in
the mid 1980s, the official business bankruptcy data and the index compiled by D&B have a positive and
significant correlation of 0.73. From 1986-1998 this correlation coefficient becomes negative and insignificant.
Extrapolating from the historic relationship between the D&B index and personal bankruptcy cases caused by
business failures leads to the conclusion that the official data under report business bankruptcy cases at least
by a factor of two.
11 We choose a short exclusion period because there is evidence that entrepreneurs obtain unsecured credit
even after defaulting. However as a robustness check, we set the exclusion period to six years and the results
do not change much.
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After the shocks are realized, production takes place. At the end of the period unsecured
borrowers decide whether to repay or whether to default and how much to consume and
how much to save. If they default, they will be borrowing constrained in the next period.
Anticipating this behavior, banks who give unsecured credit vary the interest rate charged for
each loan taking into account the individual borrower’s default probability. The remainder of
this section presents the details of the model.
2.3.1 Credit and bankruptcy law
Agents can get two types of credit: secured and unsecured. Both types of credit are subject
to a limited commitment problem.12 After getting credit, all borrowers have two options:
take all liquid assets, their own wealth plus the amount borrowed, and run or start the
entrepreneurial activity. If they run the agents can keep a fraction λ of the liquid assets. If
the agents start the entrepreneurial activity then the only difference is that secured credit
must be repaid (and it has priority in the bankruptcy proceedings), while unsecured credit is
subject to Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedure, if the agent exercises his default option.
In the event of a default the agent still must repay her secured debt. Unsecured debt,
however, is discharged. Any assets remaining after repaying the secured debt which is in
excess of an exemption level X are liquidated.
An agent who has defaulted in the past is excluded from the market for unsecured credit
for a certain period of time. During this period he still can obtained secured credit and
can become an entrepreneur. We call this agent borrowing constrained and we denote his
credit status as BC. It is important to note that this agent is not fully excluded from the
credit market. He can still obtain secured credit. However he cannot obtain unsecured credit.
We assume that every borrowing constrained agent, whether worker or entrepreneur, faces
a credit status shock at the end of the period. With probability (1− %) the agent remains
borrowing constrained. With probability % the agent regain access to unsecured credit. He
becomes an unconstrained agent with credit status UN .13 This probability % captures the
duration of exclusion period from the market of unsecured borrowing. It is calibrated such
that the average exclusion period is two year.
2.3.2 Households
Our economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. Agents
differ with respect to their level of assets a, their entrepreneurial productivity θ, their working
productivity ϕ, and their credit market status S ∈ {UN,BC}.
12 We introduce this limited commitment problem to obtain reasonable leverage ratios. As pointed out by
Heaton / Lucas [2002] models without information asymmetries yield counterfactually large leverage ratios.
13 The length of the exclusion period is transformed into a probability in order to avoid an additional state
variable that keeps track of the numbers of years left before the solvency status is returned to UN. This
procedure is standard in the literature, see Athreya [2002] and Chatterjee et al. [2007].
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Preferences
For simplicity we abstract from labor-leisure choice. All agents supply their unit of labor
inelastically either as workers or as entrepreneurs. In order to disentangle the effects of risk
aversion from that of the elasticity of inetertemporal substitution we assume that agents
have Epstein-Zin preferences. A stochastic consumption stream {ct}∞t=0 generates an utility
{ut}∞t=0 according to
ut = U (ct) + βU
(
CEt
[
U−1 (ut+1)
])
where β is the discount rate and CEt
[
U−1 (ut+1)
] ≡ Γ−1 [EtΓ (ut+1)] is the consumption
equivalent of ut+1 given information at period t. The utility function U (c) = c1−
1
ψ /
(
1− 1ψ
)
aggregates consumption across dates and ψ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The utility function Γ (c) = c1−γ/ (1− γ) aggregates consumption across states and γ is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Productivities
Each agent is endowed with a couple of stochastic productivity levels which are known
at the beginning of the period: one as an entrepreneur θ, and one as a worker ϕ. We
make the simplifying assumption that the working and entrepreneurial ability processes are
uncorrelated.
The workers’ ability process Following the literature, we assume that labor productivity
follows the following AR(1) process
logϕt = (1− ρ)µ+ ρ logϕt−1 + εt
where εt is iid and ε ∼ N (0, σε). If the agent becomes a worker his labor income during
current period is given by wϕ.
The entrepreneurs’ ability process In contrast to the case of working ability, there are no
reliable estimates of the functional form for the case of entrepreneurial ability. Therefore,
following Cagetti / De Nardi [2006], we will assume a parsimonious specification where
entrepreneurial productivity follows a 2-state Markov process with θL = 0 and θH > 0 and
transition matrix
Pθ =
[
pLL 1− pLL
1− pHH pHH
]
We calibrate the 3 parameters (θH , pHH and pLL) to match some observed features of
entrepreneurial activity in the US economy.
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2.3.3 Technology
Entrepreneurial sector Every agent in the economy has access to a productive technology
that, depending on her entrepreneurial productivity θ, produces output according to the
production function
Y = θkν
k = χI
where θ is the agent’s persistent entrepreneurial productivity described above.
We assume that investment is subject to an iid idiosyncratic shock. Each unit of the
numeraire good which is invested in the entrepreneurial activity is transformed in χ units
of capital with logχ ∼ N (0, σχ) This iid shock represents the possibility that an inherently
talented entrepreneur (i.e. an agent with high and persistent θ) might choose the wrong
project or could be hit by an adverse demand shock. Quadrini [2000] shows that the entry
rate of workers with some entrepreneurial experience in the past, is much higher than the
entry rate of those workers without any experience. Therefore it seems that entrepreneurs
come mostly from a small subset of total population. If their firms fail, they are very likely
to start a new firm within a few years. The iid shock χ helps us to capture this difference in
the entry rates.
Corporate sector Many firms are both incorporated and big enough not to be subject to
personal bankruptcy law. Therefore we follow Quadrini [2000] and Cagetti / De Nardi [2006]
and assume a perfectly competitive corporate sector which is modeled as a Cobb-Douglas
production function
F (Kc, Lc) = AKξcL1−ξc
where Kc and Lc are capital and labor employed in this sector. Given perfect competition
and constant returns to scale the corporate sector does not distribute any dividend. Capital
depreciates at rate δ in both sectors.
2.3.4 Credit market
We assume that there is perfect competition (free entry) in the credit market. Therefore
banks must make zero expected profit on any contract. The opportunity cost of lending to
entrepreneurs is the rate of return on capital in the corporate sector. This is also equal to
the deposit rate.14 Agents can get two types of credit: secured credit and unsecured credit.
Secured credit represents collateralized borrowing. Thus, it is available at the risk free rate
14 In our model, banks are isomorphic to a bond market in which each agent has the possibility to issue debt.
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plus a small transaction cost (rs = rs + τ s). Unsecured credit requires higher transaction
costs (τu > τ s) that reflect the higher information costs which are present in the real world
and from which we abstract in the model.
Both types of contracts are subject to a limited commitment constraint. Instead of investing
the money in the entrepreneurial firm the agent can take the money and run away with a
fraction λ of the credit plus assets. Anticipating this behavior, banks will never lend any
amount such that the agent prefers to run.15
There are no information asymmetries in the credit market. Banks know the agent’s assets,
the amount he borrowed secured s and his productivities. For any given value of (a, s, θ, ϕ)
and for any amount lent unsecured b, by anticipating the behavior of the entrepreneur, banks
are able to calculate the probability of default and the recovery rate in case of default. Perfect
competition implies that they set the interest rate, r (a, s, θ, ϕ, b,X), such that they expect
to break even. This interest rate depends on the exemption level X because it affects the
incentives to default and the amount the bank recovers in this event. Therefore banks offer a
menu of one period debt contracts which consist of an amount lent b and a corresponding
interest rate r (a, s, θ, ϕ, b,X) to each agent (a, s, θ, ϕ).
2.3.5 Timing
Figure 2.1 shows the timing of the model. Given the focus of the paper we choose the timing
such that workers can never default. Entrepreneurs’ borrowing and default decisions are
taken within the period. At the beginning of the period all agents face an occupational
choice: they choose whether they become entrepreneurs or workers. Agents know their current
productivities (ϕ, θ).
Workers deposit all their wealth at the banks, receiving a rate of return rd. After production
has taken place, they choose consumption and savings. At the end of the period the borrowing
constrained worker receives the credit status shock. With probability % he remains borrowing
constrained next period (i.e. S′ = BC). With probability (1− %) he becomes unconstrained
next period (i.e. S′ = UN).
The borrowing constrained entrepreneur chooses how much secured credit s to obtain
or whether to save. After having obtained secured credit s, the borrowing constrained
entrepreneur decides whether to take s and his own wealth a and run (with a fraction λ of it).
In this case the bank receives nothing. Anticipating this, the bank will never lend an amount
s with which the agent would run. The entrepreneur decides how much to invest before
the iid shock χ is realized. After χ is realized and production has taken place, he chooses
consumption and savings. At the end of the period he receives the credit status shock.
The unconstrained entrepreneur can obtain both: secured credit s and unsecured credit b.
15 This means that running with the money is an out of equilibrium behavior. We introduce it to limit the
leverage ratio to empirically plausible levels.
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Figure 2.1: Timing of the model
Before knowing χ, he chooses his capital stock by deciding how much to borrow (or invest
at rate rd). He obtains secured credit s at the interest rate rs. Unsecured borrowing is
done by picking from the menu {b, r (a, θ, ϕ, s, b,X)} offered by the the banks. As for the
borrowing constrained, the unconstrained constrained can take a + b + s and run. And as
before, the bank will never lend in a way that induces the agent to run. After χ is realized
and production has taken place, the entrepreneur must repay his secured debt. Then he can
decide whether to repay his unsecured debt as well and be unconstrained next period (i.e.
S′ = UN) or whether to declare bankruptcy and be borrowing constrained next period(i.e.
S′ = BC). After that he chooses consumption and savings.
Since the credit status S consists only of the two states BC and UN , we define the
individual state variable as (a, θ, ϕ), and we solve for two value functions V UN (a, θ, ϕ) and
V BC (a, θ, ϕ) one for each credit status.
2.3.6 The problem of the borrowing constrained agent
The borrowing constrained agent can only obtain secured credit. Therefore he can either save
or borrow at a rate rd subject to the limited commitment constraint. At the beginning of the
period he can choose whether to become an entrepreneur, which gives utility NBC (a, θ, ϕ)
or a worker which yields utility WBC (a, θ, ϕ). Therefore the value of being a borrowing
constrained agent with state (a, θ, ϕ) is
V BC (a, θ, ϕ) = max
{
NBC (a, θ, ϕ) ,WBC (a, θ, ϕ)
}
where the "max" operator reflects the occupational choice.
Worker At the beginning of the period the borrowing constrained worker deposits all his
wealth at the bank and he receives labor income wϕ. At the end of the period, he chooses
consumption and saving, taking into account that he will receive a credit status shock in
addition to productivity shocks. With probability % he will be still borrowing constrained
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next period which yields utility V BC (a′, θ, ϕ), while with probability (1− %) he will become
unconstrained which yields utility V UN (a′, θ, ϕ). His saving problem is the following
WBC (a, θ, ϕ) = max
c,a′
{
U (c) + βU
(
CEt
[
%V BC
(
a′, θ′, ϕ′
)
+ (1− %)V UN (a′, θ′, ϕ′)])}
s.t. c+ a′ = wϕ+
(
1 + rd
)
a
a′ ≥ 0
Entrepreneur At the beginning of the period the borrowing constrained entrepreneur decides
how much to invest in his firm I = a+ s by choosing how much secured credit (s > 0) or save,
at rate rd (s < 0). Each unit of investment is transformed in χ units of capital, (k = χI).
After he has got credit he could take the money and run away with a fraction λ. If he does
so his utility is given by
Υ [a+ s, θ, ϕ] = max
c,a′
{
U (c) + βU
[
CEtV BC
(
a′, θ′, ϕ′
)]}
s.t. c+ a′ = λ (a+ s)
a′ ≥ 0
After the shock χ is realized he will decide how to allocate the resources (χI)ν θ+(1− δ)χI−(
1 + rd
)
s among consumption and savings. His saving problem, after uncertainty is re-
solved,16 is
N˜BC (a, θ, ϕ, χ, s) = max
a′,c
{
U (c) + βU
(
CEt
[
%V BC
(
a′, θ′, ϕ′
)
+ (1− %)V UN (a′, θ′, ϕ′)])}
s.t. c+ a′ = [χ (a+ s)]ν θ + (1− δ)χ (a+ s)−
(
1 + rd
)
s
a′ ≥ 0
Therefore the optimal investment decisions of the agent at the beginning of the period is
NBC (a, θ, ϕ) = max
s
U
(
CEt
{
N˜BC
(
a, θ′, ϕ′, χ, s
)})
s.t. NBC (a, θ, ϕ) > Υ [a+ s, θ, ϕ]
2.3.7 The problem of the unconstrained agent
At the beginning of the period the unconstrained agent faces the following occupational choice
V UN (a, θ, ϕ) = max
{
WUN (a, θ, ϕ) , NUN (a, θ, ϕ)
}
where WUN (a, θ, ϕ) is the utility of becoming a worker and NUN (a, θ, ϕ) of becoming an
entrepreneur.
16 We denote with a "˜" all the value functions, after uncertainty (about χ) is resolved. The value functions
without "˜" are before uncertainty is resolved.
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Worker The problem of the unconstrained worker is identical to the borrowing constrained
one except that the agent will be unconstrained in the future for sure. His saving problem is
the following
WUN (a, θ, ϕ) = max
c,a′
U (c) + βU
(
CEt
[
V UN
(
a′, θ′, ϕ′
)])
s.t. c+ a′ = wϕ+
(
1 + rd
)
a
a′ ≥ 0
Entrepreneur The unconstrained entrepreneur decides how much to invest in his firm
I = a+ b+ s by choosing how much to borrow from secured credit (s > 0) from unsecured
credit (b > 0) or save at rate rd (s < 0). If he borrows unsecured credit he can choose from
the menu {b, r (a, θ, ϕ, b, s,X)} offered by competitive banks. After the shock χ is realized he
can choose whether to declare bankruptcy (default) or whether to repay and how much to
consume and save. He solves the problem backwards.
If he repays his unsecured debt, he has to choose how to allocate his resources, θ [(a+ b+ s)χ]ν+
(1− δ) (a+ b+ s)χ − b [1 + r (a, θ, ϕ, b, s,X)] − (1 + rd)s,
between consumption and savings. Given that the decision of repaying is done when current
productivities (θ, ϕ) and the shock χ are known, his utility from repaying is given by
N˜pay (a, b, s, θ, ϕ, χ) = max
c,a′
{
U (c) + βU
(
CEt
[
V UN
(
a′, θ′, ϕ′
)])}
s.t. a′ + c = θ [(a+ b+ s)χ]ν + (1− δ) (a+ b+ s)χ− · · ·
−b [1 + r (a, θ, ϕ, b, s,X)]− (1 + rd)s
a′ ≥ 0
If he defaults, his unsecured debt is discharged. But he must repay any secured debt
he had and he loses all assets in excess of the exemption levelX. Thus, the resources to allocate
between consumption and savings are
min
{
θ [(a+ b+ s)χ]ν + (1− δ) (a+ b+ s)χ− (1 + rd)s,X
}
. Moreover if he defaults he will
be borrowing constrained next period. Therefore by declaring bankruptcy he gets
N˜ bankr (a, b, s, θ, ϕ, χ) = max
c,a′
{
U (c) + βU
(
CEt
[
V BC
(
a′, θ′, ϕ′
)])}
s.t. a′ + c = min
{
θ [(a+ b+ s)χ]ν + (1− δ) (a+ b+ s)χ− (1 + rd)s,X
}
a′ ≥ 0
He will declare bankruptcy if N bankr (a, b, s, θ, ϕχ) > Npay (a, b, s, θ, ϕ, χ) and vice versa.
Thus, at the beginning of the period the agent choose the optimal amount of b from the menu
{b, r (a, θ, ϕ, b,X)} and the optimal s anticipating his future behavior. Therefore his utility
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is given by
NUN (a, θ, ϕ) = max
{b,r(·)},s
CEt
[
max
{
N˜pay (a, b, s, θ, ϕ, χ) , N˜ bankr (a, b, s, θ, ϕ, χ)
}]
s.t. NUN (a, θ, ϕ) ≥ ΥUN [a+ s+ b, θ, ϕ]
where the "max" operator inside the square brackets reflects the bankruptcy decision, and the
"max" operator outside the square brackets reflects the borrowing decision. The last equation
represents the limited commitment constraint where
Υ [a+ s+ b, θ, ϕ] = max
c,a′
{
U (c) + βU
[
CEtV BC
(
a′, θ′, ϕ′
)]}
s.t. c+ a′ = λ (a+ s+ b)
a′ ≥ 0
2.3.8 The zero profit condition of the banks
Banks observe the state variables (a, θ, ϕ) at the moment of offering the contract.There is
perfect competition (free entry) in the credit market therefore banks make zero profit on
each secured and unsecured loan contract. Therefore the bank is indifferent between issuing
secured and unsecured loans. For each unit of secured credit the bank know that the agent
will repay for sure: free entry will push the interest rate on secured credit to the risk free
rate plus the transaction cost τ s. For any given state (a, θ, ϕ) and for any given amount of
secured borrowing the agent is doing (s) and for any unsecured loan (b), banks know in which
states of the world the agent will file for bankruptcy. Therefore, they are able to calculate
the probability that a certain agent with characteristics (a, θ, ϕ), and secured loan s, will
default for any given amount b. This default probability, pibankr (a, θ, ϕ, b, s,X), depends on
the exemption level X because X affects the incentive to default directly.
If the agent repays banks receive [1 + r(a, θ, ϕ, b, s,X)] b. If the agent defaults banks
sells the firm’s un-depreciated capital. Therefore they receive: nothing if θ [(a+ b+ s)χ]ν +
(1− δ) (a+ b+ s)χ−
(
1 + rd
)
s < X, while banks receive θ [(a+ b+ s)χ]ν+(1− δ) (a+ b+ s)χ−(
1 + rd
)
s−X otherwise.
The zero profit condition of the banks is given by

[
1− pibankr(a, θ, ϕ, b, s,X)
]
[1 + r(a, θ, ϕ, b, s,X)] b+
+pibankr(a, θ, ϕ, b, s,X)
max
{
θ [χI]ν + (1− δ)χI −
(
1 + rd
)
s−X, 0
}
 = (1 + rd)(1 + τu)b,
where I = a+ b+ s
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2.3.9 Equilibrium
Let η = (a, θ, ϕ, S) be a state vector for an individual, where a denotes assets, θ entrepreneurial
productivity, ϕ working productivity and S the credit status. From the optimal policy
functions (savings, capital demand, default decisions), from the exogenous Markov process for
productivity and from the credit status shocks, we can derive a transition function, that, for
any distribution µ (η) over the state provides the next period distribution µ′ (η). A stationary
equilibrium is given by
• a deposit rate of return rd and a wage rate w
• an interest rate function
• a set of policy functions g (η) (consumption and saving, secured and unsecured borrowing,
capital demand, bankruptcy decisions and occupational choice)
• a constant distribution over the state η, µ∗ (η)
such that, given rd and w and a bankruptcy regime X and %:
• g (η) solves the maximization problem of the agents;
• the corporate sector representative firm is optimizing;
• capital, labor and goods market clear:
– capital demand comes from both, entrepreneurs and the corporate sector, while
supply comes from the saving decisions of the agents;
– labor demand comes from the corporate sector, while labor supply comes from the
occupational choice of the agents;
• the interest rate function reflects the zero profit condition of the banks
• The distribution µ∗ (η) is the invariant distribution associated with the transition
function generated by the optimal policy function g (η) and the exogenous shocks.
The model has no analytical solution and must be solved numerically. The algorithm used
to solve the model and other details are presented in the appendix.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Parametrization
Fixed parameters
Following standard practice in the literature we try to minimize the number of parameters of
the model used to match the data. We therefore select some parameters which have already
been estimated in the literature. We choose ρ = 0.95 for the auto-regressive coefficient of the
earnings process.17 The variance of the earnings process is chosen to match the Gini index
of labor income as observed in the PSID, where it is 0.38.18 The process is approximated
using a 4-state Markov chain, using the Tauchen [1986a] method as suggested by Adda /
Cooper [2003].19 Total factor productivity is normalized to 1, while the share of capital in
the Cobb-Douglas technology for the corporate sector is set to ξ = 0.36. The depreciation
rate is set δ = 0.08. These parameters are summarized in table 2.4-1.
Table 2.4-1: The fixed parameters
Parameter Symbol Baseline
TFP A 1 (normalization)
Share of capital ξ 0.36
Transaction cost secured credit τ s 0.01
Transaction cost unsecured credit τu 0.05
Depreciation rate δ 0.08
Working productivities ϕ
[
ϕ1 = 0.316, ϕ2 = 0.745
ϕ3 = 1.342, ϕ4 = 3.163
]
Transition matrix Pϕ

0.8393 0.1579 0.0028 0.0000
0.1579 0.6428 0.1965 0.0028
0.0028 0.1965 0.6428 0.1579
0.0000 0.0028 0.1579 0.8393

Preference parameters
The option to default provides agents with an insurance against bad outcomes. The value of
this insurance depends crucially on the agents attitudes towards risk. As described above, the
price of this insurance are worsened credit conditions. Agents who still borrow face higher
17 In a life cycle setting, Storesletten et al. [2004] and Storesletten et al. [2001] find ρ in the range between
0.95 and 0.98. We choose ρ = 0.95 to take into account that the agents in our model are infinitely lived and
that the intergenerational auto-regressive coefficient is lower. Solon [1992] estimates it around 0.4.
18 The exact value of the variance is σ2ε = .08125. This is higher than the estimate of Storesletten et al.
[2004] of about 0.02. We abstract from many important factors that are empirically relevant for the earnings
distribution, e.g. human capital, life-cycle savings. Therefore, in order to generate the observed inequality, we
need a higher variance of the earnings process.
19 Floden [2007] shows that for highly correlated processes the method of Adda / Cooper [2003] achieves a
higher accuracy than the original methods of Tauchen [1986a] and Tauchen / Hussey [1991].
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interest rates. Thus, the value of the costs of the insurance depends mainly on the agents
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Therefore, we separate these two parameters and
conduct our main policy experiment for different values of these parameters. In the baseline
model, we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ = 3 and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution ψ = 1.1. Later on we investigate values for σ ranging from 1.5 to 4.5 and ψ
ranging from 0.5 to 1.5. Table 2.4-2 summarizes preferences.
Table 2.4-2: Preference parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
CRRA σ 3
IES ψ 1.1
Bankruptcy policy parameters
The two policy parameters are the exemption level X and the probability % of being able
to obtain unsecured credit again. The law does not state any formal period of exclusion
from unsecured credit after a bankruptcy filing. For our baseline specification, we set % = 0.5
which corresponds to an average exclusion period from credit of two years. This is lower
than most values in the consumer bankruptcy literature.20 We think that this is warranted
since there is evidence the entrepreneurs have access to unsecured credits relatively fast
after having defaulted, see for example Lawless / Warren [2005]. However, we conduct a
robustness check and also investigate a considerably longer exclusion period of six years.
The exemption level differs across US sates. Using US state-level data for 1993 we calculate
the median across states of the total exemption21 ("homestead" plus "personal property"
exemption). The resulting median exemption level is $47,800, taking an average household
labor income of $48,600 corresponds to a value of 0.98 for the exemption/wage ratio.22 Table
2.4-3 summarizes the bankruptcy parameters.
Table 2.4-3: the bankruptcy parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Exemption/wage X/w 0.98
Unsecured credit exclusion (expressed as probability) % 0.5
20 Athreya [2002] sets the exclusion period to 4 years, Li / Sarte [2006] to 5 years, Chatterjee et al. [2007] to
10 years.
21 We took the data from Berkowitz / White [2004] and top-coded the unlimited homestead exemption to the
maximum state exemption.
22 As a further robustness check, we increase the exemption level by 50% and the results do not change
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Calibrated parameters
We are left with the following 7 parameters to be calibrated: high entrepreneurial productivity
(θH), entrepreneurial productivity transition matrix (pHH , pLL), concavity of entrepreneurial
production function (ν), fraction of cash on hand with which an agent can run (λ), discount
factor (β) and the variance of the transitory shock (σχ).
We choose these 7 parameters such that the model matches the following 7 moments of the
US economy. First we want the model to match the capital-output ratio (K/Y) in the US
economy. In the literature we find values ranging from 2.8 to 3.1. We target it to be 3.0. We
target the fraction of defaults. Given the discussion in Section 2 we set this equal to 2.25%.
The fraction of entrepreneurs in the total population is 7.3% in the Survey of Consumers
Finances.23 Based on PSID data the exit rate of entrepreneurs is equal to 15%. The median
leverage ratio of entrepreneurs 24 in the SCF is around 15%.
Since the benefits of bankruptcy depend crucially on the wealth of an agent we match some
features of the wealth distribution. The US wealth distribution is extremely skewed with the
top 40% of richest households holding around 94% of total assets. As a last target we choose
to match the ratio of the median wealth of entrepreneurs to the median wealth in the whole
population. This target captures features of both the wealth distribution and entrepreneurial
productivity and technology. We set the target to 6.3 as found in the SCF. The targets are
summarized in the second column of Table 2.4-5.
2.4.2 The baseline calibration results
We first present the baseline version of the model. Table 2.4-4 reports the value of the
calibrated parameters in the baseline specification.
Table 2.4-4: the calibrated parameters
Parameter Symbol Benchmark Value
High entrepreneurial productivity θH 0.662
Entrepreneurial productivity transition pHH , pLL 0.890 , 0.989
Concavity of entrepreneurial technology ν 0.876
Fraction with which agent can run λ 0.963
Discount factor β 0.895
Variance of transitory shock σχ 0.346
Table 2.4-5 reports the value of the targets and the actual results achieved in the baseline
specification.
23 See Mankart / Rodano [2007, appendix B] for data sources, definitions and further details.
24 Leverage is defined as the ratio of debt to the sum of debt and equity.
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Table 2.4-5: the baseline calibration targets
Moment Target Model
Fraction of Entrepreneurs (in %) 7.3 7.3
Ratio of medians (in %) 6.3 6.1
Share of net-worth of top 40% 94.0 94.1
K/Y 3.0 3.0
Exit Rate (in %) 15.0 15.0
Bankruptcy Rate (in %) 2.25 2.25
Median leverage (in %) 15.0 15.0
The marginal product of capital in the corporate sector (rd) is 2.9%. Less than one percent
(0.79%) of the total population is in the constrained state. Our model does replicate the ratio
of medians and the share of the wealth held by the richest 40% fairly well. It captures the
main features that entrepreneurs are several times richer than workers and that most of the
wealth is held by the richest. The Gini coefficient of wealth is 0.83 in the model, slightly
higher than the data (0.8). For the purpose of our policy experiments it is important that
the model replicates the middle and lower part of the wealth distribution since bankruptcy
law affects almost exclusively these agents.
Another feature that we do not target but that our model captures fairly well is the
difference in the entry rate between workers with previous business experience and those
without previous business experience. Based on PSID data25, those who had some experience
within the past three years are 13 times as likely to enter entrepreneurship than the average
worker. In the model this ratio is 10.
Quadrini [2000] reports that around 35-40% of total capital is invested in the entrepreneurial
sector. In our baseline specification this fraction is slightly lower, around 31.3%.
2.4.3 Investigating the model’s mechanisms
Occupational choice
The key ingredient of the model is occupational choice. Figure 2.2 represents the occupational
choice of an unconstrained agent with high entrepreneurial productivity and low working
productivity.
The dotted line shows the value function of becoming a worker, whereas the solid line
shows the value function of becoming an entrepreneur.
The first result is that, otherwise identical agents choose differently according to their
wealth: poor agents become workers while rich agents become entrepreneurs. This result
25 See Mankart / Rodano [2007, appendix B]
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Figure 2.2: Occupational choice (S = UN, θ = θH , ϕ = ϕ3)
is standard in the occupational choice under credit market imperfections literature [see e.g.
Banerjee / Newman 1993]. The main reasons are that poor agents have smaller firms and
face higher interest rates. They have smaller firms because, being poor, they need to borrow
more but they face higher rates on the loans. The cost of financing is higher for the poor
for two reasons. First, they have a higher incentive to default. Defaulting rich agents have
to give up all their wealth above the exemption level. Second, in the event of default the
bank gets less when the agent is poor. Thus, to break even, the bank has to charge a higher
interest rate. That is, in this model, wealth acts as collateral.
The behavior of the unconstrained agents
The second important ingredient is the decision of the unconstrained entrepreneurs. The
solution of the entrepreneurs’ problem is represented in Figure 2.3.
The top panel shows demand for unsecured debt (b). The second panel shows demand for
secured debt (s). The third panel shows the corresponding price of unsecured credit26 The
bottom panel shows the resulting firm size ((a + b + s)). Poorer agents (e.g. agents with
assets a < 0.8) become workers while all the others become entrepreneurs (a > 0.8). The
very rich entrepreneurs (a > 2.4) will never find it profitable to default. Their wealth is so
high that defaulting is too costly for them. Therefore they borrow only secured since secured
credit is cheaper than unsecured.27 The "middle class" entrepreneurs (e.g. a = 2) will instead
default if the shock is sufficiently bad, since the cost of bankruptcy is lower for them. In
order to break even, the bank charges a higher interest rate, i.e. the unsecured credit is more
expansive. The interest rate depends (negatively) on the assets of the entrepreneur, because
in the event of default the bank will be able to seize the difference between the assets of the
26 For readability, we show the price of credit instead of the interest rate.
27 The transaction cost for secured credit is lower than for unsecured credit.
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Figure 2.3: interest rate and firm size (θ = θH , ϕ = ϕ2)
entrepreneur and the exemption level. Capital demand for the "middle-class" entrepreneurs
is increasing because of the cost of borrowing is declining. The spikes in the demand for
unsecured credit reflect the discretization of the investment shock.
A first look at the effects of bankruptcy
Bankruptcy affects the problem of the unconstrained agents, because it changes credit
conditions and the amount of insurance available. We examine these effects with the following
experiment. We compare the behavior of the unconstrained agents in two different situations:
one in which bankruptcy is allowed and one in which bankruptcy is absent. Figure 2.4 shows
the policy functions in these situations.
The effects of allowing bankruptcy depend on the wealth of the agent. First, the default
behavior of the rich (e.g. a > 2.4) is not affected. They are entrepreneurs and they repay
their debt even in the bad states. As explained above, even if bankruptcy is available, it is too
costly for them. They demand a little bit more secured credit due to a general equilibrium
effect. Second, allowing bankruptcy affects the behavior of the less rich agents (e.g. a = 1.5).
They are entrepreneurs in both situations. But when bankruptcy is allowed they borrow
more unsecured because they are better insured at cost of more expansive credit. We call
this increase in the firm size the intensive margin. Third, the occupational choice of even
less rich agents (e.g. a = 1) is affected. When bankruptcy is not allowed they are not
insured against bad outcomes. Therefore they do not want to borrow, even though they
could borrow at rate rs. They become workers. When bankruptcy is allowed they are insured
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Figure 2.4: Firm size and interest rate (S = UN, θ = θH , ϕ = ϕ2)
against bad outcomes. Therefore they borrow, even though they have to pay a high interest
rate. This increases the rewards of entrepreneurship enough to change their occupational
choice. We call this increase in the number of entrepreneurs the extensive margin. Fourth, the
occupational choice of the very poor agents (e.g. a < 0.7) is not affected, they are workers in
both situations.
In this particular experiment abolishing bankruptcy reduces entrepreneurship and firm
size, the intensive and the extensive margins are negative. The negative effect of lowering the
amount of insurance available dominates the positive effect of better credit conditions.
2.4.4 Changing the exemption level
Our main policy experiment is to analyze the effects of changing the exemption level.
Figure 2.5 shows the effects of changing the exemption level on welfare, entrepreneurship,
exit rates and defaults. Table 2.4-6 reports the variables of interest for 3 values of X/w.
Column 2 reports results when bankruptcy is very harsh (X/w = 0). Column 3 reports
results for the baseline calibration (X/w = 0.98) and column 4 for the optimal exemption
level (X/w = 7.3).
Welfare Increasing the exemption level from zero increases welfare. The insurance effect
is dominating the worsening credit market effect. More agents become entrepreneurs (see
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Figure 2.5: Changes in the exemption levels
also Table 2.4-6) and welfare increases. However, increasing the exemption level beyond the
optimal level worsens credit market conditions so much that agents borrow less, and therefore
fewer agents find it profitable to become entrepreneurs. The current exemption level in the
US, X/w = 0.98, is too low. The bankruptcy law is too harsh. The welfare gains in increasing
the exemption level are substantial. The change in consumption equivalent (see row 10 in
2.4-6 ) is 2.2% of annual consumption. The rich and the poor both gain from increasing the
exemption level.
Entrepreneurs Increasing the exemption level increases the fraction of entrepreneurs by 0.2
percentage points. Thus, there is a positive extensive margin. In particular, the optimal
exemption level allows entrepreneurs who have defaulted to remain entrepreneurs because
they can keep more assets in the default case. However, as can be seen in figure 2.5, the
entrepreneurship rate peaks earlier than welfare. This implies that the intensive margin, i.e.
bigger firms, is important in explaining the welfare results. As expected the default rate is
increasing in the exemption level. The exit rate however is declining in the exemption level.
The reason for this is that entrepreneurs who have defaulted keep enough assets to remain
entrepreneurs despite being excluded from unsecured credit.
Access to entrepreneurship of the poor Next we turn to how bankruptcy law affects the
determinants of entry into entrepreneurship. There is allocative inefficiency in our model
because insurance markets are missing. Part of this inefficiency is reflected in some poor
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Table 2.4-6: the effects of changes in the exemption level
X/w 0 0.98 7.3
Exit rate (in %) 15.1 15.0 12.9
Fraction of Entrepreneurs (in %) 6.7 7.2 7.4
Bankruptcy/Exit (in %) 0 15.0 73.8
Capital/Output 3.02 3.02 3.02
Median assets of Entr/ Median assets 7.2 6.3 7.3
Share of Capital in entr. sector (in %) 30.9 31.4 33.2
Gini of Assets 0.84 0.84 0.83
Share of assets in top 40% of pop (in %) 94.6 94.6 94.5
Median output in entrepreneurial sector 9.7 8.9 11.4
Welfare in CE -0.5 0.0 2.2
Welfare of rich in CE -0.9 0.0 2.46
Welfare of poor in CE 0.1 0.0 2.02
highly productive agents not becoming entrepreneurs, either because they receive too little
insurance or because the conditions at which credit is available are too bad. Table 2.4-7
reports the effects of different exemption levels on the minimum assets needed for the highly
productive (θ−1 = θH) agent to become an entrepreneur.
The rows show these values for the levels of working productivity (ϕ). The attractiveness
of becoming a worker is increasing in working productivity, i.e. the outside option of
entrepreneurs is increasing in working productivity. Thus in order to enter entrepreneurship,
the expected profits must be higher for an agent with high working productivity. Since richer
agents need to borrow relatively less and since they receive better credit conditions, their
expected profits are higher. This implies that, to become an entrepreneur, an agent with high
working productivity must be richer than an agent with low working productivity to enter
entrepreneurship.
Increasing the exemption level to the optimal induces agents with high levels of labor
productivity to enter entrepreneurship earlier. Poorer agents however will enter only when
they are richer. The reason for this is that the credit market conditions worsen so much that
they can obtain only secured credit and therefore lose the insurance coming from unsecured
credit.
Table 2.4-7: minimum wealth for entrepreneurship
minimum wealth
for entrepreneurship
X/w 0 0.98 7.3
ϕ = 0.316 0.32 0.28 0.32
ϕ = 0.745 1.14 0.86 1.08
ϕ = 1.342 2.34 2.24 2.20
ϕ = 3.163 6.87 6.83 6.75
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2.4.5 Modeling of credit markets matter
Almost all paper in the bankruptcy literature allow unsecured borrowing only.28 Notable
exceptions are Athreya [2006] and Hintermaier / Koeniger [2008] in the consumption literat-
ure. The reason is that the computational burden of allowing for secured credit as well is
considerable. However, according to data from Sullivan et al. [1989], secured borrowing is as
important as unsecured borrowing.29.
Not only is secured credit empirically relevant, but also, as we show in this section, it is
crucial for the results. To show this, we set up a model identical to the one discussed so far
except that there is no secured credit available, neither for the borrowing constrained nor for
the unconstrained entrepreneur. This implies that the former cannot borrow at all and must
finance his projects with his own wealth. We first recalibrate the model and then conduct
the same policy experiment as before. The results in figure 2.6 are striking. The optimal
bankruptcy law now would be to abolish bankruptcy completely. This would increase welfare
and lead to a higher number of entrepreneurs.
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Figure 2.6: Welfare effects of changes in X if only secured credit available
Table 2.4-8: calibration unsecured credit only
Moment Target Unsec credit only Sec and Unsec
Entrepreneurs (in %) 7.3 7.17 7.44
Exit Rate (in %) 15.0 13.55 12.76
Table 2.4-8 shows what happens if we use the calibrated parameters of the model without
secured borrowing and now allow secured borrowing. Since the financial market is now
relatively more complete, we see that there are more entrepreneurs and fewer exits.
28 See for example Akyol / Athreya [2007], Meh / Terajima [2008], Athreya [2002], Livshits et al. [2007],
Chatterjee et al. [2007], Athreya / Simpson [2006], Li / Sarte [2006], Mateos-Planas / Seccia [2006].
29 Mean secured debt over mean total debt is about 55%
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The reason for this can be seen in figure 2.7. All agents is region (2) are not able to obtain
unsecured credit because their default incentive is too high. If secured credit is not available,
these agents become workers. However, if secured credit is available, these agents can borrow
secured and so become entrepreneurs. Agents in region (3) use secured credit to run bigger
firms.
This mechanism explains why the optimal exemption level in a model with secured and
unsecured credit is much higher than the optimal exemption level in a model with only
unsecured credit. Absent secured credit, an increase in the exemption level prices out many
more agents. It would expand regions (1) and (2). Thus, the agents become workers because
they are credit rationed. The availability of secured credit dampens this negative effect.
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Figure 2.7: Policy functions with secured credit
Another way of looking at this is the following. The optimal policy is a very harsh
bankruptcy law. This implies that the agents do not value the insurance that is provided by
the bankruptcy law. They would like to have less insurance but therefore have better credit
market conditions. This means essentially that the agents want a commitment device that
takes away the default option. One way to achieve his is to make the law harsher. Another
way, however, is to use secured credit. Secured credit is the commitment device that the
agents want.
As already mentioned, most previous papers do not include secured credit in their models
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and most of them find that the current bankruptcy law is too lenient.30 Our results imply
that these results might not be robust towards including secured borrowing.
2.4.6 Robustness
In this section, we show the effects of changing the agent’s preferences. We separate the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution from the coefficient of relative risk aversion because
they have different effects. With a standard utility function, one is the inverse of the other. In
this case, an increase in risk aversion as for example examined in Athreya [2006] conflates two
effects. On the one hand, since agents are more risk averse, they value insurance more so the
optimal exemption level is likely to be higher. On the other hand, with standard preferences,
an increase in risk aversion simultaneously lowers the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Thus, agents are less willing to transfer consumption across time. But a higher exemption
level will increase the interest rate agents face because banks have to charge higher interest
rates in order to break even. Thus, a decrease in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is likely to lead to a lower optimal exemption level. By not separating the two, one examines
only their net effect. It is possible that each of these two effects is big but that they cancel
each other so that the net effect is small.
Changing EIS
In this subsection we investigate the robustness of the results towards different values of
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The costs of a lenient bankruptcy law are higher
interest rates which make substitution across time more costly. If agents’ willingness to
substitute consumption across period is low (i.e. eis is small), higher interest rates will be
particularly costly. Therefore the optimal exemption level should be an increasing function of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We recalibrate the model once with a low elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, (ψ = 0.6) and once with a high elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (ψ = 1.4). We keep the coefficient of risk aversion constant. The results
are shown in table 2.4-9. The optimal exemption level is increasing in the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution as expected. While the magnitude of the effects is not huge, they
are quantitatively significant.
Changing RRA
In this subsection we investigate the robustness of the results towards different degrees of
risk aversion. The possibility to default provides insurance against bad outcomes. The value
agents attach to this insurance depends on their risk aversion. We recalibrate the model once
30 The two other papers (Akyol / Athreya [2007],Meh / Terajima [2008]) in the entrepreneurial bankruptcy
literature find significant welfare gains from making the law harsher. The papers in the consumer bankruptcy
literature reach similar conclusions.
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Table 2.4-9: Optimal exemption level for different EIS
CRRA Optimal X
0.6 6.7
1.1 7.3
1.4 7.9
with a low coefficient of risk aversion, (σ = 1.5) and once with a high coefficient of relative
risk aversion (σ = 4.5). We keep the elasticity of intertemporal substitution constant since
we want to isolate the importance of risk attitudes.
The optimal exemption level, the amount of insurance, is increasing in σ. This result is
qualitatively not surprising. However it is also quantitatively important. If agents were less
risk averse, the optimal exemption level would be 13% lower. However, the effects are rather
small in welfare terms. Welfare never changes by more than a fraction of a percent. This is
due to the fact that all exemption levels are pretty high.
Table 2.4-10: Optimal exemption level for different CRRA values
CRRA Optimal X
1.5 6.3
3.0 7.3
4.5 8.7
2.5 Conclusion
This is the first paper to explore quantitatively the effects of personal bankruptcy law on
entrepreneurship in a general equilibrium setting with heterogeneous agents and secured and
unsecured credit. First, we developed a dynamic general equilibrium model with occupational
choice which explicitly incorporates the US bankruptcy law. Our model endogenously
generates interest rates that reflect the different default probabilities of the agents. Our
model accounts for the main facts on entrepreneurial bankruptcy, entrepreneurship, wealth
distribution and macroeconomic aggregates in the US.
Then, we used the model to quantitatively evaluate the effects of changing the US bankruptcy
law. The simulation results show that increasing the exemption level would increase the
fraction of entrepreneurs and welfare. These effects are significant: increasing the exemption
level to the optimal one has positive welfare effects in the order of 2.2% of average consumption.
All households, rich and poor, would be better off.
The most important contribution of our paper is to show that the modeling of the credit
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market matters. Investigating the optimal exemption level in a model without secured credit
gives misleading results because it overstates credit rationing.
We are currently extending our research program along two dimensions. First, we are
incorporating the transition to the new steady state. So far, our results are based on a
comparison of steady-states. Transitional effects might be important to evaluate welfare. In
addition it might explain why the current law is too lenient. It could be that some groups
lose during the transition and therefore oppose changes.
Second, we are expanding our model to incorporate explicitly a European type of bankruptcy
law. The laws in European countries are much harsher than the law in the US. For example
in Italy, debt is never discharged. A defaulter is liable forever. We are analyzing the effects
of introducing a US type of law on the Italian economy.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Computational strategy
The state vector for an individual is given by η = (a, θ, ϕ, S). The aggregate state is a density
µt (a, θ, ϕ, S) over the individual state variables. We assume that a takes on value on a grid Ga
of dimension na. Therefore the dimension of the individual state space is n = na×nθ×nϕ×2
where nθ = 2 is the number of states for the entrepreneurial productivity and nϕ = 4 is the
number of states for the working productivity.
In order to solve the model we use the following:
Algorithm 3 Our solution algorithm is:
1. Assign all parameters values
2. Guess a value for the endogenous variable r.
3. Given r the FOC of the corporate sector uniquely pin down the wage rate w. The
representative competitive firm in the corporate sector will choose Kc and Lc such as
rd = ξAKξ−1c L1−ξc = ξA
(
Kdc
Ldc
)ξ−1
(2.6-1)
w = (1− ξ)AKξcL−ξc = (1− ξ)A
(
Kdc
Ldc
)ξ
(2.6-2)
Therefore r uniquely pins down
(
Kc
Lc
)
and in turn uniquely pins down w.
4. Given (r, w) we solve for the optimal value functions and corresponding policy functions
by value function iteration. Within the period we solve backwards in time.
a) We guess a value function V(η)
b) We solve the consumption-savings problem of the constrained and unconstrained
agent for a grid of cash on hand.
c) We approximate the resulting continuation value functions.
d) Since the worker faces no uncertainty within the period, these value functions give
us the values for the workers.
e) Given the continuation value, we solve the problem of the unconstrained entrepren-
eur:
• We set up a grid for secured credit.
• For each value of secured credit, we set up a grid for unsecured credit.
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• For each value of unsecured credit, we price the credit according to the zero
profit condition.
• We identify the optimal grid point and then bisect around that optimal point
to get a more accurate choice of unsecured credit.
• We calculate the value for each combination of secured.
f) The problem of the constrained entrepreneur is solved similarly.
g) Occupational choice gives us the updated value functions Vˆ(η).
h) We iterate until convergence.
i) As a byproduct we obtain the policy functions.
5. The policy functions, the exogenous transition matrix for the shocks (both for θ and for
ϕ), the iid investment shock and the credit status shock % induce a transition matrix Pη
over the state η.
6. The transition matrix Pη maps the any current distribution31 µη into a next period
distribution µ′η by simply
µη,t+1 = P
′
η × µη,t
We calculate the steady state distribution over the state µ∗η by solving for a
µ∗η = P
′
η × µ∗η
7. From the policy functions and the steady state distribution, we derive the market clearing
conditions
8. Labor market clearing implies that labor supply Ls (r) is equal to labor demand (that
comes from corporateLdc). Plugging this into the FOC (2.6-1) of the corporate sector we
get capital demand from corporate sector:
Kdc (r) =
(
r
ξA
) 1
ξ−1
LS (r)
9. Now we look at capital market clearing:
KdENTR (r) +Kdc (r) = SA (r)
10. If there is not equilibrium at point 9 we adjust interest rate, we go back to point 3 and
we iterate until market clears32.
31 Note that in our framework the distribution of household over the state µη, is vector of dimension n whose
elements sum up to 1.
32 In practice we first run a grid search over different values for r and then bisect until we get market clearing.
Chapter 3
An empirical investigation of Italian earnings
process
3.1 Introduction
Many macroeconomic issues require a clear understanding and a quantitative measure of the
risks economic agents are facing.1 Therefore the answers to many of the most important
questions in macroeconomics, like for example the size and of precautionary saving and
wealth inequality [e.g. Aiyagari 1994, Castañeda et al. 2003], the extent of the welfare costs
of business cycle [e.g. Lucas 2003] or the effects of personal bankruptcy law on saving choices
[e.g. Livshits et al. 2007], depend on the nature of earnings process the economist assumes.
In this paper we posit and estimate a general specification for the stochastic process
generating the earnings of Italian individuals. We do it by matching the theoretical age-
specific second order moments implied by the statistical model to their empirical counterparts.
There is a rich and long standing literature in labor economics dedicated to the estimation of
the earnings process, dating back at least to Lillard / Weiss [1979] and MaCurdy [1982]. But
only recently, with the diffusion of heterogeneous agents model with idiosinkratic risk [starting
from Huggett 1993, Aiyagari 1994] the issue has attracted the attention of macroeconomists.
The most popular approach among macroeconomists, adopted by almost all quantitative
general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents, dates back to MaCurdy [1982], and
has been popularized among macroeconomists by Storesletten et al. [2004]. In order to
explain the rising age profile of income inequality, it assumes that agents are subject, during
their working life to extremely persistent shocks. Moreover they share similar deterministic
earnings profiles, where only the level is determined by factors already determined before the
1 I thank Alex Michaelides for his continuous support and valuable comments on this chapter. I am also
grateful to Fabrizio Colonna, Alfonso Rosolia, Paolo Sestito and participants to lunch seminars in the Bank
of Italy. This chapter started from extremely helpful discussion with Filippo Scoccianti, to whom it goes a
special acknowledgment.
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beginning of economic activity. In particular they all have the same deterministic growth
rate. Following an older literature, dating back to Lillard / Weiss [1979], Guvenen [2009]
questioned this view. He claims that rising heterogeneity with age can be mostly explained by
individuals having heterogeneous growth rates that are already determined at the beginning
of working activity. Estimating a more general model Guvenen [2009] finds a statistically
significant heterogeneity in growth rates and a much lower persistence in the shocks during
their working lifetimes.
A simple example, taken from Guvenen [2009], might help clarify the issue. Denote yih the
logarithm of earnings of an agent i with age h, and assume that its stochastic process can be
represented by two just two components. The first is an individual-specific rate of growth βi
which has a cross sectional variance σ2β and it is already realized at the moment of entering
in the labor market. In this sense, from the point of view of the life cycle, it is deterministic,
even though it might not be known to the agent. The second is a stochastic component zih
which it is assumed to be an AR(1) with innovation ηih, with variance σ2η, and persistence ρ.
Formally
yih = βih+ zih (3.1-1)
and
zih = ρzih−1 + ηih (3.1-2)
The standard approach assumes, that σ2β = 0 and ρ ≈ 1. Guvenen [2009] calls this earnings
process restricted income profile (rip) process, because it forces all agents to share the same
deterministic growth rate2. The alternative view, heterogeneous income profile (hip), allows
σ2β 6= 0 and finds ρ < 1. To contribute to this debate, in this paper we estimate, using a
minimum distance estimator, a general version of the process above, with Italian data on
earnings, where we allow both for σ2β 6= 0 and for ρ 6= 1.
The main result of the paper is that we find some support for both the HIP and the rip
processes, only in a baseline version of the paper where we do not consider education and
other observable variables. Our baseline model yield σˆ2β = 0.00026 with a standard error
of 0.00006, and ρˆ = 0.956 with a standard error of 0.048. Therefore we can strongly reject
the hypothesis that σ2β = 0 and we can not reject the hypothesis ρ = 1. However if we
control for an additional series of observables (education, sex, area of birth) which are already
determined at the beginning of working activity, our estimate of the variance of the growth
rates becomes much smaller, σˆ2β = 0.00004, and statistically insignificant. Moreover, when
we control for these observables, the estimated persistence of the life-cycle shocks, ρˆ, falls to
0.72, casting some doubts on the rip process as well. Among the control variables education
seem to play a predominant role in determining the amount of pre-working heterogeneity.
This result is of particular interest for several reasons. The first is that it provides a
very different picture of the nature of earnings process and of the risks the agents are
2 We use the term "deterministic" to stress the point that the shock is already realized at the moment of
entering the labor market.
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facing, from both the hip and the rip models. Our results that once we consider education
and other observables the stochastic process changes dramatically, especially with such a
smaller persistence, can have important consequences on the results of quantitative models.
Moreover it suggest that differentiating agents according to education might have crucial
consequences on the risk agents are facing. This result is also interesting since it questions
the results in Guvenen [2007], which is the main paper advocating the use of hip processes
in macroeconomics. He claims that introducing a hip process in the standard model of
consumption choices can help the model explain some stylized facts on consumption behavior
that otherwise it would not be able to. However, in order to improve the explanatory power
of the standard consumption model, hip process must imply a difficult learning process
by the agents, about their growth rate over the life-cycle. If we take our estimates at face
value, it seems the agents are fairly able to predict their growth rate from their observables
characteristics at the moment of beginning their economic activity, therefore leaving not
much scope for learning. A third reason of interest in our results is that they provide a
necessary input in any quantitative general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents.
Any economist wishing to set up a quantitative life-cycle model of the Italian economy where
heterogeneity and risks are crucial ingredients, can take our estimates off the shelf and plug
them in the model [e.g. Rodano / Scoccianti 2009, Rodano 2009, Scoccianti 2009]. This
motivates the choice of our baseline specification as well. In fact, in most of these models
agents are not differentiated according to education or sex.
With our estimates of the parameters of the stochastic process in hand we can contribute to
the literature that tries to asses how much of earnings heterogeneity is due to factor already
determined at the beginning of working life, and how much is instead the results of shocks
happening during the life-cycle. Using the estimated stochastic process we can calculate the
variance of permanent income (i.e. the present value of earnings) that we would observe
if we were able to shut down all the shocks happening during the life-cycle. The result of
this exercise is that the ratio of this counterfactual variance to the variance when we keep
the life-cycle shocks in, is about 92%. Roughly speaking this implies that the variance of
permanent income related to shocks during life-cycle is about 8%. Similar exercises for the US
economy finds number ranging from 46% (Storesletten et al. [2004], under the rip assumption)
to a value of 10% found by Keane / Wolpin [1997] using a fully structural econometric model.
This is an important issue especially from a policy perspective. Our results would suggest
that, since most of the inequality in permanent income is due to factors already determined
at the beginning of working life, the risk-sharing role of well developed financial markets (e.g.
bankruptcy law) or government policy (e.g. unemployment insurance) is dampened. On the
other side, policies affecting the conditions at the beginning of working activity might have
much bigger effects, especially if the goal is to reduce inequality. In particular, given the
big effects we get when controlling for education it seems that education policies could be
particularly effective. We must point out that our empirical approach allows us a statistical
analysis of earnings, without being able to say anything on consumption and welfare or
the degree of self insurance that Italian household may achieve. Moreover our approach is
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much simpler (though much less demanding in terms of assumptions) than a fully structural,
model-dependent approach on the lines of Keane / Wolpin [1997] or Kaplan [2008].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our model of
earnings. Section 3 presents our data and our empirical strategy In Section 4 we present the
main results and in Section 5 some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 A stochastic model of earnings
We assume that the logarithm of earnings of agent i with age h, yih is the sum of three
components. Formally
yih = g (h) +
[
αi + βih
]
+
[
zih + εih
]
(3.2-3)
The first term, g (h), is a deterministic component where the function g (h) is common
to all agents. Depending on the particular application of the earnings process it might be
useful/necessary to assume that the deterministic component is a function of other observables
g
(
h, xi, wih
)
where it might be important to distinguish between factor which are already
determined at the beginning of the working period (xi) and factor which might change over
the whole life-cycle (wih)3.
The second term,
[
αi + βih
]
, is a stochastic fixed effect, already realized at the moment
the agent enters in the labor market (and thus independent of age), that affects both the
level (αi) and the growth rate (βi) of earnings. We assume that
(
αi, βi
) ∼ Niid (0,Σ), with
Σ =
(
σ2α σαβ
σαβ σ
2
β
)
(3.2-4)
being the covariance matrix.
The third term,
[
zih + εih
]
, captures the shocks affecting individual earnings during life
cycle and therefore it depends on age. These shocks can be temporary (εih) or persistent (zih).
We assume that the persistent shocks follow an AR(1) with persistence ρ and innovation ηih.
That is:
zih = ρzih−1 + ηih (3.2-5)
and zi0 = 0,∀i. By concentrating on an AR(1) rather than on a more complex ARMA
structure, we depart from most of the econometric literature. The main justification is
that the main focus of our analysis as in part of the literature, is to provide an input to a
general equilibrium, heterogeneous agents life-cycle model. In all these models it is assumed
3 For example, if the process is needed as the input of a general equilibrium model where the only heterogeneity
is in earnings and assets (and not in education or other characteristics) then the best specification is g (h). If
instead we want to quantify the amount of uncertainty that is already predetermined at the beginning of the
lifetime we might choose to control for xi as well. If instead we want this process to project future earnings
for a microsimulation exercise, we might get better prediction by controlling for as many variables as possible
g
(
h, xi, wih
)
.
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the earnings have the simple AR structure because it allows to save a state variable when
computationally solving the model4. We assume that εih ∼ Niid
(
0, σ2ε
)
and ηih ∼ Niid
(
0, σ2η
)
and that the shocks are independent on each other and on the fixed effects shocks.
The parameters we want to estimate are: i) the variances and the covariance of the fixed
effect shocks
(
σ2α, σ
2
β, σαβ
)
; ii) the variance
(
σ2η
)
of the persistent shock and its persistence
(ρ); iii) the variance of the temporary shock
(
σ2ε
)
. W set θ ≡
{
σ2α, σ
2
β, σαβ, σ
2
ε , σ
2
η, ρ
}
.
The estimation method we use is a version of the method of moments, known as minimum
distance estimator [Chamberlain 1994], which is standard in this kind of empirical research.
The logic is to pick the parameters of the statistical model in order to minimize the distance
between the theoretical moments derived from the model and their empirical counterparts.
At a very abstract level, to be qualified below, letting the vector Θ (θ) ∈ RN (with Θj (θ),
j = 1, .., N) be composed of N theoretical moment derived from the above model, and letting
and the vector Ξ ∈ RN (with Ξj , j = 1, .., N) be their empirical counterparts, our estimated
parameters, θˆ are given by
θˆ = arg min
θ
[Θ (θ)− Ξ]′ [Θ (θ)− Ξ] = arg min
θ
N∑
j=1
[
Θ (θ)j − Ξj
]2
(3.2-6)
In order to practically implement the procedure we must select which moments to match.
Given the macroeconomic focus of the paper and its goal to provide an input to life-cycle
models with heterogeneous agents, we choose to match age-specific cross sectional variances
[e.g. Storesletten et al. 2004]. Moreover, since Guvenen [2007] shows that in order to identify
the two processes we need to consider higher order autocovariances, we include among the
empirical moments to match the age-specific q-th order autocovariances.
All the theoretical moments are derived from the residual income defined as uih ≡ yih−g(h) =
αi + βih+ zih + εih. From this, for each age h, we can recover the cross sectional variance of
the residual earnings as
var(h; θ) = E
{(
uij
)2 |j = h} = σ2α + h2σ2β + 2hσαβ + σε + σ2η h∑
j=1
ρ2(j−1) (3.2-7)
and the q-th order autocovariance
cov(h, q; θ) = E
{(
uij , u
i
j+q
)
|j = h
}
= σ2α + (h2 + qh)σ2β + (2h+ q)σαβ + σε + ρqσ2η
h∑
j=1
ρ2(j−1)
(3.2-8)
4 In order to allow this model to better predict future earnings for the microsimulation model of the Bank of
Italy, we are currently working on allowing a richer ARMA structure, but results are too preliminary to be
presented.
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As explained below, we choose q as high as possible, conditionally of having enough data
to properly estimate the empirical counterparts.
3.3 Data and estimation procedure
3.3.1 Data source
The data we use are taken from the Bank of Italy’ "Survey of Household Income and Wealth",
(shiw) a representative sample of Italian population, with about 8000 households interviewed
every year5. From 1987 to 2006 the shiw was conducted every two years (with a three years
gap between 1995 and 1998). In addition to the time series of repeated cross section, we need
also a panel component in order to calculate the autocovariances. From 1987 onwards, the
shiw has re-interviewed part of the households from previous surveys. Every year some of
the "panel" households in previous survey, together with some of the "non-panel" households
are re-interviewed. Thus in the data we have a fairly big number of household which are
interviewed for two consecutive surveys, a bit less for 3 surveys and a few that have been
interviewed for all the 10 surveys and therefore span the whole 1987-2006 period.
For the purpose of the exercise we are running, a dataset with a longer and bigger panel
data dimension would have probably been better6. However there are mainly two reasons for
choosing this dataset. The first is that, by international standards, among the survey data,
this dataset is considered as a high quality dataset [e.g. Krueger / Perri 2009]. The second
and most important reason for using the shiw is the amount of information available in this
dataset. In fact the general equilibrium heterogeneous agents, to which this paper supplies a
crucial input, are usually calibrated to match several features of Italian economy (e.g. wealth
distribution) that can be derived from the shiw as well, thus allowing a more homogeneous
calibration of the models.
3.3.2 Variables description
For our baseline specification we take as the main variable of interest "earnings" as after
tax earnings, excluding income from capital and pensions. The shiw does not record gross
earnings so we are forced to use net earnings. The main reason for excluding capital income
and pensions, is that in most of the quantitative models that will use our estimates as an
input the budget constraint of the working age agents is a version of the following
at+1 = (1 + r) at + yt − ct
5 More specifically we use the "Historical Database of the Survey of Italian Households Budgets,
1977-2006", which is publicly available (together with documentation in English) at the website
http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait
6 Most studies that replicate similar exercises for the US use the psid.
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where at is assets in period t (or at age t), yt is earnings/income in period t and ct is
consumption in period t. Since in most of the models there is no distinction on where the
earnings come from (working as an employee or self employed) we do not distinguish between
them7. At the same time in all the models the saving choice is endogenous and therefore the
stochastic process for the variable yt clearly must exclude capital income (1 + r) at.
The survey, in addition to after tax earnings provides information on a series of other
variables that we use for our analysis:
• age;
• sex;
• educational qualification: a six values categorical variable that goes from 1, "none" to 6,
"post graduate qualification";
• branch of activity: a nine values categorical variable where categories are agriculture,
building and construction work, transports and communication, and the like;
• work status (self employed, employee, unemployed, retired, etc.);
• geographical area of birth: we create a four categories variable where categories are
south and islands, center, north and abroad;
• geographical area of living at the moment of the interview: a three categories variable
(south and islands, center, north)
• marital status (married, single, divorced/separated, widow/widower)
• number of household components
3.3.3 Selection criteria and unit of analysis
In our baseline specification we focus on household earnings and we associate household
earnings to the earnings of the household head. We keep information on all the individuals in
the sample who:
• are defined as household heads
• are between 25 and 55 years of age;
• are employee, self employed or unemployed (that is we exclude pensioners and first job
seekers);
• have positive earnings (to take logs);
7 In a robustness check we experiment with changing the main variable to income from employee only. This
could be necessary for example in a model that feature occupational choice to model the exogenous earnings
process for the workers
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• have ages which are consistent (i.e. they are 24 in 1995 and 27 in 1998)8.
This leaves us with a sample of 43513 observations, over 10 waves of the shiw that span
the period 1987-2006 of which only a subsample of them is interviewed more than once. In
one of the robustness check we see how results change if we focus on all the individuals as
well.
3.3.4 Estimation details
The deterministic component Since the theoretical moments are expressed in terms of the
residual income, uih ≡ yih − g(h), the first step of the estimation procedure is to eliminate
the common deterministic component g(h). To do so we have different strategies. In the
baseline version we regress the logarithm of earnings on a set of ages dummies. To account
for the possibility of time effects in the determination of the common deterministic trend
function, that is to allow for gt (h), we estimate a separate regression for each cross section of
the shiw. The residuals from these regressions constitute our residual income, uih(t), where
we make explicit the dependence on time, t. The main justification for the choice of the
baseline version of the model is that in quantitative general equilibrium model very rarely
heterogeneity in sex and education is explicitly considered. In order to understand better
how these other observables matter, in other specifications we consider how results change if
we consider a more general version of the function gt
(
h,xi,wih
)
,where we add more controls
to this regression. In one case we includes only controls for variables that are predetermined
at the moment of entering the labor market (xi) like sex, education, and area of birth. In
another case we include all the possible controls together (xi and wih).
The age-specific variances The age-specific cross sectional variances, σˆ2 (h), are calculated
in a standard way. Formally
σˆ2(h) =
∑
t∈T
∑nt
i=1 [uih(t)− µˆ(h)]2Iσ2 (i, h, t)
Nh
(3.3-9)
where T ≡ {87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 98, 00, 02, 04, 06} is the set of years for which shiw is conducted,
nt is the total number of individuals interviewed in year t ∈ T , Iσ2 (i, h, t) is an indicator
function which is equal to 1 if the agent i is "of age h" in year t, andNh =
∑
t∈T
∑nt
i=1 Iσ2 (i, h, t)
is the total number of age h individuals in the sample (considering all years) and where
µˆ(h) =
∑
t∈T
∑nt
i=1 [uih(t)]Iσ2 (i, h, t)
Nh
is the sample mean of residual income for all agents of a given age h (even in different years).
In English this is to say that we calculate the variance of residual income across all agents
8 With respect to ages we found that the great majority of agents interviewed in 1987 and in 1989 the
difference in age was only one year, suggesting that there is a problem with those ages. We adjusted the age
in 1987 accordingly.
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"of age h" considering all the years of the survey. We do this for h ∈ [25, 55].
The age specific autocovariances of order q The age-specific, for age h, autocovariances
of order q, ωˆ2 (h, q), is calculated in a standard way as well. Formally we have
ωˆ(h, q) =
∑
t∈T
∑nt
i=1 [uih(t)− µˆq(h)][uih+q(t+ q)− µˆq(h+ q)]Iω (i, h, t, q)
Mh,q
(3.3-10)
where Iω2 (i, h, t, q) is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if the agent i is "of age h"
in year t and is re-interviewed q years after, and Mh,q =
∑
t∈T
∑nt
i=1 Iω (i, h, t, q) is the total
number of individuals of age h in the whole sample that has been re-interviewed after q years,
and µq(h),and µq(h+ q) are
µˆq(h) =
∑
t∈T
∑nt
i=1 [u
i
h(t)]Iω(i,h,t,q)
Mh,q
µˆq(h+ q) =
∑
t∈T
∑nt
i=1 [u
i
h+q(t+q)]Iω(i,h,t,q)
Mh,q
In English it means that, to calculate the autocovariance of order q for individuals "of age h",
we select in all years those individuals of age h in a certain year t and are re-interviewed q
years after. For all these agents we calculate the autocovariance of "residual income".
Implementation details In the definitions above we have been explicitly loose about agents
being "of age h". This is because, as in most of the literature, when we calculate the empirical
moment for a certain age, h, we consider "of age h" all the agents of age [h− 1, h+ 1]9. This
allows us to have a greater number of agents contributing to each moment.
In addition to this criterion we consider only those moments for which we have a minimum
number of individuals contributing to a specific moment. This is done to avoid too excessive
noise in the moments. In the baseline we set to 100 the minimum numbers of agents that
must contribute to a certain moment, for that moment to be considered.
These criteria, together with the time structure of the shiw allow us to use 198 moments.
The number of individual contributing to each moment is reported in Table 3.7-8, while the
corresponding empirical moments are reported in Table 3.7-9.
As shown in Table 3.7-8 the number of individuals contributing to the variances is much
higher since we can consider all the individuals even those who do not happen to be reinter-
viewed in future years. As expected at ages neighboring the boundaries of the age span the
number of agents contributing to each age-specific variance decreases as we are losing those
who enters late in the labor market and those who retire early.
Table 3.7-9 and the above graph show that cross sectional variance increases almost linearly
9 In the literature, most of the works consider "of age h" an agent of age [h− 2, h+ 2].
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Figure 3.1: Age profile of cross sectional variances
with age. This is consistent both with the hip and the rip assumptions10. This is one of the
reasons why we need higher order moments in order to identify the two processes.
Numerical implementation Stacking the theoretical moments from (3.2-7) and (3.2-8) in
the vector Θ (θ), and their empirical counterparts from (3.3-9) and (3.3-10) in the vector Ξ,
we can solve the problem in (3.2-6), where N = 198, to get minimum distance estimator θˆ. θˆ
is consistent and asymptotically normal with covariance matrix Σ = (D′D)−1D′ΩD (D′D)−1
where the matrix D is the Jacobian matrix of the moments and Ω is the covariance matrix of
all the contributors to each moment.
The object to be minimized is not a smooth function over the parameter space. This
presents two order of numerical problems. The first is that standard minimization routines,
based on derivatives methods, often do not converge. For this reason we adopt a derivative-
free minimization routine à là Nelder and Meade. The second problem is that even a
more robust numerical minimization routine as the one we use in not guaranteed to yield a
"global" minimum. To reduce the possibility of being stuck in a local minimum we repeat the
minimization routine 100 times with random initial point. This last step of the procedure,
together with the calculation of the standard errors is implemented in fortran.11
10 It is straightforward to prove that hip implies a convex age profile for cross sectional variances, while the
profile implied by rip is at most linear (if ρ ≤ 1).
11 The code to replicate the results is available from the authors on request. The stata code that retrieve
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Implications Once we have estimated the parameters of the stochastic process, in addition
to use them as inputs in a general equilibrium model, we can use them to contribute to the
debate about how much heterogeneity is due to shocks during the working age period (i.e.
during the life-cycle) and how much is due to features already predetermined at the moment
of entering the labor market. In particular we look at the ratio between the counterfactual
variance in permanent income (present value of discounted earnings) once we shut down
life-cycle shocks, to the actual variance (including life-cycle shocks). To do so we use our
estimated stochastic process for earnings to simulate the life-cycle earnings (uih) for 10000
individuals and we calculate the following the following statistic
KW =
V AR
(∑60
h=20(1 + r)−heu
i
h |σ2η = σ2η = 0
)
V AR
(∑60
h=20(1 + r)−heu
i
h
) (3.3-11)
where the interest rate r is set to 6%.
3.4 Main results
Baseline results The main result of the paper is that we find some empirical evidence in
favor of the hip and rip hypothesis only in a baseline specification where we do not control for
any observable in determining the common deterministic trend g(h). The baseline estimates
are reported in the first column of Table 3.4-1 (base). The estimated variance of deterministic
trends, determined at the beginning of the working life, σˆ2β, is statistically significant and
equal to 0.00026. This supports the hip process. At the same time estimated autocorrelation
coefficient of the persistent life-cycle shock, ρˆ, is 0.956, smaller than one, as suggested by the
hip process. However the parameter is not precisely estimated and we can not statistically
reject the hypothesis ρ = 1. Therefore from the baseline model it appears that the earnings
process of Italian individuals is characterized both by heterogeneous growth rates, already
determined at the moment of entering the labor market, and by the presence of very persistent
shocks (almost permanent) during the life cycle.
As a rough comparison, we can look at the values for the parameters that Guvenen [2009]
finds in a similar exercise, with a similar specification, for the US. For the parameters already
predetermined at the beginning of working life, Guvenen [2009] finds that in the US there is
much higher variance in the growth rate (σ2β,US = σˆ2β,US = 0.00038 versus σˆ2β,ITA = 0.00026)
while there much less variance in the levels (σˆ2α,US = 0.022 and not statistically significant,
versus σˆ2α,ITA = 0.072). It seems that factors that are already determined at the moment
of beginning the economic activity (sex, race, education, family background...) produce less
inequality in the level of earnings in the US but more inequality in the growth rate. With
respect to permanent shocks during life-cycle, Guvenen [2009] finds that in the US they are
relevant variable and produce the empirical moments to be used as an input for the minimization routine is
fully replicable. The fortran routine heavily uses the imsl library which is not publicly available.
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much less persistent (ρˆUS = 0.821 versus ρˆITA = 0.956) even though with a bigger variance
in the innovation (σˆ2η,US = 0.029 versus σˆ2η,ITA = 0.017). These results are broadly consistent
with the stereotypical view of labor markets in both countries. In Italy there is much higher
role for active policy and labor markets are more sclerotic. This results in smaller but more
persistent shocks during the life cycle. At the same time they are consistent with the view of
the US as "the land opportunity" where "talent" is rewarded. There is little inequality in the
level of permanent income but a bigger heterogeneity in growth rates.
Table 3.4-1: Baseline Results
base rip contr allc
σ2β 0.00026 NA 0.00004 0.00003
(0.000064) (0.00005) (0.00005)
ρ 0.956 0.97 0.72 0.73
(0.048) (0.00007) (0.104) (0.105)
σ2α 0.073 0.021 0.041 0.032
(0.020) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
σαβ -0.004 NA -.00018 .00013
(0.0026) (0.0008) (0.0009)
σ2ε 0.084 0.105 0.057 0.060
(0.0084) (0.008) (0.022) (0.021)
σ2η 0.018 0.012 0.042 0.039
(0.004) (0.002) (0.020) (0.019)
KW 0.923 0.887 0.891 0.894
For completeness in the third column (rip) of Table 3.4-1 we also report the estimates of
the rip process, obtained imposing σ2β = σαβ = 0. In this case we find that the estimated
persistence of earnings shocks is slightly higher (ρˆ = 0.97) and much more precisely estimated
than in the hip model. The variance of innovation is slightly higher than in the baseline
model (σ2η = 0.023). These estimates are very close to those found for the US by Storesletten
et al. [2004] and which form the basis from almost all the general equilibrium models with
heterogeneous agents.
How important initial conditions are? The next step is to use our estimates to address
the issue of how much of earnings inequality is due to shocks that are already realized at
the moment the individuals starts their economic activity and how much is due to shocks
realized during their working age. To this end we simulate 10000 individuals’ histories using
our estimated process and we calculate the variance of permanent income (discounted present
value of earnings) both if we shut down the life cycle shocks (i.e. σ2η = σ2ε = 0) and if we
leave them active. We choose to focus on permanent income since it is the closest measure
to welfare that we can calculate with our approach. The last row of Table 3.4-1 reports
the KW statistics defined in equation (3.3-11). In the baseline specification the ratio of the
two variances is 0.923. Roughly speaking, we can interpret this result by saying that the
contribution of life-cycle shocks to the total variance in present value of earnings is about 8%.
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This results is quite close to what Keane / Wolpin [1997] find in a structural econometric
exercise for the US. They find that about 90% of total variance is due to initial conditions. In
a similar exercise, by imposing the rip process, Storesletten et al. [2004] find a much smaller
value of 0.58.
This has relevant policy implications as it signals the relative importance of the contributions
to permanent income inequality of factors that are already determined before the beginning
of economic activity (e.g. education, sex, family background) as opposed to factors happening
during the life-cycle (e.g. promotions, unemployment). On the other side it tells how
important are mechanism and policies that insure against risk life-cycle risk. Given that
about 8% of the variance of permanent income is related to life-cycle shocks there seem
to be a limited scope for unemployment insurance or bankruptcy law, while there seem
to be much broader scope for policy affecting initial conditions (e.g. education policies,
anti-discrimination, redistributive inheritance taxation...).
It is also interesting to point out that when we estimate the rip process we find that the
contribution of life-cycle shocks is slightly higher. The ratio of the variances in this case is
0.88, giving a contribution of life-cycle shocks to 12%. This has relevant consequences for the
issue of modeling the earnings process correctly when doing general equilibrium models with
heterogeneous agents. An example will clarify. Suppose you want to use one of these models
to answer the question of what are the effects on consumption and saving decision of Italian
households of introducing in Italy a personal bankruptcy law on the lines of the US one. The
main trade-off behind introducing a bankruptcy law is that it provides insurance against
otherwise uninsurable shocks (i.e. earnings shocks) at the cost of worsening credit conditions
the consumers get (see Livshits et al. [2007] for an analysis of the US). If we assume that the
earnings process is we assume the rip process instead of the correct hip in addressing this
question we would overstate the risk the agents are facing and we should bias the results of
the model (most likely in favor of introducing a very generous bankruptcy law since we are
overstating the role of insurance).
What affects initial conditions? Given that about 92% of the total variance of permanent
income is related to factor that are predetermined at the moment of starting economic activity,
a natural step forward is to investigate what are the important factors. This is an interesting
issue for policy makers, but it is also relevant for economists using these processes in general
equilibrium models. Most of the renewed attention to the kind of earnings process economists
use in their models stems from the paper of Guvenen [2007]. In this paper he claims that the
standard precautionary saving model with the hip process, is able to explain some stylized
facts about consumption that it would not be able explain if we assume the rip process.
This result is conditional on agents not knowing their individual growth rate βi and having
to learn about it over the life cycle.
As a first step in this direction we relax the assumption made in the baseline version, that
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the common deterministic component of earnings is a (time dependent) function of age only
gt(h). Instead we assume that this common component of earnings is a function of observable
individual characteristics that are already determined at the moment of starting economic
activity. That is we assume the common deterministic trend is gt(h,xi) where the variables in
xi are sex (Si), education (Ei) and area of birth (Bi). To implement this we introduce these
variables as controls in the time-dependent regressions we run to derive "residual income"
uih (t)., and then we check what happens to our model.
Table 3.4-2: The common deterministic component
log of income
primary 0.172
(0.079)
secondary 0.393
(0.077)
highschool 0.598
(0.077)
graduate 0.851
(0.079)
postgraduate 1.013
(0.161)
north 0.179
( 0.044)
center 0.072
(0.045)
south and islands -0.025
(0.044)
sex -0.181
(0.019)
constant 4.923
(0.111)
age dummies yes
The results from one of these regressions, for the year 2000, are reported in Table 3.4-2 I
where we report the coefficients for a series of education dummies (the excluded category
is less than primary school), a sex dummy and a series of area of birth dummies (excluded
category is abroad). The results are as expected. More education significantly increases
income, while being a female significantly reduce it. Being born in the north significantly
increases income as opposed to be born abroad, or in the center or in the south. Being born
in the center is positively correlated with higher incomes but the differences with south and
abroad are not significant.12
The results for this exercise are reported in the column 4 (contr) of Table 3.4-1. Once we
control for education sex and area of birth the variance of individual growth rates is much
smaller (0.00004 versus 0.00026) and statistically significant. Moreover once we control for
observables in the common deterministic trend we can see that the estimated persistence
12 Results when we introduce simply the categorical variables are essentially identical.
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is drastically reduced. Now it is ρˆ = 0.72. Much of the persistence in the baseline version
is captured by the observables in the common deterministic trend. Once we control, in a
very simple way, for variables that are already known at the moment of entering in the labor
market, the nature of earnings process is drastically changes. First of all there is no more
evidence of heterogeneous earnings profile. Therefore there seems to be little role for learning
about the heterogeneous growth rates. The conclusion of the work by Guvenen [2007] are
somewhat weakened. Moreover the amount and the kind of risks that agents are facing is
dramatically different. 13.
Table 3.4-3: Sources of inequality
base sex edu nasc contr
σ2β 0.00026 0.00026 0.000052 0.00025 0.00004
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.000057) (0.00007) (0.00005)
ρ 0.956 0.956 0.756 0.963 0.72
(0.048) (0.047) (0.107) (0.041) (0.104)
σ2α 0.073 0.079 0.048 0.073 0.041
(0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012)
σαβ -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.00018
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.001) (0.0023) (0.0008)
σ2ε 0.084 0.081 0.064 0.082 0.057
(0.0084) (0.008) (0.020) (0.008) (0.022)
σ2η 0.018 0.018 0.036 0.017 0.042
(0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.041) (0.020)
Given how much the results change when we introduce the variables xi, our next step is to
introduce each of these variables one at a time. The results are reported in Table 3.4-3. The
first and the last column reports the baseline and the one where we control for all 3 variables
together. The third column (sex) and the fifth (nasc) show that controlling for sex and
for the area of birth (which includes information about being born abroad) does not change
the results. The big changes happens when we control for education, as shown in the fourth
column (educ) which is very close tho the results when we control for all the 3 variables.
This preliminary analysis show that the most important variable in affecting our estimates is
education.
3.5 Robustness checks
In order to assess the strength of our results we run a series of robustness checks. In all cases
we present the results for the baseline hip estimation (baseXXX) and for the estimation
where we control for education sex and area of birth in deriving residual income (contrXXX).
13 The last column of Table 3.4-1 (allc) reports the results when, in the time-dependent regressions to derive
"residual income" we control for other observables which are not fixed at the moment of starting the economic
activity, and are therefore age dependent. That is we assume gt
(
h,xi,wih
)
, where the vector wih includes the
branch of activity, work status,the geographic area, the marriage status, and the qualification. As it can be
seen, adding these additional controls does not change our estimates significantly.
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In addition to check for the robustness of our main exercise, the goal of these experiments is
also to provide valuable inputs for different researchers.
Employees only In the first one we check what happens if we change the object of the
analysis. In the main estimation we assume that earnings are all net incomes excluding those
from assets and pensions. In this check we estimate it for net labor income from the employee.
This is an interesting exercise in itself, since for some macroeconomic models this is the correct
input [e.g. for any occupational choice model, like for example Cagetti / DeNardi 2009].
The results are reported in Table 3.5-4. It can be seen that in the baseline hip estimation
(baselab) results are quite similar to our baseline estimates from the main exercise (see the
first column of Table 3.4-1). The estimated parameters are similar in magnitudes even if the
heterogeneity in growth rates is smaller in magnitude. This difference can be explained from
part of the heterogeneity in deterministic profiles coming from agents sorting out between
employee and self-employed. When we control for pre-working observables (contrlab) we
find that almost the same pattern happens as in the main exercise. The heterogeneity in
life-cycle profiles falls significantly and is not statistically significant. However the persistence
remains high. This can also be explained with the fact that by focusing on income from the
employee only we are losing all the agents who shift from employee and self-employed and
also to and from the unemployed.
Table 3.5-4: Robustness checks: labor income only
baselab contrlab
σ2β 0.000175 0.000097
(0.000047) (0.000053)
ρ 0.953 0.97
(0.050) (0.03)
σ2α 0.06 0.054
(0.015) (0.017)
σαβ -0.003 -0.003
(0.0018) (0.0010)
σ2ε 0.06 0.061
(0.006) (0.004)
σ2η 0.011 0.009
(0.003) (0.001)
All individuals In the second robustness check we look at all individuals income rather than
focusing on household heads. This might be more interesting exercise for those economists
that want to go beyond the household unit and focus on all individual income14. The results of
this exercise are reported in Table 3.5-5. The most striking difference with the main exercise
in the paper, even though not very surprising, is that there is much higher heterogeneity.
The estimates of both σˆ2α and of σˆ2ε in the baseline estimation (baseind) are much higher in
14 For example this might be the most interesting exercise as an input in a microsimulation model.
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value than the main exercise of the paper (see Table 3.4-1). It is quite intuitive that focusing
on household head we are somehow restricting to a more homogeneous sample. The result of
controlling for education sex and area of birth are similar to those of the main experiment
even though in this case the heterogeneity in growth rate does not fall so much and remains
(barely) statistically significant.
Table 3.5-5: Robustness checks: all agents
baseind contrind
σ2β 0.000281 0.00014
(0.0000145) (0.000054)
ρ 0.975 0.805
(0.041) (0.08)
σ2α 0.14 0.105
(0.023 ) (0.017)
σαβ -0.0065 -0.0025
(0.0022) (0.0010)
σ2ε 0.16 0.148
(0.0087) (0.008)
σ2η 0.016 0.029
(0.004) (0.013)
Stricter criteria In the third exercise we check what happens if we restrict the criterion of
the minimum number of observations needed in order to include a moment in our estimation
procedure. In the main experiment in the paper we use a moment if at least 100 observations
contribute to the empirical counterpart. This leaves us with 198 moments and with auto-
covariances of up to order 11. When we increase the minimum number of observations to
200 the number of moments falls to 101 and the highest order of autocorrelation is 7. The
results reported in the second column of Table 3.5-6, (min = 100), show that the reduction in
moments, especially in higher order autocorrelation has drastic effects on the estimates and
on their precision. Numbers are literally all over the places. However we run also another
experiment where we keep the high minimum number of observations, 200, but we increase
the number of contributors to each age h moment. Rather than considering "of age h" any
agents of age h ∈ [h− 1, h+ 1] as in the main exercise of the paper, we consider "of age h" all
agents of age h ∈ [h− 2, h+ 2]. In this case we have 184 moments and autocorrelations up to
the order 11. The results, reported in third column of Table 3.5-6, (min = 100, range = 2)
are back to familiar numbers pretty close to the (base) estimates in Table 3.4-1. These
experiments suggests that including high order of autocorrelations and a sizable number of
moments is needed in order to have reasonable estimates.15
15 In a related work, following Hryshko [2009], we are currently working on devising a Montecarlo experiment
that simulate a dataset with the characteristics of the shiw in order to explore the ability of our estimation
procedure to identify the parameters of our stochastic process.
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Table 3.5-6: Robustness checks: stricter criteria
min = 200 min = 200, range = 2
σ2β 0.000063 0.000189
(0.000068) (0.000152)
ρ 0.535 0.978
(0.307) (0.037)
σ2α 0.037 0.074
(0.012 ) (0.017)
σαβ 0.0011 -0.005
(0.0011) (0.002)
σ2ε 0.00000 0.089
(0.12) (0.007)
σ2η 0.103 0.016
(0.12) (0.003)
Splitting the sample according to education The last robustness check is to split the
sample according to education of the agents. We assume that an agent has high education if
she has at least a high school degree. In doing so we have to relax our criteria for the selection
of the moments due to sample reduction. We lower the minimum number of moments to
50 and we increase the range of agents "of age h" to ±2. The results are reported in Table
3.5-7. The estimates of the parameters are less well estimated than in the main exercise of
the paper an the numbers must be interpreted with some cautions. There are few things to
note. Comparing the high (baseeduc) to the low (basenoeduc) education estimates we
can see that among high education agents there is less heterogeneity in the growth rates but
more heterogeneity in the level of permanent shocks. Taking these estimates at face value
most of permanent inequalities (due to factor that are already determined at the beginning
of working activity) within the high education group do not increase inequality during the
life cycle but are mostly in the level of income throughout the working. Instead within the
low education group there pre-working age characteristics are reflected mostly in growth
rate differences. At the same time during the working life the high education agents are
exposed to less shocks that are more persistent over time than the low education group.16
Further controlling for education sex and area of birth does not affects estimates for the high
education group, while it seems to matter for the low education groups.
16 Given the imprecision in the estimates of the ρ parameter these conclusion are particularly speculative
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Table 3.5-7: Robustness checks: education
baseeduc contreduc basenoeduc contrnoduc
σ2β 0.000155 0.00015 0.00029 0.00003
(0.000083) (0.000067) (0.00009) (0.00005)
ρ 0.899 0.92 0.72 0.63
(0.078) (0.07) (0.104) (0.15)
σ2α 0.056 0.068 0.037 0.032
(0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020)
σαβ -0.002 -0.0028 .00038 .0006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.0018) (0.001)
σ2ε 0.080 0.080 0.055 0.025
(0.012) (0.008) (0.024) (0.05)
σ2η 0.019 0.013 0.034 0.07
(0.008) (0.005) (0.021) (0.05)
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have posed and estimated a stochastic process for the earnings of Italian
households. We estimated the parameters that minimize the distance between the theoretical
cross sectional age-specific variances and autocovariances and their empirical counterparts,
using Italian data from the shiw. We find evidence of heterogeneity in deterministic trends,
determined at the beginning of working activity (the variance of the growth rate is σˆ2β=0.00026)
and of very persistent life-cycle shocks (ρˆ = 0.956). Once we control, in a very simple way,
for other observable characteristics that are fixed at the moment of starting the economic
activity (like sex, area of birth and in particular education) we find that the variance in
the deterministic growth rate falls to 0.00004 and it is not statistically different from zero
and the persistence of the life-cycle shocks falls to 0.72. as we find that Italian agents have
heterogeneous growth rates that are determined before the beginning of economic activity.
At the same, time we find that during the life-cycle agents are hit by very persistent shocks
as suggested by the proponents of the rip process.
Our estimated process provides a necessary input for any economist willing to use a life-cycle,
quantitative equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents to study issues like social security,
housing decision, precautionary saving in Italy. We also show that a mis-specified earnings
process might lead to bias in the quantitative results of such models, by overstating the role
of risk faced by the agents during the life-cycle. We are currently using these estimates in
some related work [e.g. Rodano / Scoccianti 2009, Rodano 2009, Scoccianti 2009].
These estimates allow a first, rough, assessment of the relative importance of pre-working
age shocks and life-cycle shocks in determining the heterogeneity in earnings in the Italian
population. We find that, if we shut down life cycle shocks, the variance in permanent income
would be 90% of the one we would obtain if we leave them in. This suggests a more limited
role for policies oriented at copying with life-cycle risk, with respect to the one assumed by
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most of the literature. Even if our approach, being mostly statistical, has the advantage of
not requiring too many assumptions [especially if compared to more structured approaches
like for example Keane / Wolpin 1997], it does not allow any analysis of the consequences
of the inequality of earnings process on consumption decisions and therefore on welfare. A
next step we are planning to do in the next future is to embed this stochastic process in
a calibrated life-cycle version of the Aiyagari-Bewley model to see which are the welfare
effects of different assumptions about the earnings process. Moreover, even if it allows a
useful decomposition, our approach is almost silent on what determines these pre-working
age factors that seems to play such a big role in affecting permanent income inequality. Some
preliminary calculations seem to point out that an important role is played by education, but
further research, possibly with a more structural approach, is certainly needed.
3.7 Appendix: additional tables
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Table 3.7-8: Number of individuals contributing to each moment
age Order of Autocovariances
var 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 11
25 1759 227 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
26 2073 298 NA 100 NA NA NA NA NA
27 2410 399 NA 135 NA NA NA NA NA
28 2770 485 NA 167 NA NA NA NA NA
29 3109 567 NA 215 NA NA NA NA NA
30 3305 610 NA 250 106 NA 124 109 NA
31 3571 711 NA 309 117 122 129 115 NA
32 3713 775 NA 322 132 121 148 142 NA
33 3949 900 NA 373 138 134 160 140 NA
34 4017 905 107 377 166 127 184 147 100
35 4197 968 115 412 170 140 187 141 112
36 4289 978 124 422 188 146 191 137 117
37 4403 1049 125 444 187 151 191 148 135
38 4560 1103 123 470 193 164 194 154 138
39 4745 1160 124 467 189 163 207 172 141
40 4828 1194 128 480 196 182 212 179 142
41 4841 1202 131 496 210 191 231 189 136
42 4722 1171 134 516 209 194 234 191 135
43 4776 1225 137 549 209 208 247 185 129
44 4762 1210 145 528 209 204 242 178 121
45 4863 1258 143 552 208 217 225 160 NA
46 4757 1202 143 535 207 202 206 136 NA
47 4765 1257 134 557 193 206 188 NA NA
48 4727 1249 134 520 183 179 167 NA NA
49 4793 1281 126 511 168 186 102 NA NA
50 4674 1197 119 462 147 116 NA NA NA
51 4586 1127 111 448 NA NA NA NA NA
52 4298 1011 106 284 NA NA NA NA NA
53 4103 933 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
54 3738 583 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
55 3539 283 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
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Table 3.7-9: Empirical moments (baseline specification)
Order of Autocovariancesage var 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 11
25 0.179 0.064 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
26 0.176 0.092 NA 0.085 NA NA NA NA NA
27 0.166 0.104 NA 0.093 NA NA NA NA NA
28 0.167 0.104 NA 0.060 NA NA NA NA NA
29 0.178 0.093 NA 0.070 NA NA NA NA NA
30 0.184 0.096 NA 0.052 0.148 NA 0.045 0.098 NA
31 0.190 0.102 NA 0.061 0.149 0.036 0.067 0.088 NA
32 0.202 0.115 NA 0.053 0.148 0.023 0.078 0.095 NA
33 0.211 0.106 NA 0.062 0.098 0.044 0.067 0.101 NA
34 0.221 0.103 0.124 0.063 0.096 0.051 0.065 0.095 0.056
35 0.226 0.115 0.070 0.080 0.093 0.061 0.086 0.087 0.051
36 0.233 0.133 0.113 0.099 0.105 0.101 0.091 0.059 0.058
37 0.237 0.141 0.142 0.094 0.127 0.096 0.102 0.073 0.082
38 0.236 0.136 0.146 0.090 0.135 0.120 0.082 0.080 0.078
39 0.232 0.143 0.150 0.084 0.156 0.086 0.107 0.126 0.065
40 0.228 0.143 0.122 0.115 0.142 0.101 0.117 0.121 0.062
41 0.232 0.143 0.181 0.130 0.151 0.100 0.148 0.124 0.077
42 0.236 0.136 0.179 0.126 0.129 0.115 0.122 0.081 0.087
43 0.244 0.150 0.160 0.126 0.119 0.153 0.120 0.103 0.094
44 0.240 0.152 0.106 0.125 0.101 0.140 0.087 0.095 0.089
45 0.251 0.166 0.102 0.139 0.106 0.145 0.126 0.115 NA
46 0.240 0.159 0.116 0.124 0.120 0.103 0.130 0.114 NA
47 0.257 0.163 0.135 0.133 0.157 0.112 0.151 NA NA
48 0.254 0.167 0.138 0.146 0.197 0.129 0.146 NA NA
49 0.282 0.179 0.161 0.172 0.214 0.133 0.165 NA NA
50 0.276 0.186 0.256 0.176 0.207 0.144 NA NA NA
51 0.277 0.187 0.241 0.167 NA NA NA NA NA
52 0.287 0.188 0.215 0.154 NA NA NA NA NA
53 0.295 0.199 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
54 0.345 0.196 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
55 0.350 0.214 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Chapter 4
Personal Bankruptcy Law in Italy
4.1 Introduction
Personal bankruptcy law is a legal procedure that specifies how much an insolvent debtor,
who holds unsecured debt, must repay and how much each creditor gets.1 In most cases the
debtor must repay from her assets and/or from future earnings. At the same time bankruptcy
procedure protects debtors from harsh collection practices from creditors by setting part of
both earnings and assets as exempt and establishing how much each creditor gets.
The main economic rationale for having a personal bankruptcy law revolves around
borrowing decisions. Households that wants to smooth consumption across time periods and
small firms that want to finance risky investment projects will take the legal framework about
bankruptcy into account [White 2007b]. In fact these decisions are made in an uncertain
environment in which explicit insurance mechanisms are mostly absent. Bankruptcy law
provides a form of consumption insurance either by discharging part of the debt or by limiting
the amount creditors can try to seize from insolvent debtors assets and earnings. If debtors
are risk averse consumption insurance increases their utility and their willingness to borrow
and invest. At the same time, there are several costs associated with bankruptcy procedure.
A generous bankruptcy law might allow opportunistic behavior from the debtors that file
even when not insolvent. Moreover, even in the case of non opportunistic behavior, debt
discharge and debtor protection increases the costs of lending for the creditors inducing them
to increase interest rate or even ration credit. Thus the main trade-off related to personal
bankruptcy law is between better insurance, provided by a debtor friendly legislation, at the
cost of worse credit conditions. This trade-off is not the unique economic feature relevant
for bankruptcy legislation. Other costs includes legal costs of bankruptcy procedures and
low effort after bankruptcy due to seizing of earnings, while other benefits include debtor
1 I thank Alex Michaelides for his continuous support and valuable comments on this chapter. I am also
grateful to Alfonso Rosolia, Filippo Scoccianti, Paolo Sestito and participants to lunch seminars in the Bank
of Italy.
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protection from excessive garnishment of her earnings from the creditors and coordination
among multiple lenders in the event of default.
This trade-off is at the center of recent public discussions and policy changes in Europe
and the U.S. In Europe, the bankruptcy law is much harsher than in the US [White 2007b].
In most European countries debt is discharged after several years (e.g. 8-10 years in France,
6 years in Germany). In the U.S. instead, bankruptcy law is very generous with debtor.
Up to 2005, insolvent debtors could choose between two different procedures: Chapter 7, in
which they would partly repay their debt using non-exempt assets and the remaining part
is immediately discharged; chapter 13, in which they can keep their assets and must repay
out of future earnings (but not more than they would have under Chapter 7). Since most
agents do not have much non-exempt assets they ended up filing under Chapter 7 and pay
nothing. In this sense the U.S. is said to provide a "fresh start". However the U.S. Congress
has recently passed a law in 2005 making personal bankruptcy less beneficial for filers, by
introducing "means testing" and by increasing filing costs for debtors. At the same time, in
Europe, many countries, like for example Germany and Greece, the Netherlands and the UK,
have made legislation more lenient by reducing the number of years before debt is discharged
[see, for example, Armour / Cumming 2008].
In Italy, there is no formal bankruptcy law that allow discharge. An insolvent debtor is
obliged to repay her debt out of post bankruptcy earnings until debt is completely repaid.
There has been an ongoing debate about reforming the personal bankruptcy law2 but even a
recently proposed reform, recently approved in the Italian Senate on April 2009, does not
allow any debt discharge [see Marcucci / Sabbatini 2009].
In this paper we address the quantitative effects of the introduction of debt discharge in a
personal bankruptcy law on saving decisions of Italian households. The focus of this paper
is only on the above trade-off related to fresh start: better insurance at the cost of worse
credit conditions. To quantify this trade off, we set up a life-cycle model of consumption and
saving decisions, very close to Livshits et al. [2007], where heterogeneous households face
uncertain and uninsurable labor earnings risk. The model explicitly model the bankruptcy
procedure on the Italian legal framework. This in turn will endogenously affect the borrowing
interest rate the agents are offered by the banking system when they borrow and therefore
their saving and borrowing decisions.
Our modeling strategy is a very parsimonious one. We choose a simple stylized model
with few ingredients and we parametrize it from microeconomic evidence whenever it is
possible. With just two free parameters, the discount factor and the transaction costs in
the intermediation sector, we are able to have a model that is broadly consistent with some
stylized facts of the Italian economy about debt, wealth distribution and the life-cycle behavior
of the most important variables (consumption income and assets accumulation). Moreover
our calibration is very neat: our free parameters are calibrated to targets that are very close
2 See for example Stanghellini [1997] and more recently Porrini [2009].
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to each of them: discount factor is set to match the wealth to income ratio and the transaction
costs in intermediation to match spread between borrowing and lending rate. The alternative
strategy would have been to add several fine details (e.g. bequest motives, more complex
demographic structure, stigma costs, labor leisure choice...) and free parameters in order to
achieve a better fit to the data. We discarded this approach in order not to run into the costs
of a much murkier intuition of where the results are coming from and what are the driving
forces.
We use the model to simulate the effects of introducing debt discharge (fresh start) on
saving and bankruptcy decisions of Italian households. All the simulations show that the
negative effects of the introduction of the fresh start in bankruptcy procedures, in terms
of worse credit conditions, will outweigh the benefits in terms of better insurance against
negative income shocks. The main effect of introducing fresh start after bankruptcy would
be to make borrowing more costly and make intertemporal allocation of consumption much
more difficult. At the same time there seem to be no much gains in terms of better insurances
across different states of the world.
The microfounded nature of the model allow us to conduct welfare comparisons. The
welfare of all agents would be reduced from the introduction of fresh start. The effects would
be much higher the more generous the new system would be for the insolvent debtor. The
welfare costs are distributed among all the population and their magnitude is equivalent to a
reduction of average consumption between 1%, in the most debtor frienly scenario, and 0.1%
in the harshest one. The agents who are most affected are those with steepest earning profile.
These results are quantitatively slightly bigger than the effects found in similar exercises for
the US. As a further comparison a reduction by half of the transaction costs in intermediation,
an unambiguously welfare improving policy, would increase welfare of the same magnitude of
the reduction of welfare caused by the extremely debtor friendly policy experiment.
In a series of robustness check we show that our results are robust to the specification of
the two most important ingredients of the model: the specification of the earnings shock and
the degree of risk aversion/intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Varying the coefficient
of risk aversion (which also controls the intertemporal elasticity of substitution) points in
the direction that what really matters for the saving decisions of the agents, at least in the
model, is not so much the substitution across states of the world but rather intertemporal
allocation of consumption.
Related literature There is a large amount of literature that tries to analyze the effects
of different personal bankruptcy law. There are two main approaches to address this issue.
On one side3, some papers try to exploit the differences across U.S. states in bankruptcy
law (e.g. in exemption level for wealth) to see the effects of different laws on households’
saving and default decisions [e.g. Gropp et al. 1997], on credit conditions for households
3 See White [2007b] for a thorough survey of this approach.
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[Fay et al. 2002] and for small businesses [Berkowitz / White 2004], and on entrepreneurial
decisions [Fan / White 2003]. On the other side, there is a rich literature that try to address
the same issue using calibrated quantitative models. This "equilibrium" approach [Athreya
2005] has focused mostly on households consumption and saving decisions [among others
Athreya 2002, Chatterjee et al. 2007, Livshits et al. 2007, Li / Sarte 2006, Athreya 2008]
and on entrepreneurial decisions [Mankart / Rodano 2008, Akyol / Athreya 2007, Meh /
Terajima 2008]. By explicitly microfounding the optimal choice of the agents as a function
of the policy variables, these type of model allows allow counter factual simulated scenario
analysis that is robust to the Lucas’ critique. Moreover, by assuming heterogeneous agents,
where heterogeneity is in wealth, earnings age, these models allow to understand winners and
losers from each policy experiment.
Our paper belongs to this second stream of literature and is most closely related to Livshits
et al. [2007] and to Athreya [2008]. It is related because it shares with them a similar
overlapping generation structure. Similarly to Athreya [2008], it also have a rich earnings
process for the agents, estimated by Rodano [2009] for Italian households using the methods
by Guvenen [2009] and Storesletten et al. [2004]. But there are two main differences. First of
all this is the first quantitative model that analyses the effects of introducing fresh start in
Italy, while all the other papers model the U.S. economy. This is a particularly useful tool
given that in Italy we can not exploit the differences in assets exemption level across U.S.
states to gather further evidence on the effects of bankruptcy law credit conditions using
microeconometric analysis. Second, it is the first paper to adopt a richer earnings process
that allow for heterogeneity in the growth rate among agents [see Guvenen 2009] and to check
whether this makes any difference. This is relevant because agents saving decisions (their
willingness to borrow) depends on the steepness of their income profile.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we quickly discuss the
legal personal bankruptcy framework in Italy and in the US. Section 3 presents the model.
Section 4 presents the main results and Section 5 concludes.
4.2 The legal framework
In Italy there is still no formal personal bankruptcy law for consumers4. An insolvent
household is forced to surrender all its assets, if any, to the creditor. At the same time the
creditor can size up to a 1/5 of the income the household is earning and any outstanding debt
is rolled over at a legal interest rate or at the borrowing interest rate, whichever is higher5.
The insolvent household is not allowed to save or borrow.
In the US insolvent households can choose between two different procedures. Under
4 Bankruptcy is only allowed to "entrepreneurs" that satisfy certain conditions on size, revenues and so on.
5 Which was 5% up to 1990, 10% from 1991 to 1996, 5% from 1997 to 1998 and between 2.5% and 3.5% from
1999 onwards.
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Chapter 7, all debt (unsecured debt) is immediately discharged and current earnings cannot
be garnished by the creditor. This is why Chapter 7 is known as providing a "fresh start".
At the same time, a person filing for bankruptcy has to surrender all wealth in excess of
an exemption level. Under Chapter 13 instead agents keep their wealth, but debt is not
discharged immediately. Creditors can size current and future earnings. And even if filing
under Chapter 13 the present value of earnings that the creditors can recover can’t be greater
than the amount they would recover under Chapter 7. Since most of the insolvent households
are asset-poor most of the bankrupt households file under Chapter 7 [see e.g. White 2007b].
Persons can file for bankruptcy only once every 6 years. The bankruptcy filing remains public
information for ten years. But there is no formal rule about former bankruptcy filers being
excluded from credit.
In this paper we focus on the role of discharge. In modeling the counter factual bankruptcy
law, the "fresh start" system, we follow Livshits et al. [2007]. We assume that agents who
defaults are subject to wage garnishment only for the period in which they declare bankruptcy6
but then debt is immediately discharged.
4.3 The model
The model is similar to the one considered by Livshits et al. [2007]. We consider an overlapping
generations life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents à là Huggett [1996]. Agents work
for Nw periods and live the remaining periods as retired until they die with certainty after
N periods. There is a continuum of measure one of agents for each age. In addition to
heterogeneity in age, agents are heterogeneous along two other dimensions: income, which
is exogenous and stochastic; wealth during the life cycle which is endogenously determined
by agents’ saving choices7. There is one homogeneous good in the economy. Financial
markets are perfectly competitive: there is free entry in the credit market where a single
non-contingent one period bond is traded. The assumption of non-contingent bonds rules out
any insurance market. Perfectly informed lender will price the bonds taking the individual
potential creditor characteristics and the bankruptcy framework into account. The only
source of uncertainty is in households’ earnings. They face idiosyncratic uncertainty but there
is no aggregate uncertainty. Since Italy is a small country, interest rate is given (and equal to
the US one) and we abstract from production side of the economy.
6 This is done for two reasons. On one side, bankruptcy filings are subject to court approval which requires
"good faith" on the side of the petitioner. Following Livshits et al. [2007] we can interpret the garnishment as
necessary to establish this "good faith". on the other side it allows us to experiment with different degrees of
severity of the counter factual "fresh start" system.
7 All agents are born without wealth.
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4.3.1 Households
Preferences The households maximize expected utility from the consumption stream over
their entire life according to the utility function
U = E
{
N∑
h=1
βh−1u (ch)
}
(4.3-1)
where β is the discount factor, ch is consumption at age h and the felicity function is assumed
to be take the crra form
u(c) = c
1−σ − 1
(1− σ) (4.3-2)
where σ is the risk aversion parameter.
Earnings process For the first Nw periods of their life an individual i of age h receive an
earning Y ih. The stochastic process for earnings represents all the uncertainty agents are
facing in this model. We assume that yih = log Y ih , the logarithm of earnings of households i
of age h, is represented by a stochastic process of the following form
yih = g (h) +
[
αi + βih
]
+
[
zih + εih
]
(4.3-3)
There are three main component of earnings. The first component, g (h), is a deterministic
trend where the function g (h) is common to all agents. In the baseline version we assume that
it is a function of age only while in robustness check we allow it to depend on education as
well. The second component,
[
αi + βih
]
, is a stochastic fixed effect, realized before entering
in the model, that affects both the level (αi) and the growth rate (βi) of earnings. We assume
that
(
αi, βi
) ∼ Niid (0,Σ), with
Σ =
(
σ2α σαβ
σαβ σ
2
β
)
(4.3-4)
being the covariance matrix. The third component,
[
zih + εih
]
, captures the shocks affecting
individual earnings during life cycle (thus it depends on age). These shocks can be temporary
(εih) or persistent (zih). We assume that the persistent shocks follow an AR(1) with persistence
ρ and innovation ηih. That is:
zih = ρzih−1 + ηih (4.3-5)
and zi0 = 0,∀i. We assume that εih ∼ Niid
(
0, σ2ε
)
and ηih ∼ Niid
(
0, σ2η
)
and the shocks are
independent on each other (and on the fixed effects shocks). The stochastic process of earnings
is characterized by six parameters that we denote with the vector θ ≡
{
σ2α, σαβ, σ
2
β, ρ, σ
2
η, σ
2
ε
}
.
For each period of retirement the household receives a fraction ζ of her own average lifetime
earnings during lifetime.
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4.3.2 Credit market and bankruptcy law
Credit market We assume that for the Italian economy the saving interest rate is given,
and equal to r which we calibrate to the return on assets in the US. We assume a perfectly
competitive credit market (i.e. there is free entry) where only a one year non-contingent bond
is traded. The fact that bonds are non contingent rules out any possibility fro the agents
of explicitly buy any insurance. All the insurance they have is provided by self insurance
by saving assets. There is no asymmetric information. Banks perfectly observe all borrower
characteristics. But the option of bankruptcy creates a limited commitment problem. After
the realization of the shocks during the period the agent has the option of filing for bankruptcy.
The different bankruptcy legislation will determine both the amount of resources that the
bank will recover and the probability of default, therefore affecting endogenously the price
of credit. The specific contract specify the price q of one unit of consumption good in the
future8. There are some transaction costs τ only on loans that will generate a positive spread
between lending and borrowing rate even if the bank can forecast that borrower will never
default under any contingency. Pricing of the loan is determined by the free entry and by
the forward looking behavior of the banks: given the information the bank can fully forecast
the probability of default and the amount that it will recover in the event of default. Since
information is perfectly symmetric and there is free entry each bank makes zero profit on
each single loan they make. There is no cross subsidization.
Bankruptcy law Household can declare bankruptcy and what happens is determined by
the legal framework. The model of Italian legal framework is as follows: if an agent defaults,
she must surrender all her asset and, if this is not enough as it is the case in our model9,
the bank seizes a fraction γ of agent’s salary. Any outstanding debt is rolled over at at a
legal rate, r fixed by the law. Wage garnishment goes on until debt is totally repaid or the
agents die. In modeling the alternative system we assume that in the period in which agents
declare bankruptcy a fraction γ of their wages are garnished by the bank. After that debt is
immediately discharged and the defaulting agent is free of any outstanding liabilities. There
is no exclusion from credit after bankruptcy.
4.3.3 The timing
Within the period the timing is as follow:
• The agent wakes up at dawn with a certain debts/savings d. If d > 0 she was a borrower
in the past and now she must repay, while if d < 0 she was saving in the past. She is of
age h and her current period earnings shocks z and ε are already realized and known to
8 Some notation: we call d′ the face value of the bond which is traded in the current period and q < 1 its
price. We assume that if d′ > 0 the agent is incurring debt. That is she is liable for an amount d′ next period,
and she has a (positive) additional amount or resources qd′ available for consumption today.
9 Given that there is a single asset, the agent is either a saver or a borrower.
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everybody. The household is also characterized by the fixed effects α and β which are
also known. Instead when she is retired, she is characterized only by her debts/savings,
by her age h and by her fixed effects (α, β) that determine her retirement earnings10.
• Then the borrower decides whether to file for bankruptcy or repay her debt.
– If she defaults her earnings are seized, she must consume the share of earnings left
and any outstanding debt is rolled over to next period
– If she repays she can allocate remaining cash on hand between consumption and
saving/borrowing.
• The saver only chooses how much to consume and how much to borrow
4.3.4 The households optimization problem
The current Italian system Let’s define the value function associated with the problem of
the households. At the moment of taking her decisions an agent of age h is characterized by
her individual state variable (d, α, β, z, ε, h) which is composed by her age, h, her outstanding
debt, d, by her earnings fixed effects (α, β) by the persistent z and by the transitory ε earning
shocks. The first decision is whether to repay or declare bankruptcy. That is
V (d, α, β, z, ε, h) = max
{
V D (d, α, β, z, ε, h) , V R (d, α, β, z, ε, h)
}
(4.3-6)
where V D(·) is the utility from defaulting and V R(·) the utility from repaying of an agent
with state variable (d, α, β, z, ε, h).
If the agent repays she has resources given by her earnings Y (α, β, z, ε, h) minus her debt re-
payment (−d), to be used on consumption c and on new saving/borrowing −q (d′, α, β, z, h) d′,
where we have made explicit that the price of new loans, q (·), depends on the size of the
loan, d′ and on the individual characteristics (α, β, z, h)11. Then her budget constraint is
given by
c− qb(d′, α, z, h)d′ = Y (α, β, z, ε, h)− d (4.3-7)
and her value function if she repays is given by
V R (d, α, β, z, ε, h) = max
c,d′
u(c) + βE
{
V
(
d′, α, β, z′, ε′, h+ 1
)}
(4.3-8)
where maximization is subject to (4.3-7) and the expectation is taken on the future value of
the life-cycle earnings shocks (z′, ε′).
If the agent defaults her consumption is given by the fraction (1− γ) of her earnings that
10 In what follow we omit the presentation of the retired agent problem given that is just a simplified version
of the one presented here.
11 The specific way in which the bank price the loan is described below.
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is not seized by the banks, and the outstanding debt is rolled over at rate r. That is her
utility is given by
V D (d, α, β, z, ε, h) = u(c) + βE
{
V
(
d′, α, β, z′, ε′, h+ 1
)}
(4.3-9)
where
c = (1− γ)Y (·)
d′ = max {[(d− γY (·)] , 0} (1 + r) (4.3-10)
The counterfactual scenario Under the counterfactual scenario the state variable is the
same as in the current Italian system and the bankruptcy decision is the same as in the
equation (4.3-6) as it is the value from repaying given by equations (4.3-8) and (4.3-7)12.
The only differences in what happens to the defaulting households. In this case the current
earnings are still garnished13 for one period but debt is immediately discharged. Therefore
the value of defaulting, in this case it is equal to
V D (d, α, β, z, ε, h) = u(c) + βE
{
V
(
d′, α, β, z′, ε′, h+ 1
)}
(4.3-11)
where
c = (1− γ)Y (·)
d′ = 0
(4.3-12)
4.3.5 Banks
The current Italian system Free entry in the credit market will force the banks to make
zero expected profits on each contract (i.e. on each individual). For each type of agent,
ω ≡ (α, β, z, ε, h), and for each loan of size d′ the bank can anticipate the probability of
default pi (d′, ω) next period. If the probability of default is zero, given the transaction costs
τ , the bank will offer a price of loan qb (d′, ω) = 1/(1 + r + τ). If the agent defaults then the
bank recovers the garnished earnings γY (ω′) and the value of rolled over debt, d′′q(d′′, ω′)
where d′′ = (max {[d′ − γY (ω′)] , 0}) (1 + r). Therefore the price of a bond of face value d′
for an agent with state ω is
qb
(
d′, ω
)
= 1− pi (d
′, ω)
1 + r + τ +
pi (d′, ω)
1 + r + τ E
{
d′′qb(d′′, ω′) + Y (ω′) γ
d′
}
(4.3-13)
The counterfactual scenario In the counterfactual scenario, in the event of a default the
bank collects only the wage garnished in the next period but debt is immediately discharged.
12 Even if the structure of the problem is identical the different bankruptcy frameworks affect the specific form
of the pricing function, as shown in next paragraph.
13 In the policy experiment we consider also the case where γ = 0.
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Therefore the price of a bond of face value d′, for an agent with state ω, is given by
qb
(
d′, ω
)
= 1− pi (d
′, ω)
1 + r + τ +
pi (d′, ω)
1 + r + τ E
{
Y (ω′) γ
d′
}
(4.3-14)
4.3.6 Equilibrium
Given a certain interest rate, a recursive competitive equilibrium is given by:
• a collection of value functions and policy functions that solve the problems above
• a collection of default probabilities that are coherent with the optimal bankruptcy
decision
• a collection of bond prices that solve the zero profit condition, given the above optimal
decision and default probabilities
The equilibrium is computed by backward induction. Therefore we already know the
default probabilities from the future, which implies a certain price, and then we solve the
optimal saving problem of the agents.
These problems endogenously determine a wealth distribution for each age that we use to
calculate aggregate statistics. In order to recover the steady state distribution of wealth we
simulate a large number of agent’s lifetimes and we derive all the relevant model statistics.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Parametrization
Our parametrization is the most conservative as possible. We choose as many parameters as
possible from micro evidence available and we try to avoid to use free parameters to match
targets in the Italian economy. The goal is to keep the model as simple and stark as possible
but at the same time get a reasonable picture of the phenomenon we are studying.
The model period is 3 years. Agents enter the labor market at age 24, they all retire
exogenously at 56 and die at 86 leaving no bequests. The preferences of the agents are
characterized by the discount factor and by the risk aversion parameter. Following the
literature we assume the crra specification with u (c) = c1−σ/ (1− σ) where σ is the risk
aversion parameter. We set to σ = 2 and we conduct some robustness checks on it. The
discount factor is calibrated to match the ratio of financial wealth to income in the economy.
Coherently with the small open economy interpretation of our partial equilibrium model, we
set the interest rate equal to 4% which is the average rate of return on capital in the US
[McGrattan / Prescott 2001]. In the model period it gives us r = 0.12. Another parameter is
the exogenously given transaction cost on borrowing, τ , which yield a spread between riskless
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borrowing and lending rates in the model. We first show that when we set τ = 0 the model
calibration is rather poor. Therefore in order to get a better calibration we choose τ we
choose it to match the observed spread between borrowing and lending in Italian data (which
we set at 6%, taking as the borrowing rate the rate on consumer credit).
To represent the bankruptcy law we need two parameters: the share of earnings that the
bank can seize if the household file for bankruptcy, γ and the legal interest rate at which the
debt is rolled over in the event of default. r¯. Given the legal features already described we
set the first equal to 1/5, (γ = 0.2), and the second equal to the borrowing rate r¯ = rb.
The earnings process The earnings process is represented by 4.3-3 which is characterized by
the parameters θ =
{
σ2α, σαβ, σ
2
β, ρ, σ
2
η, σ
2
ε
}
and by the common deterministic trend g (h). It
represents all the uncertainty agents are facing in this model. In a companion paper [Rodano
2009], following Storesletten et al. [2004] and Guvenen [2009], we estimate the earnings
process in (4.3-3). The minimum distance estimates of the parameters we find are reported
in Table 4.4-1.
Table 4.4-1: Earnings process estimates
hip rip educ
σ2β 0.00026 NA 0.00004
(0.000064) (0.00005)
ρ 0.956 0.97 0.72
(0.048) (0.00007) (0.104)
σ2α 0.073 0.021 0.041
0.020 0.013 0.012
σαβ -0.004 NA -.00018
(0.0026) (0.0008)
σ2ε 0.084 0.105 0.057
0.0084 0.008 0.022
σ2η 0.018 0.012 0.042
(0.004) (0.002) (0.020)
In our baseline model we adopt the specification that allow for heterogeneity in the growth
rates (hip process). The estimates are reported in the first column of Table 4.4-1. We
are the first to allow heterogeneity in the growth rate in a model of bankruptcy in general
equilibrium.14 For simplicity, since σαβ is not statistically different from zero we assume that
αi and βi are independent.
Given the importance of the earnings process we look at what happens if we assume
two other specifications in the robustness checks. In the first we follow what most of the
14 The first paper to adopt this earning process and to explore its consequences for consumption choices is
Guvenen [2007]. He assumes that agents do not know their specific deterministic growth rate βi, but have to
learn it through their life-time. We assume that agents already know their βi. The reason for this assumption
is that once we control for variables already known at the moment of entering the model σ2β is statistically
insignificant [for details see Rodano 2009]. Since in this baseline specification we do not differentiate the agents
by education or sex we keep the heterogeneity in growth rate but we assume no learning.
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quantitative literature on consumer bankruptcy done. Following Storesletten et al. [2004],
we assume σ2β = 0 (rip process) and we get the estimates reported in the second column of
Table 4.4-1. In the second we assume that agents are born, exogenously either with either
high or low education and that education affects only the deterministic profile g
(
h,Ei
)
, but
not the stochastic process15. When we estimate the parameters of the model under these
conditions, we get the estimates of the parameters in the third column of Table 4.4-1. Since
σ2β is not significantly different from zero we set both σ2β = σαβ = 0. In this case we have
also to assume the fraction of low education agents in the economy. We do two exercises:
one in which an high education agent has at least a bachelor’s degree and one in which she
has at least an high school degree. In this robustness check we also assume that agents
have a different deterministic earnings age-profile according to their education. The earnings
profiles for the case in which education is given by an high school degree are reported in the
Figure 4.1 where the "all" refers to the general case where we do not differentiate with respect
to education (i.e. the case when the deterministic trend is g (h)). These are derived from
regressing the logarithm of earnings on a series of age and time dummies, on an education
dummy and on the interaction of age and education dummies16. In addition to the robustness
check on income we also run some robustness checks on the risk aversion coefficient.
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Figure 4.1: Common deterministic life cycle profiles (high and low education)
15 As shown in the robustness checks in Rodano [2009], we are not able to properly estimate the process
separately for high and low education agents separately.
16 Unless otherwise specified, all the data on the Italian economy used in this paper comes from the Bank of
Italy’ "Survey of Household Income and Wealth", (shiw) a representative sample of Italian population, with
about 8000 households interviewed every year.
4.4. Results 122
We assume that the social security replacement ratio is ζ = 0.7 [see for example Brugiavini
1997]. That implies that when retired each individual will receive an income which is equal
to 70% of her average income.
In transforming the yearly values from the table we set ρ˜ = ρ3 and σ˜2η = σ2η
(
1 + ρ2 + ρ4
)
.
All shocks are discretized using the method suggested by Tauchen [1986b]. For the persistent
shock zih we have an age-specific Markov chain, while for all other shock we discretized the
shocks17.
4.4.2 The baseline specification results
In order to yield useful policy predictions the model should fit reasonably well some stylized
facts of Italian economy which are relevant for the phenomenon we are interested in. At
the same time, in order to discipline the model, we do not want to abuse of calibration and
choose too many free parameters.
Table 4.4-2: The baseline specifications and the data
data notc base
Financial wealth to income ratio 3 3 3
Spread borrowing lending rate 0.06 0.002 0.059
Share of population with positive debt 0.11 (0.2) 0.25 0.11
Debt/income ratio for those in debt 0.3 (0.8) 0.86 0.66
Consumption/Income 0.84 1.11 1.11
Gini of financial wealth 0.77 0.98 0.78
In order to judge the ability of our model in replicating the behavior of Italian households we
report in Table 4.4-2 some statistics taken from the Italian data (data) and the corresponding
numbers generated from the model18. We report the results from two baseline specifications,
one without transaction costs (notc) and one where we calibrate τ in order to match the
spread (base) between borrowing and lending rate. As it can be seen from the comparison
between the first and the second column, when we do not consider transaction costs the
calibration is not very good. The borrowing rate is too low an this imply that the fraction of
borrowers is too high and the agents borrow too much. Consumption over income is too high
as well as the Gini index of financial wealth. When we introduce transaction costs, and we
set τ to match the spread between borrowing and lending rate, we manage to match it very
well. The value of τ that matches the spread in rates is 0.2. But now the model does much
better in matching both the fraction of borrowers and the Gini index of financial wealth. The
model does slightly better with respect to the average debt to income ratio for those in debt
17 In all specification we choose Nε = 3. In the baseline hip specification of the earnings process we choose
Nα = Nβ = 3 while in the rip specification we choose Nα = 9. In the specification with heterogeneity in skill
we assume Nα = 4 for each of the low and high education groups.
18 The data are all taken from the shiw, with the exception of the financial wealth to income ratio, which
is taken from Bartiloro et al. [2008]. In general the absolute numbers of wealth from the shiw seem to
underestimate the number from other sources.
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Figure 4.2: Consumption and income over the life cycle (data and model)
but it still too high as well19. This is true also for the fraction of total debt which is defaulted
on which is too big as compared with the Italian data20. The consumption to income ratio is
higher in the model than in the real data, but this might be due to the absence of bequest
motive and to the assumption that all agents are born with zero wealth. The discount factor
that allows to match the financial wealth to income ratio is equal to 0.875020 which in yearly
term is 0.957, well within the range commonly used in the standard macroeconomic literature.
Given the better performance of the model with transaction costs, from now on all results we
report includes τ = 0.2. Another aspect where the model perform reasonably well, especially
in the light of its simplicity, is the life-cycle behavior of the most important variables, income,
consumption and financial wealth. The model is able to replicate the life-cycle pattern of
both average consumption and average income as can be seen from Figure 4.2. In the graph
the dotted lines are the model-generated data of consumption (red) and income (black). The
solid lines are the Italian data data taken from the shiw21. As it can be seen, apart from
19 The numbers we derive for the Italian data are derived when we exclude from debt calculations the debt
related to housing (i.e. mortgages). We chose this definition since we exclude housing decisions from the
model. The number in parenthesis are those that we get if we include housing related debt
20 This number is not reported in the table. It should be possible to match also this target by introducing some
non monetary bankruptcy costs (e.g. stigma) but, for the sake of clarity, we prefer not pursue this road here.
21 Given some normalization issues the two sets of series have different units of measure. The model-generated
variables values must be read on the right hand axis while those of Italian data from the left hand axis. This
is true also for Figure 4.3
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Figure 4.3: Financial wealth over the life cycle (data and model)
the drastic fall in income in the model around retirement age, which is due to our coarse
assumption about retirement, the qualitative pattern of the model-generated variables seem
to fit reasonably well the one of the true data. Consumption tracks income pretty closely
and both model and data series peak roughly at the same time. The fit is particularly good
during the working age (up to age 55), which is where all the action in our model happens,
since there are no shocks to earnings after retirement. A similar pattern can be seen also
from the pattern of financial wealth in Figure 4.3. Both series share the same qualitative
pattern, even though, by abstracting from bequest motives and by assigning zero wealth to
the new entrants in the market we do not capture exactly the same magnitudes.
4.4.3 The policy experiment
Confident that the model perform reasonably well in representing saving decisions of Italian
households, we are now able to analyze the effects on these choices of the introduction of a
system close to the US one which allow the bankrupt household a fresh start. More specifically
the bankrupt household has a fraction (γ) of the earnings garnished by the creditor for one
period and after that her debt is completely discharged. We repeat the exercise for three
values of γ between 0.01 to 0.5, where the lower the parameter γ the more generous for the
debtor is the bankruptcy legal framework.
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Table 4.4-3: The main policy experiment results
base γ = 0.01 γ = 0.2 γ = 0.5
Financial wealth to income ratio 3 3.39 3.27 3.15
Spread borrowing lending rate 0.059 0.16 0.07 0.06
Share of population with positive debt 0.11 0.001 0.06 0.1
Debt/income ratio for those in debt 0.66 0 0.11 0.21
Consumption/Income 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.11
Gini of financial wealth 0.78 0.63 0.66 0.69
Welfare 0 -0.010 -0.005 -0.001
The results for the main variables and for a measure of welfare22 are reported in Table
4.4-3. It is evident that introducing fresh start has a negative effect on welfare. As explained
the main trade-off related to the introduction is between insurance provision on one side and
the cost of credit on the other. As expected introducing fresh start has a negative effect on
the borrowing interest rate. The spread between lending rate and borrowing rate increases
and the increase is higher the more generous for the borrower is the bankruptcy code (i.e.
the lower is the fraction of earnings that the lender can garnish, γ). The increase in the cost
of borrowing reduces significantly both the number of borrowers and the amount borrowed.
This is the bad side of "fresh start": agents can do less consumption smoothing over time
because they are borrowing constrained, especially when young. This can be better seen
from the Figure 4.4 that plots the life-cycle profile of the average consumption under the
baseline specification and the extremely borrower friendly case γ = 0.01. Very young agents,
in the life-cycle model would like to borrow, since they face a rising income profile. Under
the current system, interest rates are low, borrowing is not so costly and they can smooth
consumption over time much better. At the same time we would expect a better ability
of the agents under a fresh start system to smooth consumption across states of the world.
Ceteris paribus this should result in a lower variability of consumption at each age, provided
agents are not borrowing constrained23. The Figure 4.5 shows that this is not happening.
For the young the variance of consumption is lower under the baseline than under the fresh
start. This is somehow expected since the young are borrowing constrained and the positive
effects of better smoothing across states of the world does not apply to them. Given that a
fresh start exacerbates the credit conditions, younger agents are actually more borrowing
constrained and this explain why their consumption have higher variance under the counter
factual scenario. If there was to be a positive side of the fresh start it should have been for
the middle aged agents. But this simply does not happen in any significant amount: the
variance of consumption of the middle aged is basically the same under both scenarios.
22 Our measure of welfare is, as it is standard in this literature, the change in consumption equivalent. What
is reported is the percentage change of constant consumption over the life-cycle that would make the agents
indifferent between the status quo and any of the counter factual scenarios. A negative number (e.g. -0.01)
means that agents are worse off in the counterfactual scenario than in the status quo and in order to be
indifferent between the 2 situations the consumption of the status quo should be reduced by 1%.
23 If an agent is borrowing constrained then she can not smooth the shocks either and this positive effect
would not happen.
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Figure 4.4: Consumption over the life cycle (baseline and γ = 0.01)
Given the heterogeneity in the deterministic profile, we can seek confirmation of the
intuition behind these results by looking at welfare changes across classes of permanent
income agents. Agents are characterized, at the beginning of their lifetime, by a draw of α
the permanent income level and by β the deterministic growth rate of output. If the main
effect of the introduction of fresh start is a worsening of credit constraints and an increase in
borrowing constrained agents, we would expect that the most affected among all the agents
should be the those with a high deterministic growth rate β since they are those which are
more willing to borrow. The results in Table 4.4-4, where we report our welfare measure
under all scenarios for different type of agents, confirms this intuition. There are no winners
under any circumstances. But the worse losers from all fresh start policies are those agents
with a fast growing earnings profile (i.e. high β). Those with low β are barely affected by the
policy. Their incentive to borrow are lower since they have a relatively flat profile. The bulk
of the losses (and they are pretty big losses, in the order of 2.5% of their current consumption)
comes from the high β agents. The conclusion we can draw from this kind of experiment is
that fresh start is not a good policy for Italy. The benefits, in terms of better smoothing of
consumption across different states of the world, if there, are completely outweighed by the
costs of worsening the credit conditions. In order to have an idea of the magnitudes we show
in Table 4.4-5 the welfare effects of halving the transaction costs on intermediation, a policy
which has unambiguous beneficial effects. These are bigger, in absolute value, than the case
γ = 0.5 but smaller than the case γ = 0.01.
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Figure 4.5: Variance of log of consumption over the life cycle (baseline and γ = 0.01)
4.4.4 Robustness checks and further intuition
The main result of the paper is that introducing a bankruptcy legislation that is very generous
towards the defaulting borrowers has negative effects on welfare because the effect of worse
credit conditions dominates the improved insurance against bad shocks. Even if our very
conservative strategy would suggest that our results are robust, we replicate the baseline
version of the model and the policy experiment changing some of the ingredients. Throughout
these robustness checks we keep τ = 0.2, but we recalibrate the discount factor to match the
financial wealth to income ratio.
Changing the earnings process The first ingredient we change is the earnings process. Since
income is the only source of risk we want to make sure that our results do not depend on
the specific formulation of the earnings process we assume. With respect to earnings process
we two main experiments. The first to use the estimated earnings process under the rip
assumption [see Guvenen 2009, Storesletten et al. 2004]. This is done mainly for comparison
with the previous literature on bankruptcy in quantitative equilibrium models which mostly
uses this kind of process. The second is to adopt a common deterministic function of earnings
that depend on education as well as on age. That is we assume the form g
(
h,Ei
)
. We do it
in two ways which differ for the assumption on what we mean by high and low education
in the Italian data: in one case we assume that high education agents are those with a
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Table 4.4-4: Welfare effects for different permanent income levels and growth rates
base γ = 0.01 γ = 0.2 γ = 0.5
low α low β 0 -0.002 0.000 0.000
low α middle β 0 -0.008 -0.002 0.000
low α high β 0 -0.025 -0.014 -0.004
middle α low β 0 -0.001 0.000 0.001
middle α middle β 0 -0.008 -0.002 0.000
middle α high β 0 -0.025 -0.013 -0.003
high α low β 0 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
high α middle β 0 -0.008 -0.003 0.000
high α high β 0 -0.025 -0.012 -0.003
Table 4.4-5: Welfare effects of a reduction in transaction costs
base τ = 0.01
aggregate 0 0.008
low α low β 0 0.002
low α middle β 0 0.008
low α high β 0 0.022
middle α low β 0 0.003
middle α middle β 0 0.008
middle α high β 0 0.022
high α low β 0 0.002
high α middle β 0 0.007
high α high β 0 0.022
bachelor’s degree (ba) and in the other agents with high school degree (high). The results of
the baseline version of these 3 cases are reported in Table 4.4-6 together with Italian data
(data) and the baseline specification (base). As it can be seen from the Table 4.4-6 none of
the different assumptions on earning provide significant improvement in the calibration of
the baseline model. Using the (rip) assumption gives us a slightly better average debt to
income ratio, but a worse financial wealth distribution and a slightly off target fraction of
borrowers. The two education experiments (ba) and (high) instead give much worse financial
wealth distribution and worse fraction of borrowers and no significant improvement. The
next step is to repeat the policy experiment we run before and see what are the effects on
some important variables and on welfare of moving to a fresh start system with different
Table 4.4-6: The earnings robustness check (baseline calibrations)
data base RIP ba high
Financial wealth to income ratio 3 3 3 3 3
Spread borrowing lending rate 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Share of population with positive debt 0.11 (0.2) 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06
Debt/income ratio for those in debt 0.3 (0.8) 0.66 0.37 0.37 0.36
Consumption/Income 0.84 1.11 1.1 1.1 1.1
Gini of financial wealth 0.77 0.78 0.69 0.59 0.58
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level of wage garnishment. The results are reported in Table 4.4-8. The main message is the
same as in the baseline case. Introducing fresh start worsen credit market conditions and by
doing so it worsen the welfare of the agents. Even if the magnitudes are slightly different the
behavior of all the main variables considered is remarkably similar across all specifications of
the earnings process.
Changing the risk aversion coefficient The other main robustness check that we run is to
see whether the assumption we made about the preferences parameter, risk aversion, is in
any way driving the results. Risk aversion is a very important parameter, as it affects the
magnitude of the gain from better insurance that the household will get if we change to a
fresh start system. However since we have assumed standard separable utility and crra
preferences by changing risk aversion we are also changing the interetemporal elasticity of
substitution which affects the costs in term of less consumption smoothing across time derived
from worsening credit conditions. It is therefore not clear which way a change of risk aversion
will affects our results24. The baseline results for σ ∈ {1.01, 2, 3, 4}, where σ = 2 is the base
Table 4.4-7: The robustness checks with respect to σ (baseline calibrations)
data σ = 1 base σ = 3 σ = 4
Financial wealth to income ratio 3 3 3 3 3
Spread borrowing lending rate 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Share of population with positive debt 0.11 (0.2) 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.12
Debt/income ratio for those in debt 0.3 (0.8) 0.22 0.66 1.03 1.17
Consumption/Income 0.84 1.1 1.11 1.11 1.11
Gini of financial wealth 0.77 0.69 0.78 0.87 0.87
column, are reported in Table 4.4-7. We can see that high values of risk aversion produce a
much higher debt to income ratio and a much more unequal distribution of financial wealth.
The explanation for the first result is that what is really playing a major role here is not
risk aversion but the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Higher risk aversion means low
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This implies that agents want a really flat profile of
consumption and therefore incur in the higher debt to smooth the rising profile of income.
The calibration of the model is much better with lower values of σ, thus supporting our
baseline choice of σ = 2. With σ = 1.01, the debt to income ratio is lower than the baseline
value (thus closer to the Italian data) and there are less borrowers (too few as compared with
the data). This confirms that what is really playing a role is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Indirectly this confirms our intuition that of the two margins that are involved
in the trade-off related to bankruptcy law the most prominent one is the smoothing over time
relate to credit market conditions, and this explains the results we get in the paper. If our
intuition is correct the results of the policy experiment should point out that welfare is much
less affected when elasticity of substitution is high (σ is low), because in this case the weight
24 We are currently working on extending the model to allow Epstein-Zin type of preferences that allow to
disentangle risk aversion and elasticity of substitution and include standard CRRA preferences as a special case.
This will allow to analyze separately the role of risk aversion and of intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
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Table 4.4-8: Policy experiment with different earnings processes
The policy experiment under RIP process
rip γ = 0.01 γ = 0.2 γ = 0.5
Financial wealth to income ratio 3.00 3.24 3.12 3.06
Spread borrowing lending rate 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.06
Share of population with positive debt 0.09 0.0004 0.06 0.08
Debt/income ratio for those in debt 0.37 0.03 0.12 0.16
Consumption/Income 1.10 1.10 1.11 1.11
Gini of financial wealth 0.69 0.61 0.64 0.66
Welfare 0 -0.009 -0.003 -0.001
The policy experiment with earnings dependent on education (ba)
ba γ = 0.01 γ = 0.2 γ = 0.5
Financial wealth to income ratio 3 3.27 3.15 3.03
Spread borrowing lending rate 0.059 0.15 0.07 0.06
Share of population with positive debt 0.07 0.0007 0.04 0.07
Debt/income ratio for those in debt 0.37 0.00 0.12 0.21
Consumption/Income 1.1 1.12 1.11 1.11
Gini of financial wealth 0.59 0.61 0.55 0.57
Welfare 0 -0.006 -0.002 0.000
The policy experiment with earnings dependen on education (high)
high γ = 0.01 γ = 0.2 γ = 0.5
Financial wealth to income ratio 3 3.27 3.15 3.03
Spread borrowing lending rate 0.059 0.15 0.06 0.06
Share of population with positive debt 0.06 0.0004 0.04 0.06
Debt/income ratio for those in debt 0.36 0.00 0.11 0.20
Consumption/Income 1.1 1.12 1.11 1.11
Gini of financial wealth 0.58 0.52 0.54 0.56
Welfare 0.000 -0.006 -0.002 0.000
given by individuals to the worsening of credit conditions is much lower. When we look at
the results of the policy experiment in Table 4.4-9, we see that our intuition is confirmed.
Welfare falls much more for high risk aversion/low elasticity of substitution (high σ) agents.
It is also interesting to see that for very high elasticity of substitution (σ = 1) among the
fresh start scenarios, the best policy is not the harshest (γ = 0.5) but the intermediate one
(γ = 0.2) which is basically equivalent to the status quo. The qualitative pattern of all the
variables is unchanged.
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Table 4.4-9: Policy experiment with different levels of σ
The policy experiment with σ = 1
σ = 1 γ = 0.01 γ = 0.2 γ = 0.5
Financial wealth to income ratio 3.00 3.09 3.00 3.01
Spread borrowing lending rate 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.06
Share of population with positive debt 0.06 0.0010 0.05 0.06
Debt/income ratio for those in debt 0.22 0.00 0.11 0.13
Consumption/Income 1.1 1.11 1.11 1.11
Gini of financial wealth 0.69 0.65 0.67 0.68
Welfare 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
The policy experiment with σ = 3
σ = 3 γ = 0.01 γ = 0.2 γ = 0.5
Financial wealth to income ratio 3 3.60 3.48 3.33
Spread borrowing lending rate 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.06
Share of population with positive debt 0.12 0.0030 0.06 0.11
Debt/income ratio for those in debt 1.03 0.00 0.11 0.23
Consumption/Income 1.11 1.13 1.13 1.12
Gini of financial wealth 0.87 0.62 0.64 0.68
Welfare 0.000 -0.019 -0.010 -0.003
The policy experiment with σ = 4
σ = 4 γ = 0.01 γ = 0.2 γ = 0.5
Financial wealth to income ratio 3 3.72 3.60 3.42
Spread borrowing lending rate 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.06
Share of population with positive debt 0.12 0.0050 0.05 0.11
Debt/income ratio for those in debt 1.17 0.01 0.11 0.25
Consumption/Income 1.11 1.13 1.13 1.12
Gini of financial wealth 0.87 0.61 0.63 0.67
Welfare 0.000 -0.029 -0.015 -0.003
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the effects of introducing fresh start in bankruptcy on the saving
decisions and welfare of Italian households. Our main result is that introducing more generous
bankruptcy procedures will have strong negative effects on the cost of borrowing (borrowing
rates would increase) and will not provide much gains in terms of improved insurance.
Therefore if we focus on the trade off between better insurance against worse credit conditions,
to introduce a new bankruptcy law that features immediate debt discharge is not a good
policy. This result is robust to alternative specifications of the risk the agents are subject to
and to alternative values of the main preference parameters. From the model the picture
that emerges is that, differently from the U.S., there is not much need of an insurance role
for bankruptcy legislation, maybe because the insurance role is already played by other
institutions, like a more generous welfare state or social security.
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But there are several other features of bankruptcy law that this model does not address.
First, one of the main costs of the actual Italian system could be related to the disincentive
to work that the wage garnishment implies. Extending the model to allow for a leisure-labor
choice might shed further light on this role of bankruptcy regulation and change our conclusion
about the introduction of fresh start. Second, as shown by some works about the US, [Fan /
White 2003, Berkowitz / White 2004, Akyol / Athreya 2007, Meh / Terajima 2008, Mankart
/ Rodano 2008, 2009] personal bankruptcy is very important for the credit conditions and the
investment decisions of small firms that finance themselves with unsecured credit. Third, there
is a series of coordination issues among multiple lenders that might induce them to garnish
excessively the debtor wages. We abstract from all these aspects in this work. Therefore
our strong negative answer regarding the introduction of fresh start must be interpreted
in relation to the specific trade-off we are addressing: there is still further research to be
conducted in order to address some of these issues.
Our results show that there is an important role for borrowing constraints. In this respect it
is not completely satisfying that the model does not generate endogenously a spread between
a borrowing and a lending rate as a reaction to the the bankruptcy decisions. There is a
small margin produced endogenously by the model but the effects are not enough to generate
all the spread unless we assume some exogenous transactions costs. Given the importance of
the banking side for the issue we are addressing, further investigation of the way banks deal
with consumer credit could shed some further light on the phenomenon we are studying.
The results from the robustness checks on the role of risk aversion/elasticity of substitution
suggests that the most important parameter in affecting the magnitude of our results is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution rather than the risk aversion. To further strengthen
this claim and to disentangle the role of risk aversion from that of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution we are currently extending the model to incorporate the Epstein-Zin kind of
preferences that allow to separate these two parameters.
Chapter 5
The Causal Effect of Bankruptcy Law on the
Cost of Finance
5.1 Introduction
Bankruptcy law deals with firm distress by means of two procedures: firm reorganization and
firm liquidation. While both procedures attempt to mitigate creditors’ conflicting positions,
reorganization procedures also need to balance these considerations against the need to
preserve firm’s incentives to repay outstanding liabilities.1 Moreover, since financial contracts
take into account how bankruptcy law deals with conflicts among the stakeholders of a firm,
both procedures are likely to affect a firm’s cost of finance. In most OECD countries reforms
of the bankruptcy code generally modify both procedures at the same time, thus complicating
the empirical assessment of the distinct impact of each procedure on firms’ cost of finance.2
In this paper we exploit the staggered nature of the Italian corporate bankruptcy reform
of 2005-2006, which was imposed through two laws. The first law de facto introduced a
reorganization procedure for firms in distress.3 The second law significantly accelerated firm
liquidation procedures. We investigate the impacts of this reform using a unique loan-level
dataset covering the universe of bank funding contracts to firms. This allows us to disentangle
how the changes to reorganization and liquidation procedures affect the costs of funding
borne by small- and medium-sized manufacturing firms.
We present two major findings. Our first result is that the introduction of a reorganization
1 We thank Steve Bond for invaluable discussions. This paper also benefited from comments by Laurent Bach,
Magda Bianco, Nick Bloom, Graziella Capello, Raj Chetty, Mike Devereux, Roberto Felici, Nicola Gennaioli,
Augustin Landier, Fabiano Schivardi, Enrico Sette, Lorenzo Stanghellini, Giorgio Topa, Elu von Thadden,
Greg Udell, Fabian Waldinger, Pierre-Olivier Weill, Michelle White.
2 The most recent examples include Spain, France, and Brazil. The Spanish reform of 2004 merged the two
bankruptcy procedures into one; in 2005, Brazil and France each amended both procedures simultaneously.
3 As we will discuss in section 5.2, pre-reform reorganization procedures formally existed but were hardly
used because of the numerous constraints imposed on their content and their legal contestability.
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procedure increased the interest rates on loan-financing for firms by up to 0.2 percentage
points, or 20 basis points. In principle, the introduction of a reorganization procedure gives
rise to two opposite effects. The first is to lower interest payments because of efficiency
gains from improved creditor coordination. In the absence of a clear legal procedure, if
each creditor negotiates with the firm about the enforcement of respective claims, strategic
holdout by other debt-holders may penalize those that reach a deal. As a result, the firm
may inefficiently shut down. At the same time, reorganization may exacerbate the debtor’s
incentives to behave in an opportunistic way, and thus increase the ex-ante cost of financing.
If the firm has greater value as a going concern than in liquidation, banks are tempted to
agree on continuation. Reorganization thus weakens banks’ commitment to punishment, and
lowers entrepreneurs’ incentives to behave [Hart / Moore 1998, Fudenberg / Tirole 1990].
Our results therefore show that worse repayment incentives outweigh efficiency gains from
improved creditor coordination.
Our second result is that the reform of the liquidation procedure has produced a substantial
decrease in the cost of finance. The legislation was intended to make the distribution of
liquidation proceeds happen more quickly, and in a more orderly fashion. This led to creditor
expectation that bankruptcy recovery rates would improve. Importantly, we also show that
the reduction of the cost of finance caused by the liquidation reform has also lessened firms’
credit constraints.4
We interpret our results as causal because our identification strategy exploits the exogenous
change in Italian bankruptcy law and combines it with a feature of Italian bank lending
that allows us to implement a differences-in-differences (henceforth DID) methodology. The
original Italian bankruptcy code dated back to 1942; the legal change was triggered by
one of Europe’s biggest corporate governance scandals, which ended with the bankruptcy
of the Italian Parmalat corporation at the end of 2003. To avoid violation of European
regulations, the Italian government had to act quickly to reform Italian bankruptcy law. Our
DID framework also takes advantage of an important feature of Italian bank lending: banks
observe the same measure of firm default probability, the Z-score. Therefore, we compare
interest rates for firms that are perceived to be at no risk of default with the interest rates of
firms for which banks perceive a non-zero probability of default.
To support the interpretation of our results we extend our analysis in several ways. First
we analyze how the impact of the procedures varies with the number and concentration
of firm-bank relationships. We show that firms with a large number of bank relationships,
or a low degree of loan concentration, where gains from creditor coordination are higher,
experience a lower increase in interest rates after reorganization is introduced. Secondly,
we use CEO forecasts on sales, prices, and production capacity to show that there is no
contemporaneous change on the demand side that could rationalize our results. Finally,
we address the concern that our results are driven by credit cycles by controlling for the
difference between yields on triple A-rated US corporate bonds and Baa-rated bonds.
4 Defined as firms demanding more credit but being rejected by banks.
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Italy offers a particularly advantageous environment to test the issues at stake for several
reasons. Banking finance is the major source of finance for small- and medium-sized enterprises
in Italy, accounting for around 80% of funding sources.5 In addition, banks’ loan contracts
are mostly short-term, which implies that the procedures affecting the scope for renegotiation
of the terms of funding contracts are compelling for banks’ loan pricing decisions. Finally,
multi-bank borrowing is a pervasive aspect of firm financing in Italy, with a median of five
banks per firm.
A large body of the literature on corporate bankruptcy has studied the ex-post consequences
of bankruptcy-law design, in terms of the direct costs they generate and the associated
continuation and liquidation rates (e.g., Weiss [1990]; Franks / Torous [1994]; Stromberg
[2000]; Bris et al. [2006]).6 Lately, a number of contributions have also investigated the
indirect costs of bankruptcy, by looking at its impact on corporate financial and real decisions
under a cross-country perspective, e.g., Acharya et al. [2010], Qian / Strahan [2007], Djankov
et al. [2008], Acharya / Subramanian [2009],Bae / Goyal [2009]. More specifically, Djankov
et al. [2008] analyze the debt-enforcement process in 88 countries and find that it is an
important predictor of the level of per-capita income and debt-market development. Bae
/ Goyal [2009] exploit the differences in creditors’ legal protection across 48 countries to
show that banks respond to poor debt enforcement by reducing loan amounts, shortening
loan maturities, and increasing loan spreads. Davydenko / Franks [2008] use a sample of
small- and medium-sized enterprises that defaulted on bank debt in France, Germany, and
the UK to show that banks adjust lending and reorganization procedures so as to mitigate
costly aspects of bankruptcy codes. By means of a cross-country panel of large firms, Qian /
Strahan [2007] finds that higher creditor protection is associated with lower interest rates,
longer-term lending, and more concentrated loan ownership.
A second strand of the literature has documented the impact of bankruptcy on firms’ credit
conditions by employing a within-country perspective. For example, Benmelech / Bergman
[2011] shows that waves of bankruptcies in a given industry have an adverse impact on the
cost of debt borne by firms in the same industry. Franks / Sussman [2005] shows that in
England banks commit to a severe stance towards debt renegotiations, and argue that this is
done to avoid firms’ strategic default. Interestingly, they also find little evidence of creditors’
mis-coordination. Vig [2008] analyses the impact of the 2002 Indian bankruptcy reform on
the volume of secured credit, and finds that strengthening creditor rights reduces the demand
for secured credit, because borrowers anticipate a greater liquidation bias in bankruptcy.
Our study is directly related to the articles that analyze the effect of bankruptcy reforms
on the cost of funding, e.g. Scott / Smith [1986], Berkowitz / White [2004], Araujo et al.
[2011]. Using cross-sectional data, Scott / Smith [1986] finds that the 1978 U.S. corporate
bankruptcy law reform has raised the cost of funding by introducing several novelties, such as
5 See Bank of Italy Annual Report, 2009.
6 Direct bankruptcy costs comprise all the expenses necessary to carry out the process of reorganization and
liquidation. Indirect costs are those generated by the corporate response at the prospect of a given legal
procedure. See Senbet / Seward [1995] for a survey of the indirect and direct costs of bankruptcy.
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expanding the list of personal property exemptions, and allowing the entrepreneur to invoke
the automatic stay of creditors’ claims. We improve on Scott / Smith [1986] because the
timeline of the Italian bankruptcy law reform allows us to disentangle the impacts of both the
new reorganization procedure and the new liquidation procedure on the cost of debt financing.
Araujo et al. [2011] use the recent Brazilian bankruptcy reform as a natural experiment
and compare the average cost of debt financing for Brazilian firms with that of firms in
other South American countries. They show that the simultaneous reform of liquidation and
reorganization procedures has significantly decreased the average cost of funding borne by
publicly traded firms. Our results suggest however that distinct changes in each procedure can
have opposite effects on a firms’ cost of finance. Finally, Berkowitz / White [2004] documents
that the provision of larger exemptions in personal bankruptcy has worsened the conditions
applied to business loans.7 Although their results share similarities with ours, the theoretical
underpinnings are somewhat different. Indeed, the outcomes in Berkowitz / White [2004]
hinge on the response made by creditors to a reduction of borrowers’ degree of liability. In
our study, the new reorganization procedure generates a theoretical trade-off that could have
resulted in improved firms’ credit conditions. We show that the introduction of reorganization
procedures that reinforce entrepreneurs’ rights to restructure a firm in difficulty triggers a
significant increase of the cost of finance to small- and medium-sized firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes Italian bankruptcy
law and the legal changes that occurred in 2005 and 2006. Section 5.3 describes the data
set and the variables used in the analysis, and provides descriptives statistics. Section 5.4
presents the underlying theoretical framework to be tested and discusses our identification
strategy. Section 5.5 presents the empirical results. Section 5.6 addresses threats to the
causal interpretation of the results. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 The Italian Bankruptcy Law Reform
5.2.1 The Pre-Reform Regime
Under the 1942 Italian bankruptcy act, the insolvent entrepreneur could try and settle
with creditors by opening an in-court procedure of reorganization (concordato preventivo).8
However, the pre-reform reorganization procedure was extremely difficult to implement for
a number of reasons. First, an entrepreneur’s settlement plan needed to feature the full
repayment of secured creditors and at least 40% of unsecured creditors’ claims. In this way,
the law constrained parties’ freedom to negotiate, potentially inhibiting the implementation
of viable agreements. Moreover, before opening negotiations the court had to assess whether
7 Analogously, Gropp et al. [1997] studies the impact of exemptions in personal bankruptcy on non-business
loans, and also finds that the cost of financing increased.
8 The synopsis in this section is based on Stanghellini [2008], chapter 9.
5.2. The Italian Bankruptcy Law Reform 137
the distressed entrepreneur “deserved” the chance to reorganize, on the grounds that he
had been unlucky but was fundamentally honest. Again, even profitable proposals could
be rejected for arguments not grounded on efficiency reasons. Finally, in the pre-reform
regime the entrepreneur was not protected by the automatic stay of creditors (a provision
that protects the entrepreneur during the reorganization process by introducing a standstill
on creditor’s right to ask for the reimbursement of their claims).
Figure 5.1 uses data from Italian chambers of commerce to plot the share of opened in-court
procedures of reorganization in total bankruptcy procedures across time. In the early 2000s,
only 1% of the total new bankruptcy procedures were reorganizations, concordato preventivo,
highlighting its inefficiency as an instrument of negotiation with banks in the pre-reform
regime.
Figure 5.1: Share of Renegotiation Procedures in Total Distress Procedures Over Time
Note: Plot of the ratio between the number of opened procedures of Concordato Preventivo over the total number of
opened procedures. Source: Chamber of Commerce.
Entrepreneurs in difficulty could renegotiate with creditors out-of-court (accordo stragi-
udiziale). However, a deal reached out-of court between the parties could subsequently be
nullified by the trustee during bankruptcy proceedings, thereby undermining the certainty of
negotiations’ effects [Costantini 2009].
Thus the main instrument for dealing with firms in distress at this time was the liquidation
procedure. Under the pre-reform liquidation procedure, proceeds were distributed to creditors
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by a court-appointed trustee, and creditors could neither control nor veto the decisions taken
by the trustee, who decided with full autonomy. The combined effect of a judicially directed
liquidation procedure, coupled with insufficient creditor power to control the trustee, made
the pre-reform liquidation procedure a poor instrument to protect creditor interests and
preserve the value of the bankrupt enterprise.
As a consequence, liquidation procedures were very lengthy. Figure 5.2 uses data from
Unicredit SpA, one of Italy’s largest retail banks, to plot the distribution of liquidation
procedures according to their duration. The blue bars indicate the distribution of liquidation
procedures in the pre-reform regime. Figure 5.2 shows that approximately 95% of the
liquidation procedures before 2005 lasted for more than 24 months.9
Figure 5.2: Duration of Liquidation Procedures Before and After Law 5 Reform
Note: Plot of the percentage of liquidation procedures closed within X months before and after Law 5 reform. Totals
reported on top of bars. Source: Unicredit.
Overall, the 1942 bankruptcy act was not able to resolve the problems of distressed firms.
The chance to reform such an obsolete system came in the aftermath of the Parmalat crash.
Parmalat SpA was a multinational Italian dairy and food corporation. The company collapsed
in late 2003 with a EU14 billion ($20bn; £13bn) hole in its accounts, in what remains one
of Europe’s biggest corporate bankruptcies. The pre-reform Italian bankruptcy law also
9 In an interview given to an Italian press agency (ANSA) in 2005, Giuseppe Zadra, general director of the
Italian Banks Association, stated that the lengthiness of the Italian liquidation procedures generated high
costs for banks, inevitably leading to higher interest rates for firms.
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included an ad hoc procedure to rescue big, distressed enterprises without compromising
their long-term viability. However, Italy had already been condemned twice by the E.C.
Court of Justice because these types of procedures were deemed to constitute a form of illegal
state aid. Therefore, the government needed to intervene so as to avoid an infringement of
the European regulations and at the same time restructure Parmalat. To accomplish both
objectives, reform of the Italian law governing reorganization was required.
5.2.2 The Reform of Reorganization Procedures – Decree 35
In February 2004, the Trevisanato parliamentary committee was set up to restructure the
procedures to reorganize distressed firms. At the end of December 2004, the committee
proposed the scheme that dictated the terms of the final draft of Decree 35 (in other words,
the content of Decree 35 was known to banks and firms by the end of December 2004).
It is important to underline that Decree 35 reformed only the in-court and out-of-court
reorganization procedures, and did not involve or discuss any reform of the liquidation
procedure.10
Decree 35 empowered the legal instruments that parties could use to resolve insolvency by
renegotiating outstanding financial contracts either in-court or out-of-court. More specifically,
Decree 35 introduced two crucial reforms: first, it strengthened the judicial validity of out-of-
court agreements by limiting the impact of claw-back provisions. In the pre-reform regime,
these had constituted the main impediment to the effectiveness of out-of-court restructuring.
Second, it greatly reformed the in-court reorganization procedure (concordato preventivo).
The new law prescribes that the debtor is the sole party entitled to open the procedure and
formulate a restructuring plan, while continuing to run the company under the protection of
an automatic stay of creditors’ claims. The court ratifies the debtor’s proposal if the majority
of creditors vote for it,11 or if the judge believes that, even if creditors reject the plan, they
will be made no worse off by the proposal than under any alternative.12
Figure 5.1 suggests that Decree 35 has had significant impact on the relative use of
reorganization procedures. Indeed the share of reorganization procedures has increased
from approximately 1% of total procedures before 2005, to over 10% of the total number of
procedures opened in 2009.
10 The reconstruction of the timeline of the Italian reform is based on research conducted using the Lexis-Nexis
database, on Italian press articles related to the 2005/2006 bankruptcy reforms. Keywords “legge fallimentare”,
time span January 2004 - December 2006.
11 The new law also allows the debtor to discriminate among creditors by class. In this case, for the agreement
to be approved, a majority vote is not sufficient, and a more sophisticated system of qualified majorities is
devised.
12 This is similar to what happens in the U.S. under Chapter 11 with judge’s cramdown decision.
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5.2.3 The Reform of Liquidation Procedures – Law 5
In May 2005, the government was mandated to amend the liquidation procedure. The declared
objective of this reform should have been to speed up the liquidation procedure. However,
although major stakeholders (e.g., the banks association) had lobbied intensively for a change
of the liquidation phase, the reform of liquidation procedures finally took place on January 9,
2006, when parliament enacted Law 5.
The new law set in place a system that was able to preserve creditors’ interest in the
reimbursement of their claims and avoid conflicts among them. Law 5 prescribes that proceeds’
distribution must respect the Absolute Priority Rule (APR).13 To speed up the procedure
the law prescribes that creditors can set up a committee, which can be composed of three or
five members, and must represent all the classes of creditors equally.14 Under the new regime,
the creditors’ committee can ask for the substitution of the trustee, must give its consent to
the trustee’s actions, and, most importantly, can veto the continuation of the firm’s activity
if this harms creditors’ interests. Finally, the committee can suspend the liquidation phase if
it approves a settlement agreement proposed by the same creditors, the trustee, a third party,
or the debtor.
Figure 5.2 shows that Law 5 significantly reduced the time taken by liquidation procedures.
The red bars indicate the distribution of liquidation procedures after Law 5 was introduced.
Whereas approximately 95% of the liquidation procedures before 2005 lasted for more than 24
months, the share of such durations decreased below 60%. More than 25% of the procedures
were closed within 18 months after the introduction of Law 5, as opposed to 2% pre-reform.15
5.3 Data
An empirical investigation of the relationship between bankruptcy law and the cost of finance
of firms requires extensive data. This should comprise information not only about loans, but
also concerning the financing structure and balance sheet characteristics of firms. In addition,
given the high incidence of multi-bank lending in Italy[Detragiache et al. 2000], it is desirable
to identify all the contracts in which the firm has engaged.
13 The APR determines the order of reimbursement of creditor claims in bankruptcy. It states that creditors
who have secured their loans have seniority over other creditors and, therefore, have the right to be paid back
first.
14 Members are formally appointed by the bankruptcy judge, but following creditors’ indications.
15 We provide a discussion comparing the Italian bankruptcy following its reform, with the US bankruptcy law.
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5.3.1 Data sources
We obtained information on interest rates charged to firms from the Taxia dataset. This
dataset is a subset of the Central Credit Register (Centrale dei Rischi), and we mainly used
it to compute aggregate financial characteristics of firms. Finally, balance sheet data on the
universe of Italian companies came from the Cerved database.
The Central Credit Register In order to comply with Italian banking regulation, all financial
intermediaries operating in Italy (banks, special purpose vehicles, other financial intermediaries
providing credit) have to report financial information, on a monthly basis, for each borrower
whose aggregate exposure exceeds 75,000 Euros. For each borrower-bank relation we thus
have information on financing levels, granted and utilized, for three broad categories of
financing: term loans, revolving credit lines, and loans backed by account receivables. The
information on term loans is further broken down by other financial characteristics, such as
maturity, presence of real and/or personal guarantees, and status of the loan (restructured or
not). Note that the information in the Central Credit Register is collected, maintained, and
thoroughly scrutinized by the Italian Central Bank, the Bank of Italy, and is an essential
component of its banking sector supervision activity.16 The Central Credit Register also
includes unique firm and bank identifiers that enable us to match this dataset with interest
rates and balance sheet data.
Taxia The information in Taxia is collected by the Bank of Italy as part of its supervision
of the banking sector, in addition to the Central Credit Register. It covers a subgroup of
banks which accounts for more than 80 percent of total bank lending in Italy. This dataset
provides us, on a quarterly basis, with detailed information on the interest rates that banks
charge to individual borrowers on newly issued term loans and outstanding credit lines. In
addition, the dataset provides information on the amount and maturity of all newly issued
term loans. The data collection process of Taxia was introduced in 2004, so we have reliable
loan-level information starting from the second quarter of 2004.
Cerved database Balance sheets as well as profit and loss accounts of firms come from the
Cerved database, collected by the private company Cerved Group. This data covers the
universe of Italian corporations (about 800,000 firms) and is used, amongst others things, for
the purpose of credit risk evaluation by banks. One of the unique features of this dataset is
that it provides extensive coverage of privately owned small- and medium-sized firms. This is
particularly important for our purposes, since the bankruptcy law we are interested in applies
to this type of firm. From this dataset, we collect yearly balance-sheet information on assets,
revenues, value added, and other characteristics such as location, date of constitution, and
16 This dataset has been used by several papers, including Detragiache et al. [2000], Sapienza [2002], Patti /
Gobbi [2007].
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industry. In addition, the Cerved data provides an indicator of the default probability of each
firm, the Score variable, that will play a crucial role in our analysis.
Other Data Sources In addition to these data sources, we use complementary information
from the Invind survey. Invind is a yearly survey of a subsample of manufacturing firms, run
by Bank of Italy. The survey collects, amongst other data, information about CEO forecasts
of sales growth, prices, and other qualitative information, such as production capacity and
capacity utilization. The number of firms in each cross section is around 1,500 and the
representativeness of the survey is ensured by the stratification of the sample by sector of
activity, firm size, and region.
Since only small- and medium-sized firms were affected by the policy change, we omitted
data on firms with more than 500 recorded employees.17 Further details on data organization
and data cleaning can be found in Appendix A. The final dataset is of quarterly frequency,
and runs from the second quarter of 2004 to the last quarter of 2007, for a total of 203,355
distinct firms and 1,097 banks.
5.3.2 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Interest Rates The dependent variable of interest is Loan Interest Rate, which computes
the gross annual interest rate for newly issued term loans, inclusive of participation fees,
loan origination fees, monthly service charges, and late fees. This rate is calculated so that
the present value of loan installments equals the present value of payments. We also define
the following term loan characteristics: Size of Loan is the amount of the issued term loan;
Maturity is a set of binary variables indicating whether the maturity of the newly issued
loans is up to one year, between one and five years, or more than five years; Guarantee is
a set of binary variables indicating whether the loan has no collateral (Unsecured), only
real collateral (Real), only personal collateral (Personal), both (Real and Personal), or is
unmatched (Other).
We also compute a price measure for revolving credit lines, Credit Line Interest Rate, as the
average net annual interest rate on the credit line. Unlike loans, credit lines are a relatively
more homogeneous financial product, and we consider only two main characteristics: Use
of Credit Lines is the total amount on the credit lines utilized by the firm during a quarter;
Granted Credit Lines is the total credit line the firm was granted by the bank for a quarter.
Table 5.3-1 presents descriptive statistics on interest rates for newly issued term loans, and
for credit lines between the second quarter of 2004 and the last quarter of 2007.
The interest rate charged for a loan in the sample period is 5.15%. However these rates
varied substantially since at the lowest and at the highest quartiles of the distribution, the
17 Firms above this threshold have access to a different set of procedures.
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interest rates were 4.06% and 6.03%, respectively. The average loan in the sample amounted
to approximately 383,000 Euros. However, in our data we capture loans as small as 1,000
Euros, and the loan at the median of the distribution amounted to 120,000 Euros. The lower
panels of Table 5.3-1 explore heterogeneity in annual interest rates across loan characteristics.
The second panel relates interest rates to the maturity of loans. On the one hand, liabilities
with longer maturity may face greater credit risk, but, on the other hand, they are more
likely to be granted to creditworthy firms. As in Strahan [1999] and Santos [2011], we find
that short-term loans with less than one-year’s maturity, which constitute around two-thirds
of all loans, have a significantly higher interest rate than medium- or long-term loans.
The third panel relates interest rates to the presence of collateral as measured by the
existence of guarantees. All else being equal, collateral should make the loan safer. However,
because of a self-selection effect, banks may require collateral from firms that they consider
riskier [Berger / Udell 1990], so collateral can be associated with both higher and lower
rates. We find that loans guaranteed by real securities have significantly lower interest rates
attached to them. However, as can be seen from the sample size, only a minority of firms
seem to guarantee loans with real securities. Instead, we find that personal guarantees are
much more prevalent as collateral in Italy, and that the interest charged on these loans is
significantly higher than the interest charged on loans with real guarantees.
The bottom panel of Table 5.3-1 shows that the average interest rate charged on credit
lines is 9.03%, and is significantly higher than the rate for loans. Credit lines are not only
associated with higher mean rates, but also to a greater dispersion around the mean, as
measured by the higher standard deviation and the higher inter-quartile differences. Finally,
firms have on average 123,000 Euros of credit lines granted.
Aggregate Financing Variables We use information from the Credit Register to compute
aggregate variables describing the financial structure of firms. Credit Lines/Tot.Fin is the
firm’s total amount of credit lines divided by the total amount of bank financing granted for
all loan categories. Advances/Tot.Fin is the firm’s total amount of loans, backed by account
receivables, divided by the total amount of bank financing granted for all loan categories.
Loans/Tot.Fin is the firm’s total amount of term loans, divided by the total amount of bank
financing granted for all loan categories. The first panel in Table 5.3-2 describes the financing
structure of the firm.
Consistent with previous evidence on Italian firms, we find that loan financing accounts for
a substantial share of bank financing. Term loans represent, on average, 37% of total bank
financing of the firm, while credit lines represent on average 14% of total bank financing.
Even though backed loans account for 49% of total bank financing, they are mostly used for
liquidity purposes. Finally, total bank financing represents 57% in terms of book value of
assets of the firm.
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Balance Sheet Variables On the basis of balance sheets we compute several characteristics
of firms. Note that in our empirical framework these variables are lagged one year with
respect to financial variables. We define Age of Firm as the difference between current year
and year of incorporation of the firm. Value Added and Total Assets are defined on the basis
of the Balance Sheet accounts. Total Sales are firm revenues, as taken from the profit and loss
accounts. Group Ownership is a binary variable equal to one if the firm belongs to a group.
Score is an indicator of the default probability of each firm that takes a value from one (the
safest) to nine (the most risky) and is computed using balance sheet indicators (assets, rate
of return, debts, etc.) according to the methodology described in Altman (1968) and Altman,
Marco and Varetto (1994). Cerved Group classifies firms into four categories on the basis
of the Score variable: (i) “safe” (Score =1,2), (ii) “solvent” (Score =3,4), (iii) “vulnerable”
(Score =5,6), and (iv) “risky” (Score =7,8,9). Leverage is defined as the ratio of debt (both
short- and long-term) over total assets, as taken from balance sheet data.
The bottom panel in Table 5.3-2 provides an overview of the main balance sheet charac-
teristics of Italian manufacturing firms in terms of unique firm-year observations. As the
variation in firm age suggests, the sample includes not only newly created firms, but also
relatively old firms. Similarly, sales vary between 0.66 ME at the bottom quartile of the
distribution to over 4.3 ME at the top quartile of the distribution. Finally, note that default
risk, as proxied by Score, varies considerably. At the lowest quartile, firms are solvent, but at
the median, firms are already classified as vulnerable by banks.
5.4 Theoretical and Empirical Framework
A naive comparison of financing conditions of firms before and after the legal changes could be
misleading, because such differences might also reflect unobserved economic conditions. We
therefore examine the impact of the reforms on the financing conditions of firms by employing
a differences-in-differences methodology. We introduce a simple theoretical framework to
motivate our empirical strategy and to explain the choice of the control group. Moreover,
this framework helps to illustrate the theoretical predictions that we bring to the data in our
empirical analysis.
5.4.1 Testable Predictions
Assume the economy is populated by risk-neutral banks and firms. As is standard in the
corporate finance literature we assume that banks operate in perfectly competitive financial
markets and firms have all the bargaining power. Each firm is identified by its investment
project, which can be either safe or risky.18 Firms need banking capital to finance their
18 To simplify matters, in our framework the project type is not chosen by firms but is assigned by nature.
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projects. All investment projects last two periods, with the difference that the safe ones
always succeed whereas the risky ones might fail, with some probability at the end of the
first period. In the case of first period failure, the continuation of the risky projects depends
on the bankruptcy code: either the project is automatically liquidated following failure, or
the law may allow the entrepreneur to open a reorganization procedure. Again, this applies
only to risky firms, because the safe ones never fail.
As we document below, banks in our sample can identify those companies that carry out
projects with almost no probability of default (safe), and those with projects that are likely
to fail (risky types). This naturally maps into our DID framework, as the latter assesses how
the introduction of each new bill has had an impact on the spread between two groups of
firms: one group that comprises all firms logically unaffected by bankruptcy codes because
never at risk of failure (control group), and one group of firms whose cost of finance depends
on bankruptcy law because their business project is at risk of failure (treatment group).
Decree 35—Reorganization Procedures The reform of the reorganization procedure has
reinforced an entrepreneurs’ right to open a restructuring phase either in-court or out-of-court
while staying in control of the firm. To understand the impact of this reform on spreads, we
distinguish between two scenarios for the contracting environment.
In the first scenario we consider, agents in the economy negotiate in the absence of agency
costs. Following this presumption, a strand of the literature on bankruptcy has shown that
the existence of a structured procedure of reorganization in bankruptcy can spur investment
by distressed firms. This is because, in the absence of a clear renegotiation procedure,
the conflicts between creditors would be exacerbated [Gertner / Scharfstein 1991]. This is
demonstrated by the following example: if the continuation value of a risky project is positive
following first period failure, the efficient decision from the banks’ point of view features
the negotiation of a haircut on respective claims. This enables the entrepreneur to bring
the project to completion and avoid inefficient liquidation. However, in the absence of a
structured procedure of negotiation a problem of strategic holdout may arise. If a single bank
negotiates a haircut to let the firm continue, all the others have an incentive to free-ride
and preserve the value of their claims. Therefore, under this scenario the introduction of a
renewed reorganization phase should have reduced the interest rate difference between safe
and risky firms.
In the second scenario, the contracting environment is characterized by a problem of repeated
agency costs. This agency problem reduces the value of the risky projects’ pledgeable income
to the bank.19 Indeed, the literature has shown that in the presence of asymmetric information
renegotiation impairs the contract’s ability to cope with agency problems (e.g., Hart / Moore
19 For instance, this may be consistent with a model in which the entrepreneur needs to put effort into a risky
project (and this decision is unobservable and unverifiable), otherwise the success probability of the project
is lower and the entrepreneur gains private benefits. Note that by pledgeable income we mean the surplus
delivered by a project net of the cost related to the investment allotment and private benefits [Tirole 2006].
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[1998]; Tirole [2006]; Fudenberg / Tirole [1990]). To clarify this point, consider a risky project
that fails at the end of the first period because the entrepreneur has behaved opportunistically.
In these circumstances, the optimal contract would require the project’s termination. However,
if the project’s continuation value is positive, there are rents to be shared via renegotiation.
The presence of a reorganization procedure offers a natural environment in which parties can
find an agreement to let the venture continue. Now, consider the consequences of this outcome
on the first-period contracting stage: the entrepreneur knows that behaving opportunistically
does not harm his chances to complete the project, therefore he requires a larger agency rent
to implement the project, and this reduces the bank’s pledgeable income.
Prediction 1 The introduction of a reorganization procedure can either increase or reduce
the interest rates’ difference between firms into the risky and into the safe groups. This
depends on whether the gains from creditor coordination offset the costs caused by the agency
problem.
The structured reorganization phase means reduced creditors’ conflicts. Since these remain
despite the agency problem, the next corollary follows.
Corollary 1 The higher the number of a firm’s bank relations, and the lower a firm’s loan
concentration, the greater should be the decrease in interest-rates differences due to gains
from creditor coordination.
Law 5—Liquidation Procedure Law 5 has considerably improved creditors’ ability to take
coordinated decisions and control the phase of liquidation. At the same time, the law
prescribes that the failed entrepreneur is dismissed from the venture. Independent of the
presence of asymmetric information, we expect that these changes will result in larger recovery
rates for the banks and reduced interest rate spreads between safe and risky firms.
Prediction 2 The reform of the liquidation procedures should have reduced the interest rates’
difference between risky and safe firms.
As for Decree 35, the reduction in interest-rate differences should be stronger if there are
greater potential coordination gains.
5.4.2 Empirical Framework and Predictions
Our dependent variable of interest is the firm’s cost of finance which we measure through the
interest rate charged on newly issued loans. This is the main source of investment financing
for firms in Italy. Unlike measures of the average cost of finance, the interest rate on newly
issued loans should directly capture the impact of the legal changes.
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Differences-In-Differences In our theoretical framework, we argued that the cost of finance
for firms with a zero probability of distress was not affected by the bankruptcy code. Hence,
changes in the financing conditions of these firms should only reflect changes in the bankruptcy-
free cost of finance, and allow the econometrician to account for unobserved changes in market
fundamentals. This suggests that assignment to treatment and control groups in the DID
setting should be based on a measure of the perception of the firm’s default risk at the time
a funding contract is negotiated.
The identification strategy takes advantage of a feature of Italian bank lending: Italian
banks observe a common Z-score (henceforth Score) to measure the default probabilities
of firms. Our idea is to compare interest rates for firms that, on the basis of Score, are
considered at no risk of default with those for which banks perceive a non-zero probability of
default. Since Score will play the crucial role of assignment variable in our empirical strategy,
we discuss in greater detail its computation, timing, and release in what follows.
The first advantage of our assignment variable is that the same firm Score is observed by
all the banks, and they use it before making loan decisions. The second advantage of our
assignment variable is that the algorithm for the computation of Score did not change in
response to the bankruptcy reform. A third advantage of Score is that it is predetermined at
the moment of the reform. Indeed, the Score of a firm in a given year is, due to accounting rules
and data collection requirements, computed on the basis of lagged balance sheet information.
This implies that firms, at the time of the reforms, could not self-select into Score categories
based on the anticipated costs or benefits of the same reforms.
Empirical Features of Score Figure 5.3 summarizes the key features of our assignment
variable. The top-left panel of Figure 5.3 is taken from Panetta et al. [2009]20 and plots the
Score variable against an indicator of actual default incidence. The remaining figures are
computed on the basis of our pre-reform sample. The top-right panel of Figure 5.3 plots the
distribution of firms into each Score category. The bottom panels plot the Score variable
against the interest-rate spreads on loans (bottom-left) and credit lines (bottom-right).
The top left panel of Figure 5.3 shows that Score is an accurate predictor of actual default
incidence among Italian firms. Firms with a Score of three in a given year have a probability
of defaulting within the next two years (i.e., during years t or t+ 1) of less than 1%, but this
probability rises to 10% for firms with a Score of 7. The top right panel of Figure 5.3 shows
that there are relatively few firms at the extremes of the Score classification. Only 5% of
the firms in our sample belong to the first Score category, and only 2% of our sample firms
belong to the highest Score category. The panels at the bottom show that there is a strong
positive relation between Score and interest rates on loans and credit lines. The best Score in
terms of creditworthiness is on average associated with a loan interest rate of 4%, whereas the
worst category has an average loan interest rate of around 5%. Note also that in most figures
20 Panetta et al. [2009] analyzes the importance of merger informational effects on bank lending between 1988
and 1998.
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Figure 5.3: Characteristics of the Score Assignment Variable
Note:The top left panel is taken from Panetta et al. [2009] who, using the same data for the period between 1988 to
1998, plots the Score variable against an indicator of default within the next one (circle) and two years (triangle). The
top right panel plots, for our pre-reform sample (2004.Q2-2004.Q4), the share of firms within each Score category. The
bottom panel, computed on the basis of our pre-reform sample (2004.Q2-2004.Q4), plots the Score variable against the
average interest rate on loans (bottom-left) and credit lines (bottom-right).
the main distinction seems to be between between Score one to four, not Score five to nine.
Specification and Hypothesis Testing These empirical patterns suggest, as a first step, that
we should assign firms in Score categories one to four to the control group, and compare them
to a treatment group composed of firms in Score categories five to nine. This classification has
two advantages. First, it mirrors the split of the Score categories at which bankruptcy rates
and interest-rate spreads start to increase significantly. Secondly, it enables the construction
of larger treatment and control groups, and so limits the influence of extreme observations.
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Figure 5.4 gives a graphical representation of our empirical framework. There are po-
tentially three relevant dates. The first threshold corresponds to the announcement and
implementation of Decree 35 in the first quarter of 2005. The second threshold corresponds to
the announcement of a future reform on liquidation procedures at the beginning of the third
quarter of 2005.Q3. The last threshold corresponds to the announcement and implementation
of Law 5 on liquidation procedures in the first quarter of 2006. β, γ and δ correspond
respectively to estimates of the differences in the dependent variable between treatment and
control group across these thresholds, whereas α represents baseline differences before the
reform.
Figure 5.4: Treatment Effects from Differences-In-Differences Specification.
Note:Graphical representation of treatment effects across reforms. α, β, γ and δ correspond to estimates of the differ-
ences in the dependent variable between treatment and control group across time. Vertical lines represent legislative
reforms that occurred in the first quarter of 2005 for Decree 35, and in the first quarter of 2006 for Law 5. The left
panel illustrates the hypothesis that both reforms lowered the interest rate differences between treatment and control
groups. The right panel illustrates the alternative hypothesis that the renegotiation reform increased the interest rate
differences between treatment and control groups.
The left panel and right panels depict the two distinct scenarios outlined in the theoretical
framework. Under the first scenario β and δ are both negative, i.e., they decrease the spreads
between treatment and control groups across reforms. Under the alternative scenario β is
positive and δ negative, i.e., the reorganization reform increased spreads, while the liquidation
reform decreased them. In both cases the sign of γ is undetermined, as it potentially captures
anticipation effects of the liquidation reform.
Multivariate Analysis Let Yijlt denote the interest rate to firm i by bank j on loan l at time
t.
5.5. Results 152
Yijlt = constant+ αTreatmenti + β (Treatmenti ×After Reorganization)
+ γ (Treatmenti × Interim Period)
+ δ (Treatmenti ×After Liquidation)
+ Xijltκ+ Zitω +Bit−1µ
+ Firm×Bank +Quartert + ijlt
where Treatmenti is a dummy variable equal to one for firms that, in 2004, have a
Score between five and nine, 0 otherwise. After Reorganization, Interim Period and
After Liquidation are time dummies associated to the thresholds of the reforms described
in the previous paragraph. These dummies take the value 0 before the date of the reform
and one afterwards. The model includes also a rich set of loan and firm characteristics. Xijlt
are loan characteristics such as maturity, collateral, or loan size. Zit denotes firm financing
characteristics as constructed from the Central Credit Register. Bit−1 are balance sheet
variables measured in the calendar year prior to the contract. ijlt denotes the error term,
clustered at the firm level.
We estimate two versions of this model: one specification including only quarter and
industry fixed effects, and a second specification including Firm×Bank fixed effects. In the
former case, we allow for composition effects in treatment and control groups whereas in the
latter case, we exploit specific variation within the firm-bank relationships. Note that we
separately address composition effects and market participation as outcomes of the reforms.21
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Cost of Finance
Differences-In-Differences Plots Figure 5.5 provides a first insight into changes of average
interest rate set on newly issued loans between the second quarter of 2004 and the fourth
quarter of 2007. The left panel of figure 5.5 separately plots average interest rates on loans
for control firms (black line, square) and average interest rates on loans for treated firms (red
line, triangle). The right panel plots the difference in average interest rates on loans between
the two groups of firms for each quarter. Vertical lines represent legislative reforms that
occurred in the first quarter of 2005 for Decree 35 and in the first quarter of 2006 for Law 5.
The left panel of figure 5.5 shows that average loan interest rates increased between the
beginning of 2004 and the end of 2007. During this period, the average loan interest rate
21 We thank Laurent Bach for enlightening discussions on this issue.
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Figure 5.5: Differences-in-Differences Plot of Loan Interest Rates
Note: The left panel of the figure separately plots average interest rates on loans for control firms (black line) and
average interest rates on loans for treated firm categories (red line). The right panel plots the difference in average
interest rates on loans between the two groups of firms for each quarter. Vertical lines represent legislative reforms that
occurred in the first quarter of 2005 for Decree 35, and in the first quarter of 2006 for Law 5.
of control firms increased from 3.89 percentage points in the second quarter of 2004 to 6.09
percentage points in the last quarter of 2007. Similarly, average interest rates charged on
loans of treated firms increased from 4.46 to 6.49 percentage points during the same period.
The right panel of figure 5.5 shows that differences in average loan interest rates before
Decree 35 were stable at around 57 basis points. The fact that loan rates of both groups of
firms were on similar time trends before the first reform seems to validate the common trend
assumption embedded in the DID setting. When Decree 35 was announced at the beginning
of 2005 the difference in loan rates increased slightly, before experiencing a significant drop
of approximately ten basis points upon the announcement of Law 5. This suggests that
anticipation effects in the ‘intermediate’ period might complicate the empirical assessment of
the liquidation reform.22 After Law 5 was passed, differences then decreased again to around
45 basis points. To better judge the statistical significance of these variations in interest rates
we turn to multivariate analysis.
Multivariate Analysis Table 5.5-3 estimates the DID specification by OLS, clustering stand-
ard errors at the firm level. Columns 1 and 3 of table 5.5-3 control for loan and firm
characteristics, whereas columns 2 and 4 also include Firm×Bank fixed effects.
Our results reject the prediction that both reforms decreased the marginal cost of loan
22 For instance, in a press release to ANSA (Italian press agency) in November 2005, Giuseppe Zadra (the
general director of the Italian Banks Association) stated that the approach taken by the government with
respect to the reform of the liquidation procedure was perfectly agreeable, but it was still necessary to
implement it as soon as possible.
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Table 5.5-3: Impact of Reforms on Loan Interest Rates
Dependent Variable: Interest Rates on Loans
All Firms 1-4 vs 7-9
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.246*** 0.401***
(0.021) (0.028)
After Reorganization*Treatment 0.028 0.043*** 0.069*** 0.067***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.024) (0.021)
Interim Period*Treatment -0.059*** 0.005 -0.102*** -0.005
(0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.017)
After Liquidation*Treatment -0.036** -0.045*** -0.074*** -0.049***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018)
Real Guarantee 0.151*** -0.015 0.170*** -0.012
(0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.034)
Personal Guarantee 0.297*** 0.036*** 0.279*** 0.029
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018)
Personal+Real Guarantees 0.175*** -0.191*** 0.141*** -0.231***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.032)
Personal+Real Guarantees 0.327*** 0.042*** 0.321*** 0.030*
(0.020) (0.013) (0.026) (0.018)
Maturity: 1-5 Years -0.243*** -0.285*** -0.234*** -0.295***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
Maturity: >5 Years -0.413*** -0.511*** -0.413*** -0.515***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021)
Log Size of Loan -0.212*** -0.085*** -0.215*** -0.093***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Credit Lines/Tot.Fin. -0.161** 0.143** -0.130 0.154*
(0.066) (0.071) (0.080) (0.090)
Loans/Tot.Fin. -0.330*** -0.156*** -0.262*** -0.128***
(0.034) (0.039) (0.041) (0.048)
Log Value Added 0.035*** -0.013 0.036** -0.014
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
Leverage 0.678*** 0.481*** 0.516*** 0.458***
(0.055) (0.085) (0.061) (0.101)
Log Total Assets 0.215*** 0.123*** 0.178*** 0.121***
(0.015) (0.027) (0.018) (0.036)
Log Total Sales -0.427*** -0.166*** -0.381*** -0.132***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.020) (0.029)
Age of Firm -0.011 -0.100 -0.009 -0.149*
(0.010) (0.068) (0.013) (0.079)
Group Ownership -0.008 0.013 0.017 0.056
(0.046) (0.048) (0.060) (0.074)
Firm*Bank FE No Yes No Yes
Industry FE Yes - Yes -
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.501 0.559 0.518 0.552
N 226422 183498 132436 104782
The table reports OLS estimation of the impact of the bankruptcy reforms on loan interest rates.
Columns 1 and 2 use the entire range of Score observations. Columns 3 and 4 use the range of Score
observations between 1-4 and 7-9. After Reorganization is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning
in January 2005 (2005.Q1). Interim Period is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in June 2005
(2005.Q3). After Liquidation is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in January 2006 (2006.Q1).
Treatment is a binary variable indicating whether the loan was made by a firm which had a Score
above 4 in 2004. See Table 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 for the definition of the remaining variables. Omitted
categories are “Unsecured” in the case of Guarantees and “Backed Loans/Tot.Fin.” in the case of
financing structure variables. Robust, firm clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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financing of firms. The DID estimates of the impact of the reorganization reform suggest
that the reform increased the cost of loan financing for treated firms relative to control firms.
While the difference is small and not statistically significant in the cross section, it increases
to 4.3 basis points when exploiting variation within firm-bank relationships. The increase in
interest rates is especially strong in columns 3 and 4 when comparing control group firms to a
subsample of treated firms that are perceived to be significantly more likely to default. Indeed,
the seven basis points increase in the cost of financing of treated firms following Decree
35, corresponds to an increase of conditional baseline spreads of 17.5%. In principle, the
introduction of a reorganization procedure gives rise to two opposite effects. The first effect
is to lower interest payments because of efficiency gains from greater creditor coordination.
At the same time, reorganization might exacerbate the debtor’s incentives to behave in an
opportunistic way, and thus increase the ex-ante cost of financing. Our results therefore show
that worse repayment incentives outweigh efficiency gains from greater creditor coordination.
The liquidation reform decreased interest rate differences. This result has an intuitive
rationale, since the reform of the liquidation procedure made the distribution of liquidation
proceeds faster and more orderly, and creditors expected improved recovery rates in bankruptcy.
The magnitude of the coefficient is close to the estimates of the reorganization reform and
suggests that these effects could empirically wash out when assessing simultaneous reforms.
Finally, estimates of the differences in the interim period hint at the presence of anticipation
effects in the cross section.23
The analysis in Table 5.5-3 comprises a number of controls at the firm and contractual level.
Although we do not make causal statements on their interpretation, we can still discuss their
impact and possible interpretation. The existence of either real, personal, or other guarantees
as opposed to no guarantees increases loan rates. This is consistent with Strahan [1999],
Davydenko / Franks [2008] and Santos [2011]. Maturity decreases interest rates: this idea
was presented in the discussion of descriptive statistics. Our evidence suggests that the size
of a loan decreases interest rates. The larger size of a loan may generate more credit risk, but
it can also allow a decrease in rates due to economies of scale in processing and monitoring.
Turning to firm characteristics, we find that firms with higher leverage face higher interest
rates. Sales significantly decrease rates as in Santos [2011], whilst age and group affiliation
have no significant impact.24
Creditor Coordination Gains To further link our empirical evidence to the theoretical
framework, we exploit heterogeneity in the benefits of both reforms. While the scope for
opportunistic behaviour is in principle common across firms, benefits from coordination are
23 We find that treatment effects are relatively higher for short-term as opposed to medium- and long-term
loans. We also find weak evidence that secured credit is relatively worse off than unsecured credit after the
introduction of reorganization. Results are available on request.
24 In robustness checks we address feedback effects on covariates by leaving out loan and financing characteristics
from the specification. The reason is that, unlike balance sheet characteristics, these financing variables are
likely to respond quickly to the costs and benefits of legal changes. Results remain qualitatively similar.
Results are available on request.
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not. We construct two indicators of creditor-coordination problems. The first is the number of
bank relations of a firm, and the second is a Herfindahl index of loan concentration. The use
of a Herfindahl index allows us to take into account that certain bank links are negligible in
terms of amounts granted. The indicators are computed in 2004, since afterwards they might
have changed as a consequence of the reforms. Table 5.5-4 re-estimates our DID specification
for subsamples split on the basis of median of these two indicators.
The first two columns of table 5.5-4 report coefficient estimates when the sample is split
according to the number of banks indicator. The costs of the reform were mainly borne by
firms with a small number of bank relations. For firms with less than four bank relations,
interest rates significantly increased following the introduction of reorganization, while not
decreasing significantly following the reform of the liquidation procedures. In the subsample
of firms with a high number of bank relations, reorganization had a significantly smaller and
statistically non-significant impact. This contrasts with a decrease of seven basis points in
loan rates after the second reform. The assumption that the coefficients of both reforms were
equal across samples is rejected, lending support to the idea that the benefits of both reforms
mainly accrued to firms with high gains from coordination. This conclusion is confirmed if
loan concentration is used to split the sample.
Credit Lines We extend our analysis to the cost of finance of credit lines. A credit line
contract involves the bank providing the firm with a sum of money at a certain interest
rate. In turn, the firm can use the money when needed. Although credit lines represent
a significantly smaller fraction of total bank financing, they present two advantages in our
empirical analysis. First of all, the interest rate on a credit line is observed across time,
whereas a loan interest rate is only observed at loan origination. Second, for credit lines,
banks can typically retain the right to modify the pricing terms of the relationship at the
occurrence of contract-specified events.
The left panel of figure 5.6 plots average credit-line interest rates for control (black line,
square) and treatment (red line, triangle) firms. The right panel plots the difference in average
interest rates on credit lines for each quarter.
The patterns in credit-line rates are consistent with those on loan interest rates. We again
find a stable level difference in the pre-reform period of approximately 80 basis points followed
by an increase in the difference following Decree 35. Interestingly, the drop in interest rates
for credit lines occurs precisely at the moment of the Law 5 reform. This is consistent with
automatic renegotiation mechanisms being in place for credit lines, which are therefore less
subject to anticipation effects.
We next exploit the fact that credit lines are easier to track empirically by plotting changes
in average quarterly interest rates on credit lines within each Score category in the quarter
preceding and following the reforms. The left panel of figure 5.7 focuses on the announcement
of Decree 35 and plots changes in interest rates between 2004.Q4-2004.Q3 (black line, square)
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Table 5.5-4: Impact of Reforms on Loan Interest Rates
Dependent Variable: Interest Rates on Loans
# of Bank Relations Loan Concentration
Low High Low High
After Reorganization*Treatment 0.079*** 0.022 0.024 0.075**
(0.029) (0.020) (0.019) (0.030)
Interim Period*Treatment -0.008 0.015 0.024 -0.021
(0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025)
After Liquidation*Treatment -0.011 -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.006
(0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
Loan Controls: Guarantee, Maturity, Size, Financing Composition
Firm Controls: Value Added, Leverage, Assets, Sales, Age, Ownership
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.522 0.590 0.587 0.525
N 72477 106402 106682 72197
F-Test for Homogeneus Treatment Effect Across Splits
0.0227 0.0210
The table reports split OLS estimation of the impact of the bankruptcy reforms on loan interest
rates. Columns 1 and 2 splits the sample into Low versus High on the basis of the median # of
Bank Relations. # of Bank Relations is computed in 2004 as the number of distinct bank relations
with positive granted term loans. Columns 1 and 2 splits the sample into Low versus High on the
basis of the median Loan Concentration. Loan Concentration is computed in 2004 as sum of the
squares of bank shares in terms of granted loans. Note that High Loan Concentration is therefore
associated with a single bank representing most of the loan financing. After Reorganization is a
binary variable equal to 1 beginning in January 2005 (2005.Q1). Interim Period is a binary variable
equal to 1 beginning in June 2005 (2005.Q3). After Liquidation is a binary variable equal to 1
beginning in January 2006 (2006.Q1). Treatment is a binary variable indicating whether the loan
was made by a firm which had a Score above 4 in 2004. See Table 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 for the definition
of the remaining variables. Omitted categories are “Unsecured” in the case of Guarantees and
“Backed Loans/Tot.Fin.” in the case of financing structure variables. F-Test is a partial F(2,32406)
test on equality of coefficients After Reorganization*Treatment and After Liquidation*Treatment
across splits. Robust, firm clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 5.6: Differences-in-Differences Plot of Credit Line Interest Rates
Note: The left panel of the figure separately plots average interest rates on credit lines for control firms (black line)
and average interest rates on credit lines for treated firm categories (red line). The right panel plots the difference in
average interest rates on credit lines between the two groups of firms for each quarter. Vertical lines represent legislative
reforms that occurred in the first quarter of 2005 for Decree 35, and in the first quarter of 2006 for Law 5.
and 2005.Q1-2004.Q4 (green line, triangle). The right panel focuses on the announcement of
Law 5 and plots changes in interest rates between 2005.Q4-2005.Q3 (black line, square) and
2006.Q1-2005.Q4 (green line, triangle).
The black line (square) on the left panel of Figure 5.7 shows that credit-line interest rates in
the two quarters preceding Decree 35 remained stable across the entire Score range. Even
after the announcement of the reorganization procedure credit-line rates remained unchanged
for lower Score categories. Only firms in higher Score categories experienced an increase in
their average interest rates. Whereas the interest rate for a firm in Score category eight did
not change before Decree 35, interest rates immediately increased by approximately 20 basis
points at the announcement of Decree 35. The right panel of Figure 5.7 shows that Law
5 reversed interest rate movements. In the two quarters preceding the reform (black line,
square), the average cost of credit lines increased across categories. This suggests that for
credit lines the increase in interest rates due to Decree 35 had not yet vanished. Immediately
after Law 5 was passed, within Score interest rates decreased most significantly for higher
default risks.
Finally, we estimate our cost of finance specification for credit lines in table 5.5-5. Since
credit lines are a more homogeneous financing instrument we only have amounts used and
granted in our data in terms of specific information about credit lines.
Table 5.5-5 confirms our previous findings on loan interest rates. Credit-line interest rates
increased by eight to eleven basis points following Decree 35, but decreased by three to six
basis points following the reform of liquidation procedures. One interesting difference between
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Table 5.5-5: Impact of Reforms on Credit Lines Interest Rates
Dependent Variable: Interest Rates on Credit Lines
All Firms 1-4 vs 7-9
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.346*** 0.632***
(0.022) (0.028)
After Reorganization*Treatment 0.018 0.086*** 0.014 0.112***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014)
Interim Period*Treatment -0.003 0.019* -0.020 0.021*
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012)
After Liquidation*Treatment -0.056*** -0.028** -0.129*** -0.066***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015)
Log Use of Credit Lines -0.027*** -0.084*** -0.037*** -0.081***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Log Granted Credit Lines -0.290*** -0.113*** -0.279*** -0.112***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Credit Lines/Tot.Fin. -2.679*** -0.981*** -2.582*** -0.887***
(0.068) (0.058) (0.082) (0.069)
Loans/Tot.Fin. -0.551*** -0.285*** -0.528*** -0.248***
(0.037) (0.030) (0.044) (0.037)
Log Value Added -0.011 -0.010 0.015 0.007
(0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013)
Leverage 1.117*** 0.891*** 0.848*** 0.811***
(0.063) (0.069) (0.074) (0.082)
Log Total Assets 0.336*** 0.177*** 0.278*** 0.194***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.021) (0.027)
Log Total Sales -0.467*** -0.213*** -0.428*** -0.216***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021)
Age of Firm 0.078*** 0.320*** 0.103*** 0.375***
(0.012) (0.048) (0.015) (0.059)
Group Ownership -0.356*** 0.040 -0.341*** -0.004
(0.066) (0.079) (0.084) (0.115)
Firm*Bank FE No Yes No Yes
Industry FE Yes - Yes -
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.273 0.096 0.284 0.093
N 1570167 1558095 974402 965632
The table reports OLS estimation of the impact of the bankruptcy reforms on credit line interest
rates. Columns 1 and 2 use the entire range of Score observations. Columns 3 and 4 use the range
of Score observations between 1-4 and 7-9. After Reorganization is a binary variable equal to 1
beginning in January 2005 (2005.Q1). Interim Period is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in
June 2005 (2005.Q3). After Liquidation is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in January 2006
(2006.Q1). Treatment is a binary variable indicating whether the loan was made by a firm which
had a Score above 4 in 2004. See Table 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 for the definition of the remaining variables.
Omitted category is “Backed Loans/Tot.Fin.” in the case of financing structure variables. Robust,
firm clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 5.7: Within Score Variations At Threshold of Reforms
Note:The figure plots changes in average quarterly interest rates on credit lines within each Score category in the quarter
preceding and following the reforms. The left panel focuses on the announcement of Decree 35 and plots changes in
interest rates between 2004.Q4-2004.Q3 (black line) and 2005.Q1-2004.Q4 (green line). The right panel focuses on the
announcement of Law 5 and plots changes in interest rates between 2005.Q4-2005.Q3 (black line) and 2006.Q1-2005.Q4
(green line).
the estimates on loans and credit lines is their magnitudes. Whereas the net effect of the
sequential legal changes nearly washed out for loans, credit lines displayed a significantly
larger increase in interest rates following Decree 35.
5.5.2 Alternative Interpretations
We now address concerns related to the causal interpretation of our DID estimates on the
pricing of a loan contract. The first issue is related to unobserved demand shocks which
differentially affect treatment and control groups. The second issue is related to the existence
of a credit boom during the sample period, which again would differentially affect both groups
of firms.
Demand Shocks We interpreted estimates from the DID estimation as being caused by
successive reforms of bankruptcy procedures, which affected the expected recovery rates on
the side of banks. At the same time, prices of loan contracts may also have changed due to
demand shocks. These can be relevant in our empirical strategy, insofar as our treatment
and control groups are not randomized. Addressing this issue is difficult, since the price of
loan contracts depends on anticipated demand shocks.
To address this issue we rely on our Invind survey of manufacturing firms. Each year
the survey asks the top management of each firm about their year-ahead forecasts of sales
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growth, prices, and productive capacity. In Figure 5.8 we provide a first graphical check of
the effect of differential demand shocks to treatment and control firms. The left panels of the
figure separately plot average forecasts for control firms (black line, square) and treated firm
categories (red line, triangle). The right panels plot the difference in forecasts between the
two groups of firms for each year.
The top panels in figure 5.8 plot forecasts of sales growth. Between 2001 and 2007, the
average forecast of sales growth for treatment group firms was 6-7%, but only 5% for control
group firms. As long as these level differences remain constant, they do not invalidate our
DID framework. The left panel shows that during our sample period (2004-2007), differences
in sales forecasts were stable at two percentage points. Since demand shocks can also be
channeled through prices, we plot price forecasts for own-production in the middle panel.
Differences in price forecasts seem small in magnitude and statistically not significantly
different from zero. The bottom panel plots forecasts of productive capacity for treatment and
control firms. If firms were to differ in their forecasted use of productive capacity we would
expect such differences to materialize in higher investment and financing needs. However, in
terms of their use of productive capacity, again, both groups of firms seem to display parallel
trends.
To check the robustness of our main results to demand shocks we embed these forecasts
into our multivariate DID specification. We proceed as follows: in each year we compute
average firm forecasts by industry code (two- and three-digit level) and by size dummies (five
categories), Score, or binary treatment group indicator. We assign these average forecasts
by industry-size-year and industry-score-year to each firm in our population of firms in the
economy. If we cannot construct an average forecast in a given cell, we assign the industry-year
average forecast. We then re-estimate our baseline loan-interest rate specification. Results
are presented in table 5.5-6.
Each set of columns is divided according to the assignment criterion: Sic*Score, Sic*Size,
Sic*TC. Table 5.5-6 confirms graphical evidence suggesting that demand factors do not
confound our estimates of the impact of the bankruptcy reform. All estimates of the impact of
reorganization and liquidation remain similar in magnitude and precision. Only forecasts on
productive capacity seem to impact the loan-financing conditions of firms: a higher capacity
utilization implies higher investment needs, and results in increases in the price of the loan
contract.
Credit Boom An alternative threat to the causal interpretation of our results is the behaviour
of international credit markets during the sample period. The argument is that in the period
leading up to the crash of Lehman Brothers, credit markets were booming, and riskier firms
were able to obtain loans at better conditions. Although this is not consistent with our results
on the introduction of the reorganization procedure, credit booms might explain the lower
interest rates after the liquidation phase was reformed.
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Table 5.5-7: Impact of Reforms and Credit Cycles
Dependent Variable: Interest Rates on Loans
All Firms 1-4 vs 7-9
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After Reorganization*Treatment 0.034* 0.045*** 0.080*** 0.070***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.021)
Interim Period*Treatment -0.040** 0.010 -0.062*** 0.004
(0.017) (0.014) (0.021) (0.017)
After Liquidation*Treatment -0.034** -0.045*** -0.070*** -0.048***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018)
US BAA/AAA*Treatment -0.133*** -0.031 -0.274*** -0.058
(0.042) (0.036) (0.052) (0.045)
Loan Controls: Guarantee, Maturity, Size, Financing Composition
Firm Controls: Value Added, Leverage, Assets, Sales, Age, Ownership
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.501 0.559 0.518 0.552
N 226422 183498 132436 104782
The table reports OLS estimation of the impact of the bankruptcy reforms on loan interest rates.
Columns 1 and 2 use the entire range of Score observations. Columns 3 and 4 use the range of Score
observations between 1-4 and 7-9. After Reorganization is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning
in January 2005 (2005.Q1). Interim Period is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in June 2005
(2005.Q3). After Liquidation is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in January 2006 (2006.Q1).
Treatment is a binary variable indicating whether the loan was made by a firm which had a Score
above 4 in 2004. US BAA/AAA is the difference between yields on US corporate AAA rated bonds
and Baa rated bonds. Information on corpororate bond yields comes from http://www.federalreserve.
gov/releases/h15/current/. See Table 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 for the definition of the remaining variables.
Omitted categories are “Unsecured” in the case of Guarantees and “Backed Loans/Tot.Fin.” in
the case of financing structure variables. Robust, firm clustered standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
To address this issue we construct a proxy for international credit markets cycles. We
collect information on Moody’s corporate bond yields from the Federal Reserve Board
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/current/) and we compute US BAA/AAA as the
difference between yields on US corporate triple A-rated bonds and Baa-rated bonds. The
use of US measures of credit-market cycles has two advantages. First, the US corporate bond
market provides a very good first approximation for such credit cycles. Since it is the most
liquid bond market, European issuers would often raise capital there, and swap the proceeds
immediately into Euros. Second, we need a measure of interest rates which is not affected by
the Italian bankruptcy reform. Table 5.5-7 augments our DID specification by interacting
the treatment group dummy with US BAA/AAA.
The magnitude and statistical significance of our estimates are unchanged. International
credit market conditions are significant only in the cross-sectional estimates, but not in the
fixed-effects estimates. The sign on the coefficient on US spreads would suggest that Italian
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Table 5.5-8: Alternative Specifications
Dependent Variable: Interest Rates on Loans
Score No No Switchers
Switchers No Attrition
After Reorganization*Treatment 0.018*** 0.053** 0.055***
(0.006) (0.021) (0.021)
Interim Period*Treatment -0.000 0.013 0.008
(0.005) (0.017) (0.017)
After Liquidation*Treatment -0.015*** -0.050*** -0.045***
(0.005) (0.017) (0.017)
Loan Controls: Guarantee, Maturity, Size, Financing Composition
Firm Controls: Value Added, Leverage, Assets, Sales, Age, Ownership
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.559 0.553 0.551
N 183498 137392 142913
The table reports OLS estimation of the impact of the bankruptcy reforms on loan
interest rates. Column 1 defines Treatment as the Score variable in 2004. Column 2
defines Treatment again as a binary variable but excludes observations that changed
Treatment category on the basis of post-2004 Score. Column 3 defines Treatment on
the basis of each years’ Score but excluding switchers. After Reorganization is a binary
variable equal to 1 beginning in January 2005 (2005.Q1). Interim Period is a binary
variable equal to 1 beginning in June 2005 (2005.Q3). After Liquidation is a binary
variable equal to 1 beginning in January 2006 (2006.Q1). See Table 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 for
the definition of the remaining variables. Omitted categories are “Unsecured” in the case
of Guarantees and “Backed Loans/Tot.Fin.” in the case of financing structure variables.
Robust, firm clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
loan spreads behave counter-cyclically. This result is not surprising when considering not
only the sluggish growth of the Italian economy during the sample period, but also the fact
that Italian banks have not been greatly affected by the 2009 financial crisis.25
5.5.3 Other Robustness Checks
Specifications We used the Score variable in 2004 in order to divide firms into treatment
and control groups. This specification not only allowed us to construct more equally sized
treatment and control groups, but also mirrored the split of Score categories at which
bankruptcy rates and interest-rate spreads start significantly to increase. Table 5.5-8 provides
robustness checks of our treatment-effect specification.
The first column interacts the reforms with the 2004 Score instead of the binary treatment
and control-group definition. Our results suggest that the relative interest-rate difference
between the 1st and the 9th category increased by 16 basis points after Decree 35, and
25 More precisely, no bank needed the intervention of the Italian government during the recent financial crisis.
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decreased by 13.5 basis points after the liquidation reform. The second column excludes firms
that changed treatment group afterwards, on the basis of their 2004 Score variable. One
should note that, as long as the switching behaviour into these groups occurs on the basis of
lagged balance-sheet variables, our identification strategy should not be affected. Results in
column 2 are similar in magnitudes and precision to our previous results. The last column
classifies firms into treatment and control group on the basis of their yearly Score indicator.
This addresses the concern that the decrease in interest rates following Law 5 might be driven
by attrition in the treatment-group sample.
Bank Composition A final robustness check relates to composition effects of a firm’s banking
relationships. If firms mitigate the consequences of reforms by matching with different banks
then it would be necessary to account for such changes, as well. Table 5.5-9 re-estimates our
baseline regression, including two measures of a firm’s banking relationships. The first is an
indicator of change in the number of bank relationships, the second is an indicator of change
in the identity of a firm’s banks.
Our main results remain very similar with respect to our baseline regression. Column 3
includes both of our indicators for a firm’s banking relationships. Our estimates suggest that
changes in the identity of banks in the portfolio are associated with lower interest rates, but
that these changes do not confound our estimates on the bankruptcy reforms.
Anticipation Effects In Decree 35 Graphical analysis of the DID plots suggested that the
level differences between treatment and control-group firms were stable before Decree 35.
But these differences in interest rates might be misleading, as the aggregate effect can veil
anticipation effects for parts of the interest rate distribution. For instance, anticipation effects
may have existed for the top quantiles of the interest-rate distribution.
To address this concern, we plot the distribution of interest-rate differences between
treatment and control-group firms for the two quarters preceding Decree 35. The left panel
of figure 5.9 plots interest rate differences in the second quarter of 2004 (blue line) and the
third quarter of 2004 (red line). The right panel these differences in the third quarter of
2004 (blue line) and the fourth quarter of 2004 (red line).26 The right panel clearly shows
that the distribution of interest rate differences were stable in the last and second to last
quarter before the reform. The interest rate difference between a firm at the 20th percentile
of the treatment distribution and a firm at the 20th percentile of the control distribution was
approximately 50 basis points in the third and fourth quarter of 2004. The left panel shows
that there is again no clear pattern of interest rate differences between the second and third
quarter of 2004.27
26 We bootstrap the sample so as to estimate confidence intervals on the differences in interest rates.
27 In unreported regressions we implement placebo experiments to show in a regression framework that interest
rates did not change prior to the first reform.
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Table 5.5-9: Bank Composition
Dependent Variable: Interest Rates on Loans
(1) (2) (3)
After Reorganization*Treatment 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Interim Period*Treatment 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
After Liquidation*Treatment -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Bank Composition -0.016* 0.012
(0.009) (0.011)
# of Banks -0.005 -0.026**
(0.008) (0.013)
Loan Controls: Guarantee, Maturity, Size, Financing Composition
Firm Controls: Value Added, Leverage, Assets, Sales, Age, Ownership
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.559 0.559 0.559
N 183336 183336 183336
The table reports OLS estimation of the impact of the bankruptcy reforms on loan interest
rates. All columns use the entire range of Score observations After Reorganization is a
binary variable equal to 1 beginning in January 2005 (2005.Q1). Interim Period is a
binary variable equal to 1 beginning in June 2005 (2005.Q3). After Liquidation is a
binary variable equal to 1 beginning in January 2006 (2006.Q1). Treatment is a binary
variable indicating whether the loan was made by a firm which had a Score above 4 in
2004. Bank Composition is a binary variable indicating whether the portfolio of bank
relationships of the firm has changed. # of Banks is a binary variable indicating whether
the number of bank relationships of the firm has changed. See Table 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 for
the definition of the remaining variables. Omitted categories are “Unsecured” in the case
of Guarantees and “Backed Loans/Tot.Fin.” in the case of financing structure variables.
Robust, firm clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 5.8: Differences-in-Differences Plot of CEO Forecasts
Note: The figure uses information from the Invind survey of manufacturing firms between 2001 and 2007. The left
panels of the figure separately plot average forecasts for control firms (black line, square) and treated firm categories
(red line, triangle). The right panels plot the difference in forecasts between the two groups of firms for each year. The
top panels plot forecasts of sales growth, the middle panels forecasts of price changes, the bottom panels forecasts of
productive capacity utilization.
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Figure 5.9: Anticipation Effects in 2004?
Note: The figure plots interest rate differences at each percentile of the distribution of treatment and control groups.
The left panel plots interest rate differences in the second quarter of 2004 (blue line) and the third quarter of 2004 (red
line). The right panel these differences in the third quarter of 2004 (blue line) and the fourth quarter of 2004 (red line).
We bootstrap the sample so as to estimate confidence intervals on the differences in interest rates.
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5.6 Additional Evidence: Credit Constraints & Non-Price Effects
So far the focus of our analysis has been on the impact of the two bankruptcy procedures
in terms of interest rates charged on a loan contract of an Italian small- or medium-sized
enterprise. However, it is also possible that these procedures modified choices on non-price
dimensions.
Credit Constraints The reform of the liquidation procedure is likely to have relaxed financing
constraints and increased participation in the credit market. This was partly reflected
in differences in magnitude and significance between our cross-sectional and fixed effects
specifications. While within firm-bank, estimates identify the impact of the reforms using
only observations of firms with continued access to banking finance, cross-sectional estimates
allow for identification of firm observations observed only after the reforms. It is therefore
not surprising that the increase in interest rates following the introduction of reorganization
procedures was significantly smaller and statistically not significant in the cross section, while
the decreases in interest rates after the liquidation were larger and statistically significant in
the cross-sectional specification.
To further investigate the issue we use complementary information coming from Invind, the
annual survey of manufacturing firms managed by the Bank of Italy. Although the survey is
collected only for a subsample of approximately 1,500 firms it has the advantage of containing
information about loan rejections, which is not provided in the Central Credit Register. More
specifically, firms are asked whether they originally wanted more credit at current or higher
interest rates, but were turned down. Following Guiso and Parigi (1999) we classify a firm as
credit-constrained if it demanded more credit but was was rejected.28
Figure 5.10 plots the credit constraints of Italian manufacturing firms between 2001 and
2007. The left panel separately plots the share of credit-constrained control firms (black line,
square) and the share of credit-constrained treatment firms (red line, triangle). The right
panel plots the difference in the share of credit-constrained firms between the two groups of
firms for each year.
Figure 5.10 shows that the share of credit-constrained firms significantly decreased after 2004
for the treatment group, but remained stable for the control group. Similar to Guiso and
Parigi (1999), we find that before the bankruptcy reform, the share of credit-constrained firms
in the treatment group was approximately 10%. This share decreased to around 5% in 2006
and 2007. The share of credit-constrained firms in the control group remained stable across
time at around 1%. The left panel shows that the difference in the share of credit-constrained
firms decreased by approximately four percentage points from 2001 to 2007, the bulk of
28 Note that the concept of credit constraints is potentially broader. In principle it also includes those firms
that were discouraged from applying in the first place. Since 2004, the Bank of Italy also includes a question
on such implicit constraints. The results remain robust even with the inclusion of this more general definition
of credit constraints.
5.6. Additional Evidence: Credit Constraints & Non-Price Effects 170
Figure 5.10: Differences-in-Differences Plot of Credit Constraints
Note: The figure uses information from the Invind survey of manufacturing firms between 2001 and 2007. We classify
a firm as credit-constrained if it demanded more credit but was was rejected. The left panel separately plots the share
of credit-constrained control firms (black line, square) and the share of credit-constrained treatment firms (red line,
triangle). The right panel plots the difference in the share of credit-constrained firms between the two groups of firms
for each year.
the variation occurring in 2005/2006. In the Table 5.6-10 we show that the drop in credit
constraints is statistically significant and not confounded by other factors. This result is
particularly interesting because, by standard revealed preference argument, this change was
welfare-enhancing.
Number of Bank Relations Our results, linking the benefits of both reforms to gains from
creditor coordination, imply that the cost of multi-bank lending has decreased as a result of
the reforms. We explore whether this implication is empirically verifiable.
The left panel of Figure 5.11 separately plots the average number of bank relations of
control firms (black line, square), and the average number of bank relations of treated firms
(red line, triangle). The right panel plots the difference in the average number of bank
relations between the two groups of firms for each quarter.
Figure 5.11 shows that the number of bank relations of treated firms has increased signific-
antly more than the bank relations of control firms. At the beginning of the sample period,
the difference in the number of bank relations was around 0.25, but this difference increased
to 0.4 at the end of the sample period. The increase in the relative number of bank relations
occurs at the moment of the liquidation reform.
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Table 5.6-10: Impact of Reforms on Credit Constraints
Dependent Variable: Is Credit Constrained
No Covariates Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After 2004 -0.001 0.007 -0.004 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Treatment 0.079*** 0.051***
(0.006) (0.010)
After*Treatment -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.025** -0.027**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Leverage 0.066*** 0.009
(0.017) (0.051)
Log Sales -0.013*** -0.015
(0.003) (0.022)
Cash Stock -0.034*** -0.041**
(0.010) (0.020)
Sales Forecast 0.001*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm*Bank FE No Yes No Yes
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.029 0.003 0.034 0.005
N 14767 14767 7620 7620
The table reports OLS estimation of the impact of the bankruptcy reforms on the probab-
ility to credit constrained. Credit Constrained is defined as wanting more bank financing
at current or slightly higher interest rates but having been rejected. Treatment is a bin-
ary variable indicating whether the loan was made by a firm which had a Score above
4 in 2004. After 2004 is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in January 2005. See
Table 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 for the definition of the remaining variables. Robust, firm clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 5.11: Differences-in-Differences Plot of Number of Bank Relations
Note: The left panel separately plots the average number of bank relations of control firms (black line, square), and
the average number of bank relations of treated firms (red line, triangle). The right panel plots the difference in the
average number of bank relations between the two groups of firms for each quarter. Vertical lines represent legislative
reforms that occurred in the first quarter of 2005 for Decree 35, and in the first quarter of 2006 for Law 5.
5.7 Conclusion
We contribute to the empirical analysis of bankruptcy by disentangling i) the impact of the
introduction of a reorganization procedure from, ii) the impact of the liquidation design on
the cost of debt finance borne by small- and medium-sized firms. We exploit the staggered
nature of the Italian bankruptcy law reform of 2005 and 2006, and examine the impact of
the legislation using a loan-level dataset covering the universe of firm funding contracts. We
reach two major results. The first is that the introduction of reorganization in bankruptcy
increases the cost of funding: this result is supported by the literature on incomplete contracts
and renegotiation, which shows that granting a second chance to an entrepreneur in distress
will translate into lower incentives for that entrepreneur to behave with care. The second
result is that the reform of the liquidation procedure to reinforce banks’ rights triggers a
significant reduction of the cost of finance. Overall, we document that the reform of the Italian
bankruptcy law has relaxed the share of credit-constrained entrepreneurs in the economy.
5.8 Appendix A: Data Organisation and Sample Selection
Our analysis focuses on manufacturing firms for the period 2004-2007. We organize our final
sample in several steps.
The first step is to organize the information in the Taxia database. We take information
on newly issued term loans (interest rates, loan size, and maturity) from the Taxia database
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and we match it with the guarantee information contained in the Central Credit Register
to recover their guarantee status.29 We drop all new loans with an amount smaller than
1,000 Euro and extreme percentiles of the term loan interest-rate distribution.30 Then we
associate the interest rates on credit lines (between a given bank and a given firm in a certain
period) in the Taxia database with other characteristics of the firm-bank relationship, such
as total amount of credit granted and utilized on the credit lines in the same period. We
drop extreme percentiles of the credit lines interest-rate distribution. Finally, we drop the
first quarter of 2004, since this is the first time data was collected on the credit-line level and
is possibly subject to substantial measurement error.31
The second step is to harmonize the format of the Credit Register and the credit line
data. We therefore organize the financial information on amounts, loan categories, and
guarantees at the quarterly level. This leaves an unbalanced panel of firm-bank relations at
the quarterly level observed over 15 periods, which are then matched with yearly balance
sheet data. We then organize the balance-sheet data before merging them with the financial
information of firms. We drop firms with incomplete balance sheets and profit and loss
accounts, missing Score, with leverage above one or below 0. Since only small- and medium-
sized firms were affected by the policy change we drop firm observations with more than 500
recorded employees.32 Every year of balance-sheet data is matched with quarterly credit
information. The final dataset is of quarterly frequency, and runs from the second quarter of
2004 to the last quarter of 2007, for a total of 202,964 firms and 1,097 banks.
5.9 Appendix B: Bankruptcy Codes in the United States and
Europe
In the United States, Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy law provide the federal
discipline that regulates corporate insolvency procedures. The objective of Chapter 11 is
to protect a bankrupt firm from pressure from outsiders while it is coping with a process
of rehabilitation. The entrepreneur can file unilaterally for Chapter 11 at the prospect of
29 We do so by constructing an algorithm that tries to match a new loan from firm j with bank b in period t to
the information on the same match in the same time period. The algorithm searches for a match to the exact
amount of the new term loan in the Credit Register by comparing it to the total size of utilized and granted
loans in a six-month window around period t. If the algorithm does not find an exact match then it searches
for matches with first differences of utilized and granted loans in the same time window around the period t of
the contract. Subsequently, we check the type of loan relationship between the bank and the firm in the Credit
Register. Provided all the contracts between the bank and the firm have the same collateral status, we assume
that the new term loan necessarily has the same collateral status (otherwise we would observe a distinct entry
in the data). If we cannot find a match we create a residual “unmatched” category that should be interpreted
as having a high probability of some type of collateral on the loan. Indeed, in the six-month window around
the date of the new loan there is some kind of collateral agreement between the firm and the bank involved.
30 For computational reasons, we focus on firms that have at most one loan per quarter with a given bank. In
this way we drop 3% of all newly issued term loans.
31 Results are robust to the inclusion of the first quarter.
32 Firms above this threshold had access to a different set of procedures that were also reformed during the
same period.
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potential distress. Once in Chapter 11, the entrepreneur must devise a restructuring plan to
be submitted to creditors.33 Creditors can propose an alternative plan to the entrepreneur’s
and then vote on the restructuring project in a ballot described by a system of qualified
majorities. By rejecting the plan, creditors can reverse the restructuring procedure into a
Chapter 7 liquidation process.
The post-reform Italian reorganization procedure shares important features with Chapter
11. In both cases, the entrepreneur can open the reorganization phase unilaterally, conditional
on court approval. Moreover, as in Chapter 11 the entrepreneur can stay in charge of the
company while renegotiating with creditors. Finally, the decision over the restructuring plan
is taken via a creditor vote. However, within Chapter 11 the judge has stronger supervision
powers, for instance the firm can undertake new financial operations only under the approval
of the judge. Moreover, the judge in Chapter 11 can decide whether to concede an extension
to the period of time during which the entrepreneur can invoke the automatic stay and devise
a restructuring plan, whereas in the Italian case the law does not impose any deadline.
In the early 2000s the European Commission tried to stimulate European adoption of
bankruptcy codes inspired by Chapter 11.34 Accordingly several countries have reformed
their bankruptcy codes. However, we were particularly interested by the fact that the Italian
policy reform came in piecemeal, over 2005-2006. This has allowed us to disentangle the effect
of the new reorganization procedure from that of the new liquidation procedure. For example,
in July 2005 the French legislator reformed corporate bankruptcy law by simultaneously
introducing a new procedure of reorganization and strengthening creditors’ enforcement
rights. The fact that the two changes were implemented at the same time makes it difficult
to distinguish the effects of each reform. Moreover, in September 2004, the reform of Spanish
bankruptcy law introduced a unified court-supervised procedure whereby parties may settle
before the liquidation phase starts, whereas in the pre-reform regime there were two separate
avenues to deal with insolvency.
5.10 Appendix C: Additional table
33 More specifically, entry into Chapter 11 opens the debtor-in-possession phase, during which the entrepreneur
has the right to stop payments to existing investors (automatic stay) and also search for new funds. To facilitate
this, the law prescribes that investors willing to finance bankrupt firms are privileged in the reimbursement
of their claims at the end of the restructuring process, i.e., they can be repaid before (even senior) existing
investors.
34 The belief of the Commission was that a harsh approach to financial distress
would deter risk-taking, experimentation, and innovation. See the website http :
//ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/sme2chance/.
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Table 5.10-11: Actively Used Credit Lines
Dependent Variable: Interest Rates on Credit Lines
All Firms 1-4 vs 7-9
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After Reorganization*Treatment 0.067*** 0.134*** 0.063*** 0.155***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.022) (0.017)
Interim Period*Treatment 0.014 0.028** 0.006 0.033**
(0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015)
After Liquidation*Treatment -0.084*** -0.054*** -0.150*** -0.088***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.023) (0.018)
Credit Line Controls: Amount Granted and Used
Firm Controls: Value Added, Leverage, Assets, Sales, Age, Ownership
Firm*Bank FE No Yes No Yes
Industry FE Yes - Yes -
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.304 0.118 0.314 0.113
N 1046600 1028693 652228 640208
The table reports OLS estimation of the impact of the bankruptcy reforms on credit line interest rates
for the subsample of firm-bank observations with non-zero overdraft use. Columns 1 and 2 use the
entire range of Score observations. Columns 3 and 4 use the range of Score observations between 1-4
and 7-9. After Reorganization is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in January 2005 (2005.Q1).
Interim Period is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in June 2005 (2005.Q3). After Liquidation
is a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in January 2006 (2006.Q1). Treatment is a binary variable
indicating whether the loan was made by a firm which had a Score above 4 in 2004. See Table 5.3-1
and 5.3-2 for the definition of the remaining variables. Omitted category is “Backed Loans/Tot.Fin.”
in the case of financing structure variables. Robust, firm clustered standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Chapter 6
Poverty traps in a world of perfect credit
markets: an efficiency wage explanation
6.1 Introduction
Starting from the work of Loury [1981] a vast literature has developed on the functional
effects of wealth inequality on the economic system.1 One main result is that both non-convex
technology and credit market imperfections are necessary conditions for the emergence of an
individual poverty trap2.
The main assumption of this paper is that individuals’ productivity increases with con-
sumption. This reflects the idea that certain types of consumption activities can be viewed
as investment in productivity3. It is assumed that this relationship has the usual properties
of a neoclassical production function. Under this assumption, it is shown that an individual
poverty trap may emerge even in a world with perfect credit markets. Even without borrowing
constraints, each agent is subject to a lifetime resources constraint that depends on inherited
initial wealth, and therefore is more stringent for the poor. When human wealth is a concave
function of consumption, incentives to leave bequest are higher for rich agents than for poor
ones, because for them bequest is cheaper in terms of consumption. Thus poor agents leave
less bequest, and in the long run may be trapped in a low wealth-low efficiency equilibrium.
The main result of the paper is to show that credit market imperfections are not a necessary
condition for an individual poverty trap to emerge.
It is also shown here that the steady-state wealth distribution is determined by the initial
1 I would like to thank Alberto Dalmazzo, Maitreesh Ghatak, Alex Michaelides, Debraj Ray, Astrid Winkler,
Giulio Zanella and participants at the MES-S401 seminar for helpful discussions and comments.
2 See Dasgupta / Ray [1986], Galor / Zeira [1993], Banerjee / Newman [1993], Moav [2002] for different
models of poverty traps, and Banerjee [2001] for a discussion.
3 This idea is at the basis of the first efficiency wages models, like Leibenstein [1957]. This relation is not to
be interpreted as only a nutrition story: "consumption" could also include health services. For a survey on
empirical evidence on the issue, see Strauss / Thomas [1995, 1998].
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distribution of wealth. Thus one-shot changes in wealth distribution will have persistent
effects on aggregate labor productivity. This is a widely accepted result in the literature,
but the main policy implication is strikingly different: while in the literature the focus is on
credit markets enhancing policies4, this paper argues that redistribution is the only way to
improve the long term outcome of the economy.
This paper is most closely related to the work by Dasgupta / Ray [1986], where the
assumption that productivity is affected by consumption is used to analyze the equilibrium
in the labour market in a static model. The main difference from this paper is that, given
the static framework, the issue of steady state wealth distribution is not addressed and there
is no role for the credit market. Ray / Streufert [1993] instead introduce similar ideas in
a dynamic setting, but they do not allow their agents to run into debt, thereby assuming
credit market imperfections. Other related work is that of Funk / Vogel [2003], which uses
a dynamic model with perfect capital markets and where investment requires a minimum
amount of resources, to analyze the issue of persistent inequality. They do not, however,
address the issue of poverty traps.
The setting of this paper is also similar to the work of Gersovitz [1983] and Moav [2002].
Gersovitz [1983] uses a two period model akin to the short run decision in this paper, to
show that average propensity to save can increase with income; but he does not explore the
long run implications. Moav [2002] generates a poverty trap by assuming that bequest is a
luxury good in a world with credit market imperfections and convex technology. This work is
different in that it assumes perfect credit market and non-convexities in technology.
6.2 The model
A small, open, one-good economy with non-overlapping generations is considered. Capital
is perfectly mobile while labor can not move across countries. Time is discrete and there is
perfect competition in all markets. There is no uncertainty.
6.2.1 Production
In this economy the good is produced by a representative firm that operates in perfect
competitive factor and good markets and uses capital (K) and efficiency of labor (H)
according to a standard neoclassical production function5:
Y = F (K,H) (6.2-1)
4 See Banerjee [2001] for a discussion.
5 Following Galor / Zeira [1993] and Moav [2002] we assume that individuals’ investment decisions are taken
before production takes place. Thus firm takes H as given.
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Given perfect capital mobility, perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the first-
order conditions of the firm’s optimization problem uniquely determines the capital-labor
ratio (K/H) and the wage per unit of efficiency of labor, w6.
6.2.2 Individuals
At any date (t) a generation of individuals is alive. Agents are identical with respect to
preferences, investment opportunity, and access to credit. They differ according to inherited
wealth, at. Gt (·) is the distribution of wealth in period t. Given perfect credit markets,
agents can freely reallocate their resources across periods of life, thus to simplify the analysis
we abstract from intertemporal consumption choice. Agents live for a single period, enjoy
consumption at the beginning of the period and bequest at the end. Each agent has only one
child, thus population is stable.
Preferences The agents derive utility from consumption c and from bequest b7. Individuals’
preferences are represented by the following Cobb-Douglas utility function
U (c, b) = log c+ β log b (6.2-2)
Resources constraint Each generation is subject to the following resources constraint
c+ b
R
= a+HW (6.2-3)
where a is financial wealth and HW is human wealth and R = 1 + r is the interest factor.
This formulation of the budget constraint, together with the preferences (6.2-2), implies that
the assumption that agents do not leave debt to future generations. Below we discuss how
the main results of the paper still hold under more general preferences and intergenerational
borrowing.
Human wealth As in efficiency wage models, consumption determines how productive the
agents are, and thus their human wealth. The simplest possible concave technology for
the transformation of consumption in human wealth is assumed. Human wealth takes the
following piece-wise linear formulation
HW = y (c) =
{
= y0 + γc if c ≤ c1
= y0 + γc1 if c ≥ c1
(6.2-4)
6 Given perfect capital mobility, capital adjusts to satisfy the FOC for the firm F1 (K,H) = F1 (K/H, 1) = r.
Thus r uniquely determines K/H, that uniquely determines w. We normalize w = 1.
7 This is a common assumption in the literature. Below we discuss how the main results of the paper hold if
this assumption is relaxed. See Banerjee [2001] for a discussion.
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where γ < 18. Our formulation can be interpreted as a reduced form of a complex investment
decision that affects agent’s productivity like in Galor / Zeira [1993] and Moav [2002]. At
the beginning of every period all agents have access to an investment opportunity, by paying
a fixed cost I, that determines their efficiency unit of labor with a return that depends on
consumption9.
6.2.3 The maximization problem
Substituting (6.2-4) into (6.2-3) we get the following resource constraint:
b =
{
= R [a+ y0 + (γ − 1) c] if c ≤ c1
= R [a+ y0 + γc1 − c] if c ≥ c1
(6.2-5)
Note that the relative price of consumption in terms of bequest is R if c ≥ c1, and (1− γ)R
if c ≤ c1.
Each generation maximizes utility (6.2-2) subject to (6.2-5). The optimal solution is
c∗ =

1
(1−γ)(1+β) (a+ y0) if a ≤ a1
c1 if a1 ≤ a ≤ a2
1
1+β [a+ y0 + γc1] if a2 ≤ a
for consumption, and
b∗ =

Rβ
(1+β) (a+ y0) if a ≤ a1
R [a+ y0 + (γ − 1) c1] if a1 ≤ a ≤ a2
Rβ
1+β [a+ y0 + γc1] if a2 ≤ a
for bequest, where a1 = c1 [(1− γ) (1 + β)]− y0 and a2 = c1 [(1 + β)− γ]− y0.
The result is due to the piece-wise linear formulation of y (c). For a general function y (c)
with y′ (c) > 0 and y′′ (c) < 0 the FOC for an interior solution is
MRS = b
cβ
= R
[
1− y′ (c)] (6.2-6)
Equation (6.2-6) underlines the basic intuition behind the result: higher wealth implies
higher consumption, and lower y′ (c). The cost of leaving bequests in terms of consumption,
−R [1− y′ (c)], is lower for rich than for poor agents. Thus rich agents will tend to leave
relatively more bequest10.
8 Linearity is assumed only for simplicity. Instead we restrict to γ < 1 because the consumer will only choose
an allocation such as y′ (c) < 1. The main results of the paper do not depend on either of these assumptions.
9 If there were credit markets imperfections, poor agents would be prevented from the investment opportunity
by the fixed cost I. This does not happen in this model.
10 See Gersovitz [1983] for a formal proof. In this general setting a poverty trap can emerge if human wealth is
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6.2.4 The steady-state equilibrium: the poverty trap
Given demographic assumptions, across generations at+1 = bt holds. Thus the evolution of
wealth can be represented by the following difference equation
at+1 = b∗t =

Rβ
1+β (at + y0) if at ≤ a1
R [at + y0 + (γ − 1) c1] if a1 ≤ at ≤ a2
Rβ
1+β [at + y0 + γc1] if at ≥ a2
(6.2-7)
In what follows we will assume that R < 1 + 1/β. If this does not hold, bequest is so cheap
in terms of consumption that wealth level would never converge11. If Figure 6.1 represents
the the evolution of wealth (6.2-7), then a poverty trap emerges:
at+1
ata1 a2a
* a**a0
45o
at+1 = f (at)
Figure 6.1: The evolution of individual wealth
the agents born poor, with initial wealth a < a = [(1− γ) c1 − y0]R/ (R− 1) will become
poor in steady-state, with a wealth level a∗ = y0 [1 + β (1−R)] / (1 + β). Instead rich agents
(a > a) will end up in the high steady state wealth level a∗∗ = (y0 + γc1) [1 + β (1−R)] / (1 + β).
assumed (similarly to Dasgupta and Ray, 1986) to be a non-concave function of consumption like
y (c) =
{
0 if c < c0
y˜ (c− c0) if c ≥ c0
with y˜ (0) = 0, y˜′ (c) > 0 and y˜′′ (c) < 0.
11 This is a common assumption in the literature, see Galor / Zeira [1993].
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By examination of Figure 6.1, it is clear that the conditions for a poverty trap to emerge
are:
• a1 < a: this implies c1/y0 > 1/ [(1− γ) (1 + β − βR)] . In words, this says that c1 must
be big with respect to y0 otherwise no agent remains trapped;
• a2 > a: if γ is big enough, γ > (1 + β − βR), this condition reduces to c1/y0 > 0 which
is always satisfied. If γ is small the condition implies c1/y0 < 1/ (1 + β − βR− γ). In
words, this means that bequests are not too costly in terms of consumption and thus
some of the agents will manage to escape poverty.
Under these conditions the steady-state equilibrium depends on the initial distribution of
wealth G0 (·). In steady-state the number of poor is Poor =
∫ a
0 dG0 (a), the number of agents
initially below the threshold wealth level a, while the rich are Rich =
∫∞
a dG0 (a). Since
a∗ < a1, poor agents consume less than c1, so their efficiency of labor is less than the rich
one. Efficiency of labor in the economy could be improved by a one-shot redistribution policy
that allows some agents to overcome the threshold without allowing anybody to fall below12.
6.3 Conclusions
In this note it is shown that, contrary to what is considered in the literature, an individual
poverty trap may arise even in an economy without credit market imperfections. Under the
assumption that the productivity of agents depends on their consumption, poor agents may be
stuck in a low wealth-low productivity equilibrium. Moreover one-shot redistributing policies
improve aggregate efficiency of labor in steady state. This result is common in the individual
poverty trap literature, but in this case the policy implications are strikingly different. While
a poverty trap generated by credit market imperfections calls both for improvements of credit
markets (titling of assets, microfinance programs, reform of legal system, credit scores...) and
for redistribution, the latter is usually considered to be socially too costly. Instead, in this
model redistribution is indeed the only way to improve steady state efficiency of labor in the
economy.
12 These results are robust to a general specification that allows for both dynastic preferences and perfect
credit markets between generations, that were implicitly ruled out by equations (6.2-2) and (6.2-3). In this
setting the time allocation of income across generations is irrelevant for their decisions. Thus we can collapse
the infinite horizon problem into a static problem of the form
max
c
u (c)
s.t. c = a+ y (c)
which has a corner solution c = a+ y (c) . This implicitly defines a concave relation between a and c. Thus an
egalitarian redistribution of wealth increases average consumption and thus productivity.
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